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In the early 1990s, antitrust law on both sides of the Atlantic appeared
to have reached a consensus that predatory pricing required proof of below-
cost prices.' But the last few years have witnessed a surprising movement
toward prohibiting firms from responding to entry with above-cost price
cuts. The European courts got things rolling with a 1996 decision holding it
illegal for monopolists to adopt selective above-cost price cuts that
sacrificed revenue in order to eliminate entrants.2 Then, in 1998, the United
States Department of Transportation proposed a regulation banning major
incumbent airlines from reacting to entry with above-cost price cuts or
capacity increases that resulted in "substantially" lower short-term profits
than alternative pricing would have.3 In May 1999, the United States
Department of Justice brought the American Airlines litigation based on the
similar theory that it was predatory to respond to entry with business
practices that (even if above cost) "clearly" sacrificed profits.4 This
government theory was supported by several expert economists, including
the Nobel Prize-winning professor Joseph Stiglitz. 5 And now, an important
new article by Professor Aaron Edlin proposes the even broader rule that,
when an entrant charges at least twenty percent below the prevailing price,
a monopolist cannot respond with any price cut at all for twelve to eighteen
months or until it loses its monopoly.6 All of these positions restrict reactive
above-cost price cuts (or output increases) even if they result in prices that
meet (rather than undercut) the entrant's price, on the notion that buyers
would likely stick with the incumbent unless the entrant can offer a lower
price.
The basic concept underlying these new legal developments and
proposals is hardly new. Some courts and scholars have long thought
reactive above-cost price cuts designed to drive out entrants were
predatory,7 and the idea was a standard staple of Socratic dialogue in
antitrust classes. 8 The Edlin proposal is the same as Professor Oliver E.
1. See infra Section I.A.
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See infra Section I.A.
4. See infra Section I.A.
5. See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1180, 1191 (D. Kan. 2001).
6. Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 945-46
(2002).
7. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1386-88 (9th Cir. 1983); Int'l Air
Indus., Inc. v. Am. Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975); William J. Baumol, Quasi-
Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1,
2-3 (1979); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV.
869, 885-90 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE L.J. 284, 290-92 (1977).
8. See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 178 (2d ed. 1974) (offering a typical set
of Socratic questions to present this (and other) theories of predatory pricing); 3 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 736c3, at 337 (rev. ed. 1996) (specifically
considering and rejecting an Edlin-like ban on any price reduction); 3 PHILLIP AREEDA &
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Williamson's famous 1977 proposal, except that it substitutes a ban on
incumbents lowering their price for Williamson's ban on incumbents
increasing their output for twelve to eighteen months after entry.9 Edlin's
proposal also has much in common, as he acknowledges, with Professor
William J. Baumol's ingenious 1978 idea of permitting reactive price cuts
only if they are quasi-permanent.' 0 These are legendary economists. The
approach of the European Union (EU) and the U.S. Departments, in turn,
has roots in various cases and scholarship that defined a predatory price as
one that would not maximize profits unless it could destroy or discipline
competitors." The scholars supporting this approach in writings between
1977 and 1981 included such heavy hitters as Professors Lawrence
Sullivan, Paul Joskow, Alvin Klevorick, Janusz Ordover, and Robert
Willig.
12
By the early 1990s, however, this earlier wave of theories seemed
safely buried, in an apparent triumph for the Areeda-Turner position that
predatory pricing must be below cost. But now they have resurfaced in
these modem legal developments, partly because cases and scholars
defending the cost-based rule rested on conclusory definitions and
contestable claims that above-cost restrictions were less administrable and
imposed certain short-term losses in post-entry price competition in return
for an uncertain long-term gain if the entrant remained in the market.' 3 This
never provided a satisfactory theoretical response to the critics nor
addressed practical objections to actual industry behavior under such a rule.
Critics were particularly provoked by an apparently serious problem
confronting the airline industry. 14 On many routes there is an incumbent
airline that dominates business on that route and sells at a price well above
DONALD E. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 714c (1978) (discussing but rejecting the general
theory).
9. Williamson, supra note 7, at 295-96, 333-36. This is not to say the two agree. Williamson
rejected a rule banning incumbents from lowering their prices in response to entry, which
Professor Alfred R. Oxenfeldt had proposed in 1976 testimony. Id. at 296 n.39, 318-20, 328 &
nn.109-10, 338 (refcrring to this 1970s articulation of the Edlin rule as the "price maintenance" or
"price umbrella" rule).
10. Baumol, supra note 7, at 4-6; Edlin, supra note 6, at 978. Again, this does not mean that
the differences are not substantively significant. See infra Part VI. Baumol's rule was actually first
proposed by Professors Areeda and Turner but rejected by them. Phillip Areeda & Donald F.
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 697, 708-09 (1975).
11. See infra Section [B.
12. See infra Section [B; sources cited infra note 71.
13. See infra Sections IB, 1V.E.
14. This was the direct motivation for the Department of Justice and Department of
Transportation efforts. See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145-69 (D. Kan.
2001) (recounting similar examples); Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary
Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,920-22 (proposed Apr. 10,
1998). Airlines also form the main examples motivating the Edlin analysis. See Edlin, supra note
6, at 942-43, 980-87. This concern with above-cost airline predation even goes back to Professor
Baumol. See Baumol, supra note 7, at 2.
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its costs for that route. Periodically, another airline enters the market at a
lower price. The incumbent firm then lowers its price to beat (or match) the
entrant. The incumbent never prices below its own costs. But because the
entrant has higher costs (or lower quality), it cannot compete at the new
price and is driven out of the market. Once the less efficient entrant is
safely gone, the incumbent reestablishes the old price.
The concern is that such reactive temporary price cuts not only drive
out entrants, but deter similar entry in the future, and thus allow the more
efficient incumbent to perpetuate monopoly prices that exceed the price the
next most efficient firm would charge. If so, the supposedly certain gains
from short-run post-entry price competition never arrive because the entry
never occurs, and the long-term loss is experienced with certainty every
day. Moreover, although airlines present the concern in particularly stark
form, this concern can exist in any industry where incumbent firms are
more efficient than potential entrants and exploit their market power (when
entrants are not present) to charge prices well above incumbent costs.
Indeed, if valid, this concern would overturn a general current skepticism
based on the presumption that predatory pricing is rare because it requires
the incumbent to sustain losses on a large number of sales. 15 If harmful
predation involved profitable above-cost pricing, it would be far more
plausible and prevalent.
This is a serious concern that can no longer be suppressed with
conclusory labels or contestable claims that ignore the effect on incentives
to enter. Unless more seriously addressed, these unanswered concerns about
above-cost reactive price cuts will likely continue to influence and expand
the development of legal doctrines to deal with those concerns in the United
States and Europe, both for antitrust law and regulatory agencies. And such
unaddressed concerns will bias conclusions about what counts as a cost
whenever a cost-based test is still used. It is thus time to take the idea of
restricting above-cost reactive price cuts more seriously. But it is not time
to adopt that idea. To the contrary, this Article shows that seriously
confronting the idea reveals several heretofore unappreciated flaws in such
restrictions.
First, such restrictions will often penalize efficient pricing behavior
when incumbents do not even have the market power to restrict output. This
is because, in many competitive markets, incumbent firms maximize their
ability to incur common costs (and thus create output) by charging high-
15. See, e.g., 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 723b, at
273-74 (2d ed. 2002) (collecting sources and linking them to the argument that the rareness of
predatory pricing means courts are more likely to condemn desirable pricing erroneously than
condemn predatory pricing correctly). But see Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (arguing that modem economic
literature contravenes earlier claims that below-cost predatory pricing was irrational).
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demand buyers higher prices to get them to cover a disproportionate share
of recurring common costs, and charging low-demand customers lower
prices that are closer to firms' marginal costs once these common costs are
incurred. Competition or low entry barriers will ensure that overall revenue
from this output-maximizing price-discrimination schedule does not exceed
economic costs. This probably describes airlines, which do not earn positive
economic profits but do charge more for a ticket that offers one nonstop
flight than for the same flight when bundled with a connecting flight. An
entrant who cherry-picks by selling only to the high-value customers at a
lower price will thus undercut an output-maximizing price schedule. In
order to continue to cover common costs, incumbents will have to react to
such entry by lowering their prices to those high-value customers. This
reactive above-cost price cut will drive a less efficient entrant out of the
market. But this does not mean that the price cut protected incumbent
market power and harmed efficiency and consumer welfare. To the
contrary, it means that the initial discriminatory pricing schedule never
indicated market power, and that allowing the normal competitive process
of price cuts to drive out the entrant restores the market to an efficient and
output-maximizing state.
Second, even if the incumbent does have market power, and we
(heroically) assume away the difficulties of implementing the restrictions,
the effects of these restrictions are generally undesirable. This is not
because, as commonly supposed, the restrictions exchange a certain short-
term loss for an uncertain long-term gain.1 6 To the contrary, it turns out to
be futile to try to encourage long-term entry with restrictions on reactive
above-cost price cuts. Less efficient firms will be driven out when any
restriction expires by passage of time or loss of monopoly power and thus
will confer no long-term benefit. Firms that are or will become equally
efficient will enter and stay in the market even with the prospect of above-
cost price cuts and thus will not be encouraged by the restriction. Further,
while the restrictions will normally inflict short-term losses, this is not
certain. Sometimes the restrictions may weakly encourage additional entry
by less efficient firms by marginally prolonging the short-run period during
which such entrants can remain in the market, though only if the additional
short-run profits provide the marginal profits necessary to make total short-
run entrant profits cover entry costs. But even in such cases the effects on
prices are mixed because a restriction on reactive price cuts can give
incumbents perverse incentives to raise post-entry prices to speed the day
when the restriction expires. Further, the restrictions will clearly increase
prices and harm consumer welfare in the lion's share of cases, when
entrants are (or will become) equally efficient or when less efficient
16. See infra Sections IB, IV.E (collecting current sources stating that this is the trade-off).
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entrants would have entered even without the restrictions. And in all cases,
the restrictions will lower productive efficiency and impose wasteful
transition costs. Worse, the restrictions will lessen important incentives to
create more efficient entrants and incumbents, which will mean higher costs
and lower product quality for society generally.
Third, these adverse effects are worsened by implementation
difficulties that are not avoidable but are rather an inevitable consequence
of trying to regulate firm pricing, output, and responsiveness to entry.
While prior analysis has assumed an unambiguous moment of entry, in fact
that moment has many possible definitions. Defining entry as the moment
when the entrant actually begins sales would, given the normal lead time
for entry, allow the incumbent to make anticipatory price cuts that have the
same effect as reactive ones. So would any definition of the moment of
entry that does not coincide with the time when entry is first foreseeable.
Defining entry as an earlier moment when entry is foreseeable (such as
when the entrant first begins to plan for entry) would likely mean any
twelve- to eighteen-month restriction would expire by the time the entry
starts. One might try to avoid the latter problem by lengthening the period
of the price restriction, but the longer the period of restriction, the greater
the inefficiencies that will result from uncertainties or inflexibilities in the
price floors or output ceilings in the face of changing market conditions.
Further, any definition of entry that begins before the entrant actually
begins sales means that incumbent prices would be artificially elevated
during a period when this is not offset by possibly lower entrant prices, thus
worsening the likely mix of effects. Another difficulty is that any price
floor or output ceiling will provoke inefficient increases in product quality,
and any effort to clamp down on that by restricting product enhancements
will hamper efficient innovation. Finally, any price floor or output ceiling
will create additional inefficiencies because it will either embody an
inflexible rule, which will cause inefficiencies in market pricing or output
given changing market conditions, or a flexible standard, which will create
similar inefficiencies because of application imprecision and uncertainties.
The above implementation difficulties cannot be dismissed as mere
administrative concerns because their effect is to raise prices, hamper
market flexibility, and distort innovation. These harms must thus be added
to all the other adverse effects noted above.
In sum, the restrictions will not have any benefit outside the limited
case where less efficient entrants face entry costs that are not so low that
they would have entered without a restriction and not so high that they
cannot recoup with short-run entry, but are in that intermediate range where
the marginal prolongation of short-run profits encourages them to engage in
hit-and-run short-term entry and exit against an incumbent who was really
exercising pre-entry market power. And even in that case, the net effects are
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mixed without considering implementation difficulties, and become worse
when we do. Further, the restrictions will have clear adverse effects for
cases involving any other sort of entrant and also discourage investment
and innovation in creating more efficient firms.
These points are all entirely separate from the lively debate about
whether below-cost predatory pricing should be banned. Many scholars
think even below-cost pricing should be legal because it inflicts greater
losses on the predator than its victims, rarely garners a future recoupment
that compensates for losses given time and uncertainty discounts, and can
be thwarted by entrant or consumer counterstrategies, all of which make
below-cost pricing self-deterring and too irrational to be credible. 7 Others
have reached a different conclusion based mainly on arguments about
differential access to capital to cover losses, multimarket reputational
effects, imperfect information, or efforts to mislead rivals (or the capital
markets that might fund rivals) about predator efficiency or market
conditions. 8 This Article takes no position on these disputed issues about
the desirability of banning below-cost predatory pricing. Rather, I focus on
the separate theoretical grounds for rejecting any restriction on above-cost
predatory pricing.
Underlying all these arguments, however, is the fundamental question
of how to define "costs," an issue now normally resolved by rather
atheoretical judgment calls that result in a murky and unsatisfactory
doctrine. Any definition of "costs" for a doctrine that bans below-cost
pricing but not above-cost pricing must reflect the rationale for treating the
two differently. The rationale for treating above-cost pricing as permissible
depends, as the above summary makes clear, on the assumption that above-
cost pricing could not deter or drive out an equally efficient entrant.
Likewise, the rationale for banning below-cost pricing must be that (if firms
did engage in it) such pricing could deter or drive out an equally efficient
entrant. It thus makes sense that, if one is going to have a doctrine against
below-cost predatory pricing, "costs" should be defined in whatever way
satisfies the condition that an above-cost price could not deter or drive out
an equally efficient firm. This test has important implications for which cost
measure to use. In particular, it clarifies several longstanding problems in
defining the relevant costs for predatory pricing, including what to do when
industries have near-zero marginal costs, when equally efficient firms have
differing variable costs, when all firms in declining industries have
17. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 269-304, 333-37 (1981); Janusz A. Ordover, Predatory Pricing, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 77, 79 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
(collecting sources).
18. See Bolton et al., supra note 15, at 2247-49, 2285-330 (synthesizing the recent literature);
Ordover, supra note 17, at 79-80.
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marginal costs below their variable costs, and when an alleged predator
strategically times low prices after it has made capital investments (and thus
has low variable costs) but the rival is deciding whether to do the same. In
this way, our inquiry into why above-cost prices are not predatory will
reveal something important about the nature of what is predatory.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF LEGAL FLUX AND SCHOLARLY DEBATE
Cost-based tests of predatory pricing have been changed or challenged
in recent years in ways that suggest legal developments have been, and will
continue to be, influenced by the underlying debate on above-cost predatory
pricing. After detailing these legal developments, I explain why the largely
conclusory points offered by both sides in the current legal and scholarly
debate cannot resolve the issue in either direction, which instead requires
the more in-depth analysis that the balance of this Article takes up.
A. Legal Developments and Ambiguities
In the early 1990s, the law on predatory pricing appeared relatively
settled. In 1991, the European Court of Justice held in AKZO that when a
firm with dominant market power prices below average variable costs,
those prices are presumed abusive, and that when it prices above average
variable costs but below average total costs,1 9 its prices are abusive if they
are intended to eliminate a competitor.2 0 This seemed to imply that prices
above average total costs could not be abusive even if coupled with such an
intent. In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brooke decided that one
necessary element of predatory pricing was proof that the defendant priced
below incremental costs.21 Brooke did not resolve which measure of costs
19. A fixed cost is a cost that does not vary with output levels. A variable cost is a cost that
varies with output levels. Total costs arc the sum of fixed and variable costs. Average variable
costs are the sum of variable costs divided by output. Average total costs are the sum of total costs
divided by output. Average total cost thus always exceeds average variable cost since it is the sum
of average fixed and variable costs. See 3 AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 15, 735b3, at
367; DFNNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 28-35
(3d ed. 1999).
20. See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359 70-73
(E.C.J.). Just as section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Act makes it illegal to have monopoly power and
engage in unilateral exclusionary conduct, EU Treaty 86 makes it illegal to have a dominant
position and engage in unilateral abusive conduct. Id. 34-75. But U.S. and EU case law
sometimes differ in the precise degree of market power necessary to satisfy the first element, and
the type of conduct deemed to anticompetitively violate the second element.
21. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993).
In addition to requiring prices below incremental costs, Brooke required proof of two other
elements whose precise definition varied with the antitrust statute in question: (I) sufficient
market power to have the requisite anticompetitive effect in the market where the predatory
pricing is occurring, and (2) a sufficient likelihood of recouping the investment in below-cost
prices after rivals were eliminated or disciplined. Id. at 224-26 (adopting somewhat higher
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should be used. 22 But there appeared to be a transatlantic consensus that
unilaterally set prices had to be below some measure of costs to be
considered predatory or illegal.
But now, the law on above-cost predatory pricing is in a considerable
state of flux. In 1996, the European Court of First Instance in Compagnie
Maritime sustained a European Commission ruling that it constituted an
abuse of a dominant position to adopt a "fighting ships" strategy of
responding to entry by making selective price cuts even though the
resulting prices were above costs.2 3 The Commission relied on three factors:
(1) the price cuts were reactive and selective, having been adopted in
response to entry and only for those ships whose sailing dates directly
competed with the entrant; (2) the reduced prices met (and once beat) the
entrant; and (3) the price cuts reduced defendant profits compared to what
they would have been with higher prices.24 The Commission got around
AKZO by saying that, although this practice was not "predatory" pricing, it
was nonetheless abusive. 25 The Court of First Instance affirmed, ruling that
these three objective criteria meant that the reactive above-cost price cuts
did not reflect "normal competition" and were thus abusive.26 The court
also suggested more broadly that any above-cost price cut (or other
conduct) whose "real purpose" was to strengthen a dominant position by
eliminating a competitor was illegal, noting internal documents indicating
that the defendant's purpose was "getting rid" of any independent
competitors.27
The European Court of Justice affirmed, declining to rule generally on
when it was illegal for a dominant firm to make selective above-cost price
cuts to meet a entrant, but holding that such price cuts were illegal when the
firm had over 90% market share and had the avowed purpose of eliminating
standards of market power and recoupment likelihood under section 2 of the Sherman Act than
under the Robinson-Patman Act). The European Court of First Instance has interpreted EU law to
reject any requirement to prove a likelihood that the defendant could recoup predatory prices. See
Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5951 7 39-44 (E.C.J.) (affirming the
interpretation of the European Court of First Instance). It has also rejected the proposition that the
dominant position and predatory pricing have to be in the same market, as long as the firm has a
dominant position in some market and the leading position in the market where the predatory
pricing happened. Id. However, the EU Advocate General had opined that EU law should properly
be interpreted to require a recoupment test, see Joined Cases C-395/96 P & C-396/96 P,
Compagnie Maritime Beige Transps. SA v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1365 136 (Opinion of
Advocate Gen.), and the European Court of Justice has not yet ruled on the issue.
22. See 509 U.S. at 222 n.1; see also infra text accompanying note 47.
23. Joined Cases T-24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93 & T-28/93, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transps.
SA v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 11-1201 7 138-153 (Ct. First Instance). This case often goes
under the name Cewal.
24. ld. 71 139-141.
25. Id. 129, 139.
26. Id. 144-145, 148, 153.
27. Id. I 146-148.
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the entrant.28 Likewise, in Irish Sugar, the European Court of First Instance
held that it was illegal for a firm with 88% market share to engage in
above-cost price cuts that were selectively adopted at the border in order to
29
deter entry from an importer.
So, at a minimum, European law now makes it illegal for a firm with a
market share near 90% to respond to entry with above-cost price cuts that
are selectively limited to the areas where the entrant competes for the
purpose of driving that entrant out. Which other above-cost price cuts might
be illegal under European law remains unclear. But the cases suggest that
European doctrine might ultimately be interpreted to mean that any above-
cost price cut made by a monopolist in reaction to entry is illegal if intended
to drive out an entrant, and that such an intent can be established not just by
subjective evidence but by objective proof that the resulting price failed to
maximize the monopolist's short-run profits.
The law regarding above-cost predatory pricing has also been in some
flux on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1998, the U.S. Department of
Transportation proposed a regulation banning major incumbent airlines in
their hub markets from responding to entrants by cutting prices (or
expanding capacity) to a level that, although above-cost, resulted in
"substantially" lower short-term profits than alternative pricing (or
capacity) would have. 30 The Department of Transportation limited its
proposed regulation to "major" carriers in their "hub markets" based on
evidence that prices in those hub markets were higher than prices
elsewhere. 31 The Department assumed that this effectively established a
market power to charge supracompetitive prices in those hub markets,32 but
did not say it would require a degree of market power sufficient to
constitute monopoly power. After receiving comments, the Department of
Transportation at the end of the Clinton Administration announced a
decision to pursue this strategy by adjudication rather than by regulation.33
28. Joined Cases C-395/96 P & C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transps. SA v.
Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1365 J 117-120 (E.C.J.). The Court noted that it would be different
if the selective price cuts were justified by lower costs on those sailings. Id. 101.
29. Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar PLC v. Commission, 1999 EC.R. 11-2969 173-193 (Ct.
First Instance), affd on other grounds, C-497/99 P, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5333 (E.C.J.). The Court also
emphasized that the selectivity of the price cuts was not justified by lower costs in those areas,
just by the existence of competition the firm wished to deter. Id. 173, 188. The Court suggested
that there might be an exception to this doctrine if the entrant priced below cost. Id. 185.
30. Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation
Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,920 (proposed Apr. 10, 1998).
31. Id.
32. Id. It is not at all clear such evidence does actually show market power in individual
routes. See infra Part II1.
33. See U.S. Dep't of Transp., Docket No. OST-98-3713-1846, Enforcement Policy
Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry: Findings and
Conclusions on the Economic, Policy, and Legal Issues 4 (Jan. 17, 2001), at http://dmses.dot.gov/
docimages/pdf59/121521 web.pdf.
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This regulatory proposal illustrated an important point. Even if barred
by antitrust law, theories for banning above-cost predatory pricing can
influence the myriad of regulatory agencies that have the power to adopt
different rules for a particular industry. True, the Bush Department of
Transportation itself seems unlikely to pursue such an approach since its
new head filed comments opposing the proposed regulation before he took
office. 34 But no administration is forever, and there remain plenty of other
federal or state regulators who might find the proposal more attractive.
Thus, the issue would remain important in the United States even if federal
antitrust law were settled.
But in fact, federal antitrust law is not so settled. Notwithstanding
Brooke, the U.S. Department of Justice in May 1999 brought the American
Airlines litigation based largely on the same theory as the Department of
Transportation regulation. 35 Like the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Justice's general theory was that it must be predatory for a
monopolist of an airline route to respond to entry by expanding capacity or
lowering prices in a way that sacrificed short-term profits (even if prices
were still above cost) since such a strategy could only be explained by the
long-run goal of driving the entrant out of the market. 36 In the alternative,
and in an effort to stay within Brooke, the Department nonetheless offered
four possible cost tests. Two of the cost tests used a measure of fully
allocated total airline costs that the Department is no longer pressing on
appeal. 7 The other two cost tests, which are being pressed on appeal along
34. See Norman Y. Mineta, Docket No. OST-1998-3713-814, Comments to the Department
of Transportation's Proposed Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclu~ionary Conduct in the
Air Transportation Industry (July 24, 1999), at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf28/
38425_web.pdf.
35. See Complaint of United States, United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D.
Kan. 1999) (No. 99-1180-JTM), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/2438.htm.
36. See Brief for Appellant United States at 25, 29-31, AMR Corp. (10th Cir. Jan. 11, 2002)
(No. 01-3202) [hereinafter U.S. Appellate Brief], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f9800/9814.pdf; Redacted Memorandum in Support of the Response of the United States in
Opposition to American's Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, 17, 19-22, AMR Corp. (No. 99-
I I80-JTM) [hereinafter U.S. Summary Judgment Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cascs/f7600/7665.pdf.
37. These two tests (called Test Two and Test Three) measured whether total revenue on the
route was less than fully allocated total airline costs for the route either generally (Test Three) or
after the allegedly predatory capacity increases (Test Two). See AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at
1179, 1203; see also id. at 1175-78 (describing fully allocated cost measures). The district court
rejected these tests for two reasons. First, they used total costs rather than incremental costs. Id. at
1203. Second, they reflected an arbitrary allocation to individual routes of the joint costs incurred
by running a hub-and-spoke flight system. Id. at 1203-04. Given that the Department defined the
market as the individual route, this meant this cost measure included costs incurred in markets
other than the one in which the alleged predatory pricing was occurring. See generally infra Part
III (discussing hub-and-spoke airline economics). The government has not appealed the rejection
of these two cost-based tests. See U.S. Appellate Brief, supra note 36, at 1-71.
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with its general theory that sacrificing profits is predatory, 38 are of more
interest here.
Test One measured whether profits on the route declined after the
capacity was added, concluding that if it did then the incremental cost of the
capacity increase exceeded its incremental revenue. 39 But this test
necessarily takes into account the fact that adding the incremental capacity
lowered prices (and thus profits) on the nonincremental flights. This
amounts to requiring a monopolist to equate marginal revenue and costs,
which is precisely the sort of calculation that causes economics texts to
predict a monopolist will harm consumer welfare by setting a profit-
maximizing monopoly price that is above marginal cost.40 Thus, although
framed as a test of the revenue and cost of the incremental added capacity,
this test in effect either subtracted forgone profits on the rest of the route
from "revenue" or added those forgone profits to "costs"---either of which
converted the seeming price-cost test into a profit-maximizing obligation.
For example, suppose an airline earned $20.6 million on a route that
cost $18 million to operate, and was contemplating adding a flight that
would cost $500,000 to operate, bring in $1 million in revenue from
passengers on that flight, but reduce revenue for the rest of the route by
$600,000 down to $20 million. Under Test One, the Department would not
compare the additional flight's $1 million in revenue to its $500,000 in
costs. Instead, the Department would condemn the capacity addition as
predatory because it reduced profits from $2.6 million to $2.5 million. This
effectively either (a) subtracts from the flight's $1 million in revenue the
$600,000 in profits forgone on the rest of the route (resulting in an
incremental revenue of $400,000 that was less than the $500,000 in that
flight's costs), or (b) adds to the $500,000 in costs the opportunity cost of
the forgone profits on the rest of the route (resulting in an incremental cost
of $1.1 million that exceeded the flight's $1 million in revenue). While I
will defer until Part II how one should measure costs, it is vital for
analytical clarity to avoid using cost measures that effectively include
forgone profits. Otherwise, one cannot keep predatory theories based on a
failure to maximize short-term profits analytically distinct from theories
based on pricing below costs. The district court rejected this effort to
redefine revenue and costs in a way that imposed a duty to maximize
38. U.S. Appellate Brief, supra note 36, at 21-22, 25, 29-31, 48-50.
39. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1179, 1200; U.S. Appellate Brief, supra note 36, at 21-22;
U.S. Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 36, at 31.
40. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 87-92; ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 334-52 (1989).
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profits, as have other courts in the past.41 But, surprisingly, the Bush
Administration has appealed the rejection of this cost test.
42
The Department's other test compared the revenue earned from the
passengers on the added capacity to the incremental costs of the added
capacity. 43 The district court concluded that this was also a profit-
maximization test, citing testimony by Department of Justice expert
Professor Stiglitz that this test also embodied a requirement that the
defendant not pass up a clearly more profitable alternative.44 But while this
accurately characterized Test One, this other test condemned a capacity
increase only if it was by itself money-losing in the sense that the revenue
earned on the new capacity was less than the cost of adding that capacity,
thus putting aside any effect the capacity increase might have on prices and
profits on the nonincremental capacity. For example, the hypothetical
described in the paragraph above would not be predatory under this test
because the $1 million in revenue for the additional capacity was greater
than its $500,000 cost. Thus, this test was not the same as a profit-
maximization test; instead, it amounted to avoiding capacity increases the
cost of which inefficiently exceeded their revenue. Unfortunately, the
government's briefing did not emphasize this distinction, probably because
its general theory (and Stiglitz's) was that it was predatory to sacrifice
short-run profits in order to drive out a rival. Instead, it defended this test
along with Test One on the grounds that it did not require profit-
maximization, but only an examination into whether the capacity expansion
was clearly less profitable than the alternative of not expanding capacity. 5
The district court correctly rejected this as mere semantics, holding there
was no substantive difference between a claimed duty to choose a "more"
profitable alternative and a duty to "maximize" profits, though the court
somewhat unfairly failed to acknowledge that the Department position did
condemn only business practices that "clearly" did not maximize short-term
profits .46
41. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1998); AAMR
Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80, 1200-02; William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the
Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. & EcoN. 49, 71 n.20 (1996) (collecting cases).
42. See U.S. Appellate Brief, supra note 36, at 21-22, 48-50.
43. This test was called Test Four. See AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1180; U.S. Appellate
Brief, supra note 36, at 22; U.S. Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 36, at 31-32.
44. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1180, 1200-03.
45. U.S. Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 36, at 31-32. On appeal, the Department has
unfortunately continued to lump together Test Four and Test One and defend them based on this
unpersuasive argument, rather than distinguishing the two tests on the ground that one requires
avoiding capacity increases that fail to maximize profits, whereas the other test only requires
avoiding capacity increases that by themselves lose money. See U.S. Appellate Brief, supra note
36, at 48-50.
46. See AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1180, 1202. The district court also rejected this test
based on two other grounds. First, it believed that the average variable cost for the route as a
whole was the only appropriate measure of costs because the route was the alleged market. Id. at
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 112: 681
However this case comes out, the temptation to redefine price and cost
in a way that effectively prohibits reactive price cuts that sacrifice short-
term profits will remain strong for any court or enforcement agency
persuaded by the underlying theory that such reactive price cuts are
undesirable regardless of the predator's true costs. Even if federal antitrust
courts are not willing to go quite so far, theoretical concerns about reactive
above-cost price cuts continue to influence U.S. courts as to which cost
measure to use under Brooke. In particular, federal courts remain divided
on whether to retain antitrust review for pricing that is above marginal or
variable costs but below average total costs. 47 There are many other reasons
to disagree about which cost measure to use, including which best assures
that equally efficient firms will not be excluded in particular cases. 48 But
courts allowing claims above marginal or variable costs, including most
notably the Tenth Circuit in the decision on which the American Airlines
litigation was based, have also been influenced by the same concerns that
underlie the proposals to ban monopolists from using reactive above-cost
price cuts to drive out entrants.49
Nor have U.S. courts been shy about changing antitrust law in more
dramatic ways as theories of antitrust economics develop. The list of
antitrust cases overruled as a result of new economic theory is long
1196, 1198-200, 1202-03. For reasons explained below, this is incorrect as a categorical or even
presumptive proposition. Normally, the appropriate measure of variable costs (if equally efficient
entrants are to be protected) is not the variable cost of producing the predator's entire output, but
the variable cost of making the additional predatory output that replaces the output of the alleged
victim. See infra Section II.C. Still, it may be appropriate to look to the route as a whole if adding
the incremental capacity has positive or negative externalities for the rest of the route-such as
when adding flights to complete a schedule of hourly flights offers a collective convenience and
flexibility that increases demand for all the flights. The district court suggested that such positive
externalities might have existed, though in a way that suggested no proof had been introduced on
the issue. See AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. Second, the district court objected that the
incremental costs of adding capacity were measured by comparing costs with the additional
capacity to what the costs were before adding the capacity, rather than comparing them to what
the costs would have been during the period of predation without the additional capacity. Id. at
1202. The court noted that increases in fuel or labor costs over time could undermine a
prepredation baseline. Id. This seems correct, though prepredation costs should be an accurate and
convenient baseline absent any evidence of an exogenous increase in costs during this time, and
the Department on appeal has noted that it introduced evidence, ignored by the district court, that
its expert in fact did account for the possibility of such exogenous increases. See U.S. Appellate
Brief, supra note 36, at 52.
47. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 723d2, at 278-79, 724c3, at 289-92,
737b-c, at 394-402, 739, at 413, 741a-c, at 441-45, 741e, at 449-53, 741f, at 456-57
(collecting the surprisingly diverse appellate authorities).
48. See infra Part 11.
49. See, e.g., Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639, 648-49
(10th Cir. 1987) (condemning prices above variable costs but below total costs because the
defendant dropped prices sharply when faced with a rival and then raised prices back to high
levels once the rival exited, and in doing so was knowingly sacrificing short-term profits to drive
out its rivals).
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indeed. 50 Here that possibility is enhanced because many regard Brooke's
statement requiring below-cost pricing as dicta. 51 Thus, the existing Brooke
rule might well be changed if federal antitrust courts come to accept the
economic critique. State antitrust courts are also not bound by Brooke and
are thus free to adopt different interpretations of state antitrust law. And
statutory amendment is always possible if Congress or state legislatures
become convinced of the merits of proposals to ban above-cost predatory
pricing.
In any event, we have long since passed the time when only U.S. law
matters in antitrust. With European unification, its markets are often as
important as U.S. markets. Further, markets are increasingly globalizing,
and the United States and European Union effectively have concurrent
antitrust jurisdiction over global markets. This means the EU position on
antitrust issues is not just relevant but generally matters more because, as
the more aggressive antitrust enforcement agency, it effectively defines the
line between legality and illegality in global markets. 2 If U.S. antitrust law
50. See, e.g., State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling the per se rule against vertical
maximum price-fixing announced in a prior Supreme Court case); Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (overruling the doctrine that a corporation could
conspire with a wholly owned subsidiary); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977) (overruling the per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints announced in a prior
Supreme Court case); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (holding that the
per se rule against tying required independent proof of tying market power, even though prior
cases had riot required such proof). Even Justice Scalia has written an opinion for the Court
agreeing that, despite his own penchant for textual interpretations and the supposed super-strong
presumption against overturning statutory precedent, courts are free to develop and change federal
antitrust law in a common-law fashion. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
731-33 (1988).
51. Because the actual ground for the decision in Brooke was that the plaintiff failed to
establish likely rccoupment, prominent scholars have characterized as dicta its statement requiring
below-cost pricing. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 723d2, at 280, 724, at 284,
724c3, at 289, 735a, at 365, 737a, at 393-94, 738a, at 405. But any holding requiring
recoupment implicitly requires pricing that incurs some sort of loss, otherwise there is nothing to
recoup, as Edlin acknowledges. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 942 n.5. Although this forecloses
Edlin's own approach, requiring a likelihood of recoupment does not (as Edlin supposes, id.)
necessarily foreclose all bans on above-cost predatory pricing. In particular, it would not
necessarily foreclose the Department of Justice position banning only reactive above-cost price
cuts that sacrifice short-term profits, a "loss" that could be said to be "recouped" after the entrant
exits. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 726c, at 305 (stating that recoupment can
be of forgone profits). This position might find obstacles, given Court language requiring a
likelihood of the defendant "recouping its investment in below-cost prices," and interpreting its
past cases to hold that lowering prices to an above-cost level cannot inflict antitrust injury. Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993). Nonetheless, one
could imagine the argument that, strictly speaking, this phrasing and interpretation were also
dicta, and that the narrow holding was to require only proof of some recoupment. My point is not
to resolve that issue here, but only to observe that these arguments about Brooke's requirement of
below-cost pricing possibly being dicta marginally increase the likelihood of a change in law (or
could serve as the pretext for one) if such a change were deemed desirable as a matter of antitrust
policy.
52. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 Declaring a Concentration To Be
Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement: Case No. COMP/M.2220-
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does not prohibit above-cost predatory pricing and EU law does, then on
global markets it is the European doctrine that trumps. There is thus
considerable practical import both in the United States and the European
Union in dispelling transatlantic economic theories about above-cost
predatory pricing that might influence the development of legal doctrine by
the more aggressive courts or regulators of either place.
53
B. The Inadequacy of Traditional Responses in Either Direction
Why has the early 1990s case law that seemingly established the cost-
based rule proven so vulnerable? Probably because the underlying concerns
about above-cost predatory pricing have never been satisfactorily
addressed. One unfortunate tendency has been to declare victory by
definition-asserting that a "predatory" price must be below cost or that
General Electric/Honeywell, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/
m2220_en.pdf (prohibiting a merger approved by the U.S. Department of Justice).
53. However, some recent cases suggest the importance of emphasizing that the issue
whether and when a straight price that is above cost should be illegal must be distinguished from
the situation when a seller conditions an above-cost discount on the buyer's taking all or a high
percentage of its purchases from the seller. Two recent decisions applying Brooke to the latter
contain language indicating they may have mistakenly confused the issues. See LePage's Inc. v.
3M, Nos. 00-1368 & 00-1473, 2002 WL 46961, at *9-11, 14 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2002), vacatedfbr
reh 'g en banc, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12419 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2002); Concord Boat v. Brunswick
Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 2000). But in fact the condition means that the latter,
while not constituting predatory pricing, can amount to de facto exclusive dealing under both U.S.
law, see 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 768b2, at 148; 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 1 1807a-b, at 115-18 (1998), and European law, see Case 322/81, NV
Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461 75-86 (E.C.J.);
Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461 89-91 (E.C.J.);
Commission Decision 2000/74/EC of 14 July 1999 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty (IV/D-2/34.780-Virgin/British Airways), 2000 O.J. (L 30) 1, 20-21. Other
language in LePage's and Concord Boat indicates that the courts recognized this doctrine but
mistakenly assumed that a discount was not conditioned when a higher discount amount depended
on the buyer purchasing a high percentage from the defendant or when the buyer voluntarily
agreed to accept the discount. LePage's, 2002 WL 46961, at * 12; Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at
1044-45, 1059-60, 1063-64. Still, there is other language indicating that the actual holdings of the
cases can be limited to the proposition that the claims of de facto exclusive dealing were not
supported by sufficient proof that the discounts produced substantial market-share foreclosure.
See LePage's, 2002 WL 46961, at *12-13; Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1059-60.
If loyalty rebates were never illegal unless the resulting price were below cost, then any firm
could immunize its exclusive-dealing agreements from antitrust scrutiny by the simple expedient
of inflating the price and then offering a rebate conditioned on exclusivity. A key reason to treat
such loyalty rebates differently is that, by foreclosing the market share rivals need to reach the
minimum efficient scale, loyalty rebates can raise rivals' costs or exclude them from the market
altogether. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Stephen C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986)
(describing how foreclosure can raise rivals' costs). When they do so, they exclude rivals not by
virtue of advantages they earned by improving their own efficiency, but by reducing their rivals'
efficiency. Rewarding the former is socially desirable. Rewarding the latter is not.
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low above-cost prices involve "competition on the merits. 54 But these are
mere formalistic labels that do not answer the substantive question
concerning what the law should define as "predatory" pricing or
"competition on the merits." Indeed, the European Commission had a very
similar test-whether reactive above-cost price cuts that intended to
eliminate rivals involved "normal competition"--and simply drew the
opposite formalistic conclusion that they do not.55 Assertions about such
formalistic labels in either direction do not really aid the inquiry.
Another unfortunate tendency has been to dismiss bans on above-cost
predatory pricing with the observation that they protect only "higher cost"
or "less efficient" firms. 56 This observation is important, but by itself does
not dictate any conclusion about the social desirability of keeping those less
efficient firms in the market, and thus should not be permitted to end the
analysis by epithet. Even less efficient firms play a useful role in
constraining the prices that more efficient firms can charge.57 If proponents
are right that restricting reactive above-cost price cuts would increase entry,
lower incumbent prices, and enhance consumer welfare, 8 then keeping less
efficient firms in the market may be desirable, 59 and courts could thus
redefine "predatory pricing" to cover (and "competition on the merits" to
exclude) any undesirable reactive above-cost price cuts.
The more substantive response has traditionally been to concede that
restricting above-cost price cuts often does have long-term benefits on entry
and pricing, but to observe that (1) they would raise short-term prices (and
lower output) following entry, and (2) it is administratively difficult to sort
out when the long-run benefits outweigh the short-run CoStS. 60 But point one
54. See, e.g., Brooke, 509 U.S. at 223; 3 AREEDA & HOVENAlMP, supra note 15, 723a, at
272; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 714c, at 161; Areeda & Turner, supra note 10, at 706-
07, 711.
55. Joined Cases T-24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93 & T-28/93, Compagnie Maritime Beige Transps.
SA v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 11-1201 130 (Ct. First Instance).
56. See, e.g., Brooke, 509 U.S. at 223; 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 736bl, at
377, 736c3, at 384; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 714c, at 161, 163; RICHARD POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 188, 193 (1976); Areeda & Turner, supra note 10,
at 711; Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337,
1339, 1342 (1978).
57. In fact, in every market there is some firm that is more efficient than the others. Workable
competition is still valuable in such markets. Indeed, even when one firm is so much more
efficient that it can be said to be dominant, the existence of the less efficient firms constrains the
pricing of the most efficient firm. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 107-18; W.
KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 164-66 (2d ed. 1995).
58. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 945-49.
59. Even if prices were lowered, there is the additional question whether this benefit to
consumer welfare offsets the loss of productive efficiency that results from transferring market
share to a less efficient produccr. See infra Part IV.
60. Brooke, 509 U.S. at 223-24; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,
231-35 (1st Cir. 1984); PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 196-97 (3d ed. 1981); 3 AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 723d2, at 277, 735a, at 364-65, 736a, at 373-75, 736b-c, at
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is hardly a satisfying riposte to the claim that the posited adverse short-run
effects never materialize, or are outweighed by long-run benefits, because
the restriction on reactive above-cost price cuts would encourage entry (or
lower everyday incumbent prices) that otherwise never would have
occurred. 61 And point two lends itself to the critique that price-cost
comparisons are themselves difficult to administer, and to efforts to make
the restrictions more administrable by banning all reactive price cuts or
output expansions (like Edlin or Williamson) or at least those that clearly or
substantially sacrifice short-term profits (like the Departments).62
For example, the leading antitrust treatise notes no particular
administrability problem with an Edlin-like ban on any price reduction, but
dismisses it with the simple observation that it would lower the incumbent's
post-entry output.6 3 Why this objection should be a show-stopper is never
explained, which seems odd since one of the authors had previously
observed that such a price-maintenance rule increased pre-entry output.
64
This treatise also considers a price floor at the short-term profit-maximizing
level (like the one developing in the European Union and proposed by the
U.S. Departments), but dismisses it purely on grounds that it is
inadministrable.
65
By the same token, the debate is also not resolved in the other direction
by asserting that reactive above-cost price cuts must be illegal because they
fit the test of being designed to maintain monopoly power by excluding
rivals. As we saw, some language in the European case law seems to
embrace this argument.66 Likewise, in the United States, proponents have
argued that reactive above-cost pricing must be illegal because it fits the
basic Grinnell test of being designed to exclude rivals and maintain
monopoly power.67 Grinnell stated:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.6
379-93; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, T 714c, 715a, at 166-68; Areeda & Turner, supra
note 10, at 708-09; Areeda & Turner, supra note 56, at 1339.
61. Edlin, supra note 6, at 945, 956, 977.
62. But see infra Part V (showing why such efforts fail).
63. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 736c3, at 383.
64. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 56, at 1340-43.
65. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 736c2, at 381-82.
66. See supra Section I.A.
67. See U.S. Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 36, at 14-15; Edlin, supra note 6, at 965.
68. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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The second element is often rephrased as requiring "exclusionary" conduct,
which is conduct that tends to exclude rivals other than "competition on the
merits. 69
But, as antitrust scholars have long understood, the problem with the
Grinnell test is that it is either wrong or conclusory. Often a firm
deliberately tries to exclude rivals and acquire or maintain monopoly power
with superior products, business acumen, or other conduct that could be
considered competition on the merits. The two are not mutually exclusive
concepts, as Grinnell's "as distinguished from" language wrongly suggests.
In practice, this tension is resolved by court decisions labeling particular
conduct that excludes rivals and enhances monopoly power as being either
"predatory" and "anticompetitive" on the one hand, or "business acumen"
and "competition on the merits" on the other. But without some underlying
normative theory to explain when to apply which label, such case law
would merely be conclusory.
Nor is the matter settled, as the European Commission and U.S.
Departments apparently thought, by evidence that the defendant has
sacrificed short-run profits and is thus engaging in behavior that could only
be profitable if it had the long-term aim of acquiring monopoly power and
earning monopoly returns. 70 True, such a definition of "predation" has long
been advanced by many courts and a long line of distinguished antitrust
scholars. 7' But the problem is that this definition would apply equally to all
69. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985).
70. See supra Section I.A.
71. Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.)
("[P]redation involves aggression against business rivals through the use of business practices that
would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation that (1) actual rivals will be
driven from the market, or the entry of potential rivals blocked or delayed, so that the predator
will gain or retain a market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be
chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds threatening to its
realization of monopoly profits."); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1386-88
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that prices above average total costs can be predatory if "'the anticipated
benefits of defendant's price depended on its tendency to discipline or eliminate competition and
thereby enhance the firm's long-term ability to reap the benefits of monopoly power"' (quoting
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035 (9th Cir.
1981))); Janich Bros. Inc. v. Am. Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Pricing is
predatory only where the firm foregoes short-term profits in order to develop a market position
such that the firm can later raise prices and recoup lost profits."); Int'l Air Indus. Inc. v. Am.
Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that pricing above average variable cost
can be predatory if "the competitor is charging a price below its short-run, profit-maximizing
price and barriers to entry arc great enough to enable the [defendant) to reap the benefits of
predation before new entry is possible"); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 737b, at
396 n.12 (collecting other cases quoting similar tests); LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 113 (1977) (noting that a characteristic feature of
predation is a "price substantially below the profit maximizing... price," which thus "makes
sense if, but only if, it is seen as a means of driving out or controlling competitors"); Bolton et al.,
supra note 15, at 2242-43 (adopting the same definition and collecting other sources); Janusz A.
Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product
Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 9-10, 15-16 (1981) (same). According to Joskow and Klevorick:
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sorts of desirable conduct. It would apply to any monopolist that does not
fully exploit its monopoly power because a failure to charge the full profit-
maximizing monopoly price could only be explained by a desire to
discourage further entrants.72 This would amount to a legal duty to engage
in monopoly pricing. Worse, this definition would apply to any firm that
invests research and development funds to invent a new innovative product
that will allow it to drive out rivals and earn monopoly rents.73 It would also
apply to any firm that sacrifices short-term profits by investing in building
new facilities, training personnel, or making organizational or distributional
changes in order to improve costs or quality and drive out 
rivals.74
Sacrificing short-term profits to build a better or cheaper mousetrap or
organization is socially desirable, even though the monopolist is motivated
not by any social benefits but by the prospect that eliminating rivals will
allow it to reap long-term monopoly profits. Indeed, the prospect of those
long-term monopoly profits is desirable precisely because it encourages
such efforts.
The proper question thus cannot be whether the defendant sacrificed
short-run profits or intended to exclude rivals or gain a monopoly. It is
whether the means it chose to do so are undesirable in a way antitrust law
can regulate without having unduly negative effects on other desirable
conduct. And that requires an assessment of the desirability of the
consequences of adopting any restriction on reactive above-cost price cuts.
It is to that task that I turn next.
Predatory pricing behavior involves a reduction of price in the short run so as to drive
competing firms out of the market or to discourage entry of new firms in an effort to
gain larger profits via higher prices in the long run than would have been earned if the
price reduction had not occurred.
Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89
YALE LJ. 213, 2i9-20 (1979).
72. See infra Section IV.D (discussing why limit pricing would violate this proposed test).
73. Anticipating this implication, Professors Ordover and Willig would actually extend their
prohibition to condemn as "predatory" any product innovations whose profitability depends on
their ability to drive rivals out of the market. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 71, at 22-30. But
this ignores the fact that innovations create long-term positive externalities for society (by
lowering cost curves or increasing product value) that matter much more than any short-term loss
of allocative efficiency, and that spur a dynamic response of innovation by other firms and
entrants that can trump the first innovation. See infra Part IV. Our intellectual property laws thus
correctly adopt the different premise that it is socially desirable to reward innovations with a right
to exclude rivals from their fruits. Further, Ordover and Willig's test would sometimes prohibit
innovation because it sacrifices profits earned on the innovator's older products even if those
profits were supracompetitive. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 71, at 25-26. But such a sacrifice
of supracompetitive profits is desirable because it brings the quality-adjusted price of market
products closer to their cost. Ordover and Willig wrongly think that such a profit sacrifice can
only have an anticompetitive objective. Id. at 26 n.49. This ignores the possibility that incumbents
fear rival competition in innovation over time, which would naturally tend to squeeze out the
supracompetitive profits on the preexisting good unless the Ordover-Willig test were adopted.
74. Indeed, Schumpeter would say that all innovative investments require such a sacrifice of
short-term profits to reap monopoly gains, and thus necessarily require the possession or prospcct
of some degree of market power. See generally infra note 266.
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II. DEFINING THE CORRECT COST MEASURE
The effects one predicts from a restriction on above-cost price cuts
obviously depend on what counts as a "cost." The dominant practice has
been to rely on a series of judgment calls about both what sorts of costs
generally seem sensible to include and when certain cases seem to suggest
that ad hoc exceptions to those cost measures would be desirable. But this
can hardly offer a satisfactory or clear resolution without some consistent
theory to guide those judgments. Nor is this a question we can answer by
assuming that "costs" have some metaphysically correct definition. Rather,
we must ask why we want to know what costs are in order to know how to
define them.
To those in the camp that believes that below-cost pricing to deter
entrants or drive out rivals is irrational and thus not credible, the answer is
that we don't want to know because their favored doctrine would permit
low prices regardless of costs.75 But any doctrine that condemns
monopolists who engage in below-cost pricing, which is what we actually
have, must rest on the opposite premise that such below-cost pricing
sometimes is a rational and credible strategy, otherwise the doctrine is not
only unnecessary but harmful. 76 For purposes of such a doctrine, the key
reason to care about the distinction between below-cost and above-cost
prices must be that (if implemented) below-cost pricing will inflict losses
on an equally efficient entrant or rival that can deter its entry or cause its
exit. It is further clear that-no matter what theory one holds-pricing that
does not inflict losses on entrants or rivals cannot deter or drive them out of
markets because they will be better off entering or staying in the market no
matter what they believe about whether the pricing will occur or persist.
I will accordingly define "costs" as whatever measure of costs would
prevent an incumbent pricing at cost from inflicting losses on an equally
efficient entrant or rival that could deter its entry or cause its exit. This
definition, it will be shown in the rest of this Article, provides the necessary
premise for the arguments that follow about why efforts to restrict above-
cost price cuts are socially undesirable. In other words, the ultimate
justification for this definition is functional. With this definition, one can
derive strong functional reasons for distinguishing above-cost price cuts
from below-cost price cuts; without it, those reasons would not follow.
77
75. See supra text accompanying note 17.
76. See supra text accompanying note 17.
77. Posner advocates such a benchmark but does notjustify it. See POSNER, supra note 56, at
188. Baumol analyzes a similar benchmark (although limited to pricing that might drive out rivals
as opposed to deterring their entry) as a "legitimate borderline" but acknowledges that his own
work indicated such a benchmark might reduce social welfare by allowing firms to drive out
marginally less efficient firms. See Baumol, supra note 41, at 50, 55-57 & n. 12. The analysis in
this Article provides the necessary justification. This is the correct benchmark because otherwise
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Accordingly, while the analysis below necessarily depends on this initial
premise about how costs are defined, an important implication of this
analysis will be that this cost definition is correct precisely because it is a
necessary premise for justifying the distinction between above-cost and
below-cost pricing even when both are designed to drive out entrants.
This understanding of the underlying justification for the proper cost
definition also has the helpful feature of permitting one to sort through, in a
more precise and analytic manner, what is currently a murky and confused
debate on how to measure costs. In particular, this Part shows how it can
provide a theoretically coherent methodology for resolving many seeming
conundrums currently handled largely by ad hoc exceptions, including how
to apply a cost-based predatory pricing test (a) to industries with near-zero
marginal costs; (b) to equally efficient firms that have different ratios of
fixed to variable costs; (c) in declining industries where all firms have
marginal costs that are below their variable costs; and (d) when an alleged
predator strategically times low prices after it has made capital investments
(and thus has low variable costs), but the rival is deciding whether to do the
same. It will be useful to sort through these issues not only for their own
sake, but because doing so will address in advance a mistaken premise
sometimes invoked in models used by those advocating restrictions on
above-cost price cuts: that any cost-based test would necessarily deter entry
by barring an entrant from recovering sunk entry costs.
7 8
A. The Murky and Divided Nature of the Current
Debate over Cost Definitions
Scholars have taken a variety of positions about the proper cost
measure. The leading proponents of a cost-based test, Professors Phillip
Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp, and Donald Turner, argue in their influential
antitrust treatise that short-run marginal cost is the correct measure but
recommend using average variable cost as an imperfect but more
measurable surrogate.79 One clear limitation of this approach is that Areeda
and Turner acknowledge that their test might allow pricing below average
total costs that destroys or deters an equally efficient entrant."
0 But
the social welfare grounds detailed below for rejecting restrictions on "above-cost" pricing would
not apply.
78. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 955-60, 973-78. Although Edlin does not extend his model to
equally efficient entrants, others have offered models with a similar assumption about entry costs,
and thus concluded that (at least when the incumbent is a monopolist in multiple markets) pricing
above variable costs can deter equally efficient entrants. See David Easley et al., Preying for Time,
33 J. INDUS. ECON. 445, 447-54, 457 (1985).
79. See AREEDA, supra note 60, at 194-95; 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
724c1 -2, at 287-89; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 71 Id.
80. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 714a, at 164-68 & n.7; Areeda & Turner, supra
note 10, at 711-12. They justify this result on the grounds that the alternative is (1) protecting
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reflecting a somewhat inconsistent attitude toward this benchmark, Areeda,
Turner, and Hovenkamp would switch to average total costs if they are
exceeded by the predator's marginal costs in part because prices above
average total costs could not drive out equally efficient rivals .8  They also
take the position that when marginal costs fall below average variable costs,
one should go by average variable costs not just as a surrogate but on the
merits, because if prices are below average variable costs it would be more
efficient for the firm to close operations.82 To deal with the problem that
average variable cost can be below marginal cost, they would also require a
defendant to show that marginal costs were not "substantially" or
"significantly" above average variable costs.83 Thus, in the end Areeda,
Turner, and Hovenkamp really embrace a three-staged cost test: (1) when
below the output that minimizes average variable costs, use average
variable costs; (2) when between the outputs that minimize average variable
and total costs, use average variable costs unless marginal costs are
significantly higher; and (3) when above the output that minimizes average
total costs, use average total costs. To complicate matters further, they
invoke several exceptions from these tests when they seem likely to lead to
adverse results.
84
Although not a proponent of a cost-based predation test, Professor
Baumol has argued that the right measure of costs to prevent predation that
could drive out an equally efficient rival must be whatever sorts of costs the
some less efficient entry and (2) incurring short-run (and perhaps long-run) market inefficiency
since there must be excess capacity for marginal cost to be below average cost. Williamson has
properly criticized them for failing to connect the goals of short-run efficiency and minimizing
inefficient entry with any larger social welfare calculus, especially since Areeda and Turner
concede alternative tests would have the long-term effect of increasing pre-entry output. See
Areeda & Turner, supra note 56, at 1339, 1342; Oliver E. Williamson, Williamson on Predatory
Pricing 11, 88 YALE L.J. 1183, 1186-87 (1979). Further, the Areeda-Tumer test, as stated,
encourages the inefficient pre-entry creation of excess capacity that justifies the short-run price
below average cost. See infra text accompanying note 117.
81. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 739a, at 413, 1 739c2, at 418; 3 AREEDA
& TURNER, supra note 8, 715b2.
82. AREEDA, supra note 60, at 195; 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 740b1; 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 715d, at 175.
83. AREEDA, supra note 60, at 195; 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 740c; 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 715d, at 176.
84. Areeda, Turner, and Hovenkamp would provide exceptions to their rule condemning
prices below average variable costs (a) when the industry has so much excess capacity that all
firms are pricing below their average variable cost or (b) when a defendant builds a plant that
turns out to be too costly compared to demand, so that prices do not cover a standard measure of
average variable costs that includes use depreciation. See infra text accompanying note 105; infra
note 110. They also provide an exception to their rule permitting prices above average variable
costs when fixed costs were incurred just to drive out the rival. See infra note 110. They also
acknowledge that exceptions would be warranted on theoretical grounds (a) when an industry is
expanding and variable or marginal costs arc low compared to fixed costs and (b) when the
defendant retains inefficient excess capacity on hand in order to be able to respond to entry, but
they reject these theoretically sound exceptions on administrative grounds. See infra note 100;
infra text accompanying note 117.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
rival could avoid by exiting the market.85 He calls these "average avoidable
costs," and notes that they exclude inescapable sunk costs "that cannot be
avoided for some limited period of time" but include any unsunk fixed costs
that "must be incurred in a lump in order for any output at all to be
provided., 86 Unfortunately, there is some confusion because different
authors use different meanings of "fixed costs." While Baumol defines
fixed costs to exclude sunk costs, Areeda, Turner, and Hovenkamp state
that "fixed costs are costs that would continue even if the firm produced no
output at all," 87 which seems to correspond to Baumol's notion of sunk
costs. Baumol's notion of fixed costs seems to correspond to what Areeda,
Turner, and Hovenkamp might call the marginal or variable cost of
producing the first unit of output. Some scholars distinguish between sunk
and avoidable fixed costs, but describe both as included within the category
of fixed costs.
88
Other prominent antitrust scholars, including those who are ordinarily
conservative about antitrust like Judge Richard Posner, worry that a
predator's price could be above short-run marginal, variable, or avoidable
costs, yet well below an equally efficient firm's long-term cost of staying in
business. They thus advocate a cost measure that also includes fixed and
sunk capital costs-called variously "long-run marginal costs," "long-run
incremental costs," or "average total costs"-and would condemn prices
below that cost measure either presumptively or (under some versions)
when coupled with an intent to exclude rivals. 89 They too, however, invoke
exceptions when this test seems likely to lead to bad results.
90
The cases in both the United States and Europe have responded to this
confusion and disagreement mainly by holding that prices between average
variable and total costs might be illegal, but differ on against whom to
allocate the presumption, and on the grounds for rebuttal.91 The result is
85. See Baumol, supra note 41, at 57-59.
86. Id. at 57 n.13, 58-59.
87. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 712, at 154; see also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 15, 735b3, at 366.
88. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 28-29.
89. E.g., POSNER, supra note 56, at 189, 191-93 (recommending that a price between short-
run and long-run marginal cost be considered predatory if coupled with an intent to exclude
rivals); Bolton et al., supra note 15, at 2271-82 (recommending that a price above average
avoidable cost but below long-run incremental cost give the defendant a burden of production (but
not persuasion) on whether the pricing maximized short-run profits or had market-expanding
efficiencies); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 71, at 252-54 (recommending that a price between
average variable and total costs be presumed predatory unless the predator shows it maximizcs
short-run profits, which is likely only when an industry has excess capacity); Richard A. Posner,
The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 942-44 (1979) (recommending
the same for a price between average variable and total costs).
90. See infra text accompanying note 110 (describing the declining-industry exception).
91. See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359 70-73
(E.C.J) (describing European law); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 723d2, at 278-
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 1 12: 681
Above-Cost Price Cuts
that if you are a monopolist or victim and prices are in between these cost
measures, you do not really know where you stand.
In short, the current debate is something of a mess. But with our
functional criteria in place, we can add some clarity. Much of the problem
is that there is little discussion about the actual source of disagreement. The
current debate is framed as being about which costs to include, when in fact
the real debate is about which time period, output, and firm to consider in
deciding how to categorize a cost. All costs are variable or avoidable in the
sufficiently long run.92 The fixed costs (like overhead) necessary to make
any output this year need not be incurred next year. Generally, even sunk
costs are inescapable only for a time. The big expensive plant will
eventually wear out and thus require a decision about whether or not to
incur the cost of its replacement. 93 Even land costs are not inescapable in
the long run. Although the land does not wear out, the plant on it does, so
that continuing to use the land for present purposes incurs the opportunity
cost of not selling the land for its market value. There is thus no cost that is
inherently variable, avoidable, fixed, or sunk. It all depends on which time
period one uses, whether that period looks backward or forward, and whose
output and ability to vary or avoid costs during that period matters. But
there has not been much explicit debate about these points, leaving the
current analyses murky. We can be more explicit on all these points by
considering more directly and systematically the extent to which they bear
on the ability of an incumbent pricing at cost to impose losses that could
deter or drive out an equally efficient entrant or rival.
B. Use Whatever Costs Are Variable During the
Period of Predatory Pricing
Professors Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Baumol all state that the correct
time period for judging whether costs are variable or avoidable is the time
period of the alleged predatory pricing.94 But Areeda and Hovenkamp
provide no justification for this standard, which they in fact abandon in
favor of a blanket assumption of "middle-run" variability, 95 and the choice
requires much more justification and elaboration than Baumol gives.
79, 724c3, at 289-92, 737b-c, at 394-402, 739, at 413, 741a-c, at 441-45, 1 741e, at 449-53,
741f, at 456-57 (collecting U.S. cases).
92. See AREEDA, supra note 60, at 199; 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 735c, at
368, $ 740dl, at 431-32; AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 712, at 155-56.
93. See Baumol, supra note 41, at 57 n.13.
94. See AREEDA, supra note 60, at 199-200; 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
740d], at 432; Baumol, supra note 41, at 61-62.
95. Although acknowledging that the period of predation is the correct time period
"theoretically," 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 740dl, at 432, Areeda and
Hovenkamp recommend adopting a "relatively arbitrary definition of middle-run variability"
based on administrative concerns and a crude overall judgment that it is reasonable to deem "most
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The basic logic is simple enough. Until the alleged predatory price lasts
long enough to be exceeded by those costs that were variable for that
period, an equally efficient entrant cannot have suffered any loss it could
have avoided by exit, and thus cannot have had any incentive to exit.
Alleged predatory prices that last only one month cannot cause an equally
efficient rival to lose any money by not exiting unless those prices are
lower than the very short-run costs the rival incurred by operating that
month. In contrast, pricing that lasts for ten years will cause an equally
efficient rival to lose money (relative to exit) if the price does not suffice to
cover the fixed costs of producing anything next year (like overhead) or the
future capital costs of rebuilding facilities that seemed like sunken costs in
the short run but are variable over a time horizon of ten years. Thus, we
need not pick one time period or cost measure in the abstract; the choice is
dictated by the time period of the alleged predation.
One implication of this is that, for purposes of predatory pricing law,
one should thus not distinguish between sunk, fixed, avoidable, and
variable costs with general definitions about whether they are escapable in a
limited period, or need to be incurred to produce any output or to produce
anything beyond the first unit of output. Rather, the question of whether
(and what) costs to consider should depend solely on whether they could be
varied during the time period of the alleged predation. It may be that the
costs that could be varied during this period include the costs of making the
first unit, and thus include what Baumol calls avoidable costs. But it may be
that the costs of making the first unit of output cannot be varied during the
relevant period, and thus should be excluded. Indeed, it may be that the
costs of making the first 100 units cannot be altered, in which case the costs
that are variable during that period do not even include all costs that are
traditionally lumped into average variable costs. At the other extreme, it
may be that the period of alleged predation is so long that it includes what
would be deemed sunk costs under a definition that considers whether they
are inescapable over a limited period. I will thus call a cost "variable" if it
could be altered during the period of alleged predatory pricing, and "fixed"
if it could not be altered during that period.
What is the concern of those who favor using long-term costs, even
when the predatory pricing period is short? One theory is that predatory
pricing at the "rival's variable costs" can induce their exit because "[t]he
costs" variable, id. 740dl, at 433-34; see also 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 715c, at
173-74. But it is not clear why the administrative concerns should be so great given that the time
period of the alleged predatory prices is presumably known, nor why it should be reasonable to
make an allocation that is clearly wrong for many time periods or firms. Further, any seeming
administrative advantage from using a categorical definition seems eliminated by Areeda and
Hovenkamp's willingness to abandon average variable costs, or narrow or broaden their
definition, when the categorical rule seems to lead to bad results. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 15, 740b3, at 429-30, 740d4-5, at 437-39, 741e, at 449-55.
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rival, who also incurs fixed costs, exhausts its financial resources and
leaves the market."96 But this is wrong. As long as the price exceeds the
costs a rival could vary during the relevant time period, the rival would lose
money from leaving the market. True, it might have to renegotiate loans or
go into bankruptcy because it becomes unable to meet any loans that it
incurred on the assumption it could cover its long-run sunk or fixed costs.
But since the rival is worth more as a going concern (which follows from
the assumption that prices exceed its variable costs), even then the business
will be maintained in bankruptcy and the firm will stay in the market. This
point is sometimes lost because of the popular image that firms somehow
"vanish" in bankruptcy, but in fact bankruptcy reorganizations just change
the owners of the business from shareholders to creditors, and the
bankruptcy trustee as fiduciary for the new owners has the obligation to
continue operating the firm if that creates profits for the new owners. (Note
that the question would be different if below-cost pricing were inflicting
actual losses, for then the firm would have to convince creditors to provide
additional funding to keep the firm afloat.) Thus, predatory pricing at the
costs that are variable to the rival may injure the rival's shareholders or
lenders, but cannot drive out an equally efficient rival. Accordingly, no
rational predator would do it, especially since the predator would be
inflicting the same injury on its own shareholders or lenders. There is also
the question why the predator would have any better access to capital
markets than the rival, but that is a general question for below-cost
predatory pricing.97 Here, the problem is that pricing above the costs that
are variable to the rival cannot inflict any loss that drives out the rival at all,
even if the predator does have better access to capital markets.
A related theory appears to be that an equally efficient rival would exit
the market after even a short period of prices below long-run costs because
the rival sees before it a future where prices will not allow it to stay in
business. Thus, some think that when the predator prices at the rival's
variable costs, "a rational rival should leave at the first indication that the
incumbent is even contemplating a predatory campaign, there being no
point in sticking it out and squandering resources when exit is inevitable."
9'
But this too is wrong. Even if the rival were convinced the predator's
pricing will be permanent,99 it would have no incentive to exit prematurely.
Until the rival begins to have to make decisions on whether to keep
96. Ordover, supra note 17, at 79-80 (summarizing the literature); see also Williamson, supra
note 7, at 322 (accepting the deep pockets theory).
97. Ordover, supra note 17, at 80.
98. Id. at 79.
99. There are reasons to doubt the predator's ability to credibly commit to continue a scheme
of pricing that imposes long-term losses on itself or even forgoes short-term profits, but those
reasons are equally applicable to below-cost pricing. Id. (describing the objection that below-cost
pricing is irrational because the predator cannot recoup its losses).
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incurring fixed or capital costs, those costs will not be variable to it, and the
rival will stay in the market because it is making a profit at the alleged
predatory price relative to the costs it could vary during the period of such
pricing.
Thus, a price that is below a rival's long-run costs will not cause it to
exit the market as long as the price allows it to cover the costs that are
actually variable during the period of alleged predation. To test the
proposition, let us directly confront the example that has most bedeviled
modem antitrust scholars. What do we do with software whose marginal or
variable cost of production is near zero? The usual answer is that the "new
economy" has to be treated differently because marginal or variable costs
are so low. 00 But this creation of an ad hoc exception is hardly satisfactory.
In the old economy, marginal or variable costs are also often below average
or long-term costs. Indeed, the distinction between these cost measures only
matters because they sometimes diverge. If this divergence presents a big
problem when it is large, it must present at least a small problem when it is
small. Our theory for how to deal with that divergence should be able to
address the full range of possible magnitudes rather than having ad hoc
exceptions, especially since those exceptions create ambiguity about just
what the vague dividing line might be.
The better answer is, instead, that it all depends on how long the pricing
lasts. If pricing at a near-zero level occurs for a short time, it cannot
persuade any equally efficient software rivals to exit, since they also will
have near-zero marginal costs and thus retain a profit from operating during
that period. If instead such pricing lasts for years, then it could be predatory
because it would not allow an equally efficient software rival to recoup the
software development costs of updating that software to stay in the market.
The latter costs become variable to the rival if the predatory pricing is
lengthy, but not if it is brief. Paradox solved.
100. See, e.g., Bolton et al., supra note 15, at 2272-73. The authors base this on the
assumption that "the short-run incremental cost of a program downloaded from the Internet is nil."
Id. at 2272. This is probably overstated, since advertising and marketing effort affects the level of
sales through downloads, and additional downloads require more billing effort and technical
support. But the incremental costs do seem very low relative to the fixed or sunk costs of making
the software, providing a sound basis for their conclusion. Likewise, Areeda and Hovenkamp are
sympathetic to cases that make an exception to average variable cost rules in regulated or high-
technology markets (a) with "an unusually high ratio of fixed to variable costs," 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 741e2, at 452, or (b) where the industry is "expanding," id.
741e2, at 454. See also id. 741e2, at 452-55 & n.48 (agreeing that long-run incremental costs
are relevant in such cases, but ultimately deciding that the test cannot be implemented). Factor (a)
is irrelevant for reasons noted in the text. Factor (b) is relevant to the extent it means the capital
costs are in fact variable during the period of the alleged predatory pricing. Cf infra text
accompanying notes 110-113 (noting that when an industry is co:ntracting, capital costs may not
recur). Thus, rather than creating a special exception, it is more straightforward to see this as one
application of the general principle.
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The fact that marginal or variable costs are uniformly low in an industry
thus raises no difficulty if one is careful to consider all (and only) costs that
are variable during the period of alleged predation. Different problems
might be raised, however, if the equally efficient rival has a different ratio
of fixed to variable costs than the alleged predator, or if the alleged
predatory price is timed after the predator has incurred a fixed or sunk cost
that the rival must decide whether to incur in the future. I address those
issues next.
C. Use Variable Costs of the Alleged Predatory Increase in
Output That Displaces the Rival, Not of Producing the
Predator's Entire Output
Another common concern is that equally efficient firms might have
different ratios of fixed and variable costs. For example, Williamson
observes that more capital-intensive firms can have lower variable costs
even when they are less efficient than more labor-intensive firms.t01 He thus
advocates using average total costs as a better means of sorting out the
efficiencies of firms.
This is a reasonable concern with using the average variable costs of
making the predator's entire output because that measure is by definition
lower than average total costs. 102 Thus, if allowed to price at this measure of
average variable costs, even a firm exceeding its optimal capacity could
price at a level that is lower than its marginal or average total costs, and
thus lower than the costs of an equally efficient firm at providing that
incremental output. An average variable cost test can thus offer inadequate
protection to an equally efficient rival if it is based on an average of the
costs that are variable for the predator's entire output.
But this does not mean that one must abandon use of a variable cost test
altogether. It simply means one must be more precise in defining the
relevant output whose costs can be varied. Since our purpose is to
determine what cost measure would prevent a firm from excluding an
equally efficient rival, the relevant costs that are variable are not the costs
of producing the predator's entire output. They are rather the variable costs
of the alleged predatory increase in output that displaces the rival's
101. Williamson, supra note 7, at 321-22. In fact, a capital-intensive firm may not always
have lower variable costs. Rather, variable costs depend, in part, on how much the firm's capital
assets depreciate with increased use. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 735c2, at 370-
71.
102. By definition, average total costs exceed average variable costs because average total
costs are the sum of average fixed and variable costs. See supra note 19.
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output. 10 3 This is because the concern is rival exit (or nonentry), and thus
the question is which firm is more efficient at producing the rival's output.
In other words, the relevant concern is that the predatory price allows
the predator to expand output so that the additional output displaces the
rival's equally efficient output and thus precludes it from the market. The
relevant cost measure is thus whatever, over the period of alleged predatory
pricing, is the cost of producing that higher output minus what the cost
would have been of producing the lower output. The higher output will be
the alleged predator's output at the predatory price, and the lower output
will be that output minus the rival output that was allegedly displaced by
predation. (Where the rival was already in the market, the lower output will
normally equal the predator's output before the alleged predatory pricing
began.) This measure of variable costs, in effect, is the sum of the marginal
costs for the predatory increase in output, but can be measured more simply
by comparing the costs at the higher output to the costs at the lower output,
rather than by trying to calculate the marginal costs of producing the last
item at each output level. Assuming marginal costs are increasing, this total
variable cost figure (when divided by the increased output to give a per-unit
figure) will give an average variable cost that is lower than the marginal
cost of producing the last item that the alleged predator makes, but will still
protect a rival that is equally efficient at making the relevant increment of
output. 104
103. See Baumol, supra note 41, at 64-65.
104. Any price below the predator's marginal cost of producing the last unit of output would
still be inefficient for at least some of its increased output, but would not drive out an equally
efficient rival. If the predator is expanding beyond its optimal capacity, a price above its variable
cost of increasing its capacity must be above its minimum average total costs, and thus cannot
displace production by an equally efficient rival. Instead, the monopolist simply will inefficiently
confer a boon of extra output at below-cost prices to buyers. Since the rival cannot be driven out
by such pricing, the monopolist will not recoup any losses, and thus such inefficient pricing
should be self-deterring.
The analysis grows a bit more complicated if the putative predator is operating below its
optimal capacity. Suppose that before the predatory behavior has begun, the predator is below its
optimal capacity by the quantity of output (Q) that could replace the victim's output. It then
increases output to its optimal level, but instead of charging its marginal cost, it charges a price
equal to its average variable cost of that increased output, which is somewhere above its marginal
cost at the original output and below the marginal cost at its final (optimal) output. Some of this
increased production has a marginal cost that exceeds its price, and one might thus worry that this
is a predatory increase in output that could replace the output of an equally efficient rival, whose
average variable cost of production is greater than this price but lower than the predator's total
cost or the marginal costs of its last unit of production. But the rest of the predator's increased
production is efficient (and cheaper than the rival's), and the overall increase in predator output
cannot displace the rival's production of the same output unless the rival has higher variable costs
of producing it, in which case the rival is not equally efficient at producing that increment of
output. The solution to this apparent anomaly is that thc proper predation claim is not that the
entire increase in output was predatory. Rather, the predatory portion of the output increase was
where the output's marginal cost began to exceed the price. For that properly defined increment of
output, the variable cost of providing it will be above price.
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Accordingly, if the capital-intensive firm has increased output to
displace its rival's output, we should look only to the higher variable costs
of the allegedly predatory increase in output, not to the lower variable costs
of producing the predator's entire output. Prices at or above those higher
average variable costs cannot drive out a rival that is equally efficient at
making that increment of output. If the capital-intensive firm's variable
costs of increasing its output enough to displace the rival are lower than the
rival's own variable costs of producing that output, then the rival is in fact
not equally efficient at making its output. Rather, the rival output can more
efficiently be supplied by an increase in the capital-intensive firm's output,
even though it may be exceeding its optimal capacity.
This approach resolves a conundrum created by the approach of
Areeda, Turner, and Hovenkamp. Although their cost measure means a
predator should shut down when its price is lower than the average variable
cost of its entire output, they recognize that this creates an anomaly when
there is so much excess capacity that this legal rule would require every
firm in an industry to shut down, and thus they create another exception to
their own rule.105 But under the equally efficient entrant benchmark, the
question is not whether the predator is profiting by producing its output.
Rather, the question is whether it could profitably displace the rival's
output. A firm pricing at marginal costs that are below its overall average
variable costs necessarily lowers those average variable costs by expanding
output. Thus, the fact that its prices are below its overall average variable
costs does not mean they would be below the additional variable costs it
would incur by adding output equal to what the rival used to produce. In
such a case, the declining demand that created the excess capacity simply
means that the minimum efficient scale can sustain fewer firms than before.
Firms that can produce the rival's output more cheaply than the rival should
be able to price down to the variable costs of increasing their output, even
To take a concrete example, suppose the predator's MC = Q, and it begins at an output of 90
and a marginal cost of S90 and subsequently increases this output by 10 to reach its optimal
capacity of 100, at which its marginal cost is $100. But instead of charging $100, the predator
charges $95/unit, which fully covers the variable cost of this output increase of 10. To test the
proposition that it will not matter if a higher proportion of the labor-intensive rival's costs are
variable, take the case where all of the rival's costs are variable and equal S96/unit, reflecting
constant labor costs. One might be concerned that by pricing at $95 and increasing output by 10,
the predator would be able to drive this rival out of business even though, at $96/unit, its costs are
lower than the capital-intensive firm's minimum average total costs and marginal costs. But if the
rival has constant variable costs of $96/unit, then the predator, by pricing at marginal cost, would
not have produced 90 units at $90, but rather 96 units at $96/unit. Thus, the rival would only have
had 4 units of output to replace, and the variable cost of replacing those last 4 units would be S98.
Since those are the relevant variable costs, the predator could not price below $98 for those 4
units, and thus could not drive out the rival under a properly defined cost test if it were correctly
alleged that the predatory increase in output consisted of the final 4 units. The first 6 units were
replaced by more efficient production and thus should not be part of the predation claim at all.
105. 3 AREEDA & HovENKAMp, supra note 15, 740b3, at 429-30.
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when these fall short of their overall average variable costs. This output
expansion and displacement of rivals will allow the surviving firms to
reestablish their optimal capacity and rebalance supply and demand.
D. If Short-Term Pricing Can Deter Long-Term Investments,
Then Use Magnitude of Predator Costs for the Sorts of Costs
Variable to the Victim, but Look to the Future
To Measure Cost Magnitudes
Another concern, which the literature has neglected, is that the predator
might time its alleged predatory pricing to begin after the predator has
incurred a sunk cost, but right before its rival has to decide whether or not
to do the same. Suppose, for example, the predator has just renewed a ten-
year lease on its factory, but knows that its equally efficient rival has an
upcoming decision about whether to renew its own factory lease. The
predator then cuts prices to a level that does not suffice to cover the sum of
operating and lease costs. The price exceeds the predator's variable costs
since its lease costs are sunk. 10 6 But the price does not exceed the variable
costs of the equally efficient rival because the rival can avoid committing to
the lease and thus its lease payments are variable at this time. If that market
price persists, the rival will lose money by renewing the lease and thus has
incentives to exit the market rather than renew. The same holds if a firm
lowers software prices to near zero after it has come out with the latest
software update, but before its rival has followed suit by investing in its
own software development.
Now, there are good reasons not to treat this concern as serious because
short-term pricing probably cannot deter long-term investments. But let me
defer those reasons until the next Section. Here, the point I wish to focus on
is that, even if this concern were serious, it still would not justify a general
rule of always employing long-term or average total costs. Rather, the
solution lies in defining more carefully just which variable costs one
examines.
Because the goal is to make sure our cost measure is not protecting less
efficient firms, antitrust examination normally focuses on the predator's
variable costs. It would be more precise to say that this benchmark requires
that the magnitude of any variable costs come from the predator's cost data.
The sorts of costs that should be deemed variable would, if this concern
106. The lease cost is sunk for that ten-year period even though the rents will be paid in the
future because the obligation to pay them will exist whether or not the firm stays in production. I
simplify the situation here for exposition-in fact, there is probably some possibility of a
sublease, just as there is some alternative use for just about any sunk investment. The actual sunk
lease cost is thus, more precisely, the difference between what the company must pay on the lease
and what it might get with a lower-valued sublease or substitute use.
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were serious, instead turn on whether those sorts of costs were variable to
the rival during the period of alleged predation. The reason is that the
purpose of our test is not to determine whether the price is profitable to the
alleged predator in the short run, but rather to determine whether it could
drive out an equally efficient rival.
The following hypothetical illustrates the proper approach if this
concern were serious. Suppose that each of two firms has one plant that
costs $10,000 a year to lease and makes 1000 gizmos annually. Take two
factual scenarios. In the first, each firm also has operating costs of $10 per
gizmo and is thus equally efficient. The alleged predator then leases two
plants and begins charging $15 per gizmo. If the rival has already rented its
plant too, the costs of leasing a plant are not variable to the rival. The
correct measure of variable costs is thus $10 per unit and the price is not
predatory because it cannot cause the rival to exit. If the rival has not rented
its plant yet, its variable costs include not only its operating cost but also
the cost of leasing a plant. The correct measure of variable cost is thus no
lower than $20 per unit, and the same S15 price is predatory because it
inflicts a loss on this rival that might cause it to exit. This difference in
results is not anomalous because the $15 price can drive out the rival that
has not incurred a lease obligation but cannot drive out the one that has
because, although equally efficient, each rival will compare the $15 price to
the differing costs that it can vary.
Now consider a second scenario, where the rival has operating costs of
$15 per gizmo and is thus less efficient. If the rival has not rented a plant,
we should look to both lease and operating costs because they are the sorts
of costs that are variable to the rival. However, $25 is not the right measure
of those costs because the magnitude of those sorts of costs must be
determined by looking at the predator. Although any price below $25 could
inflict losses that might drive out this rival, that is true only because it is
less efficient. The right cost measure is $20 per gizmo, reflecting the
magnitude of the alleged predator's costs for the sorts of costs that are
variable to the rival.
A related concern is that, even if a properly defined measure of variable
costs can prevent an incumbent from driving out an equally efficient rival,
it may not prevent an incumbent from deterring entry by equally efficient
firms. An entrant, this concern stresses, will not enter unless it expects
prices to cover its sunk costs of entry. Thus, if an equally efficient entrant
anticipates incumbent price levels that cover variable costs but do not cover
sunken entry costs, it will not enter.'0 7 But if this concern is a serious one, a
question I will take up below, it really is no different than the last case.
107. See Easley et al., supra note 78, at 447-54 (offering a model under which an incumbent
could deter entry with prices above average variable costs).
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Deterring entry is just a special case of deterring sunken investments. The
correct time period in this case starts before entry because that is the period
during which the rival decision is influenced. The sorts of costs that are
variable during this period to the potential entrant include the (not-yet-sunk)
capital costs of creating new facilities. Thus, the correct cost measure
should include the incumbent's (amortized) long-term capital costs of
replacing its facilities with new ones. If the incumbent's future costs of
plant replacement are lower than the entrant's cost of building its plant,
then the incumbent should be able to manifest that greater efficiency in
lower long-term pricing even though it excludes less efficient entrants.
Even when the rival's cost variability during the relevant period
indicates including the above sorts of capital costs but measuring them by
their magnitude to the incumbent, this does not mean we should look to the
incumbent's average total costs. The problem with most measures of
average total costs is that they look backward at the sum of variable and
fixed costs the firm has already incurred. But what matters (if this concern
is serious) is the magnitude of the future costs the incumbent will incur if its
alleged predatory pricing persists. If the market is in a steady state, then
basing average total costs on past data is a good proxy for future long-run
costs. But the proxy might be poor if the market is changing. For example,
if the industry is declining, then such measures of average total costs are a
poor proxy because firms should be contracting or exiting, and thus their
past sunk or fixed capital costs will not recur. Combining this future
orientation with the other analysis above helps address a nagging debate
when the alleged predator's marginal costs are lower than average total
costs.
Defenders of marginal or variable cost measures have tended to stress
that, if short-run marginal costs are below average total costs, then by
definition expanding output should lower average cost, which must mean
the alleged predator is below its optimal (least average cost) output and has
excess capacity.' 8 They thus conclude it will be cheaper to use that excess
capacity than to build new, more expensive capacity. Objectors have tended
to stress that marginal or variable cost measures of predatory pricing give
monopolists inefficient incentives to build the excess capacity that is
108. See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 60, at 195-96; 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
724cl, at 287, 739b, at 414-15, 741dl, at 446-47; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8,
T 715a, at 164-68 & n.7. Actually, there is technically one exception: It might be the case that the
marginal cost of the final item produced is below average total cost, but that the cost of adding
one more unit of output would exceed average total cost. For example, in the lease hypotheticals
noted above, the strict plant output limit of 1000 meant that going from 2000 to 2001 units has a
marginal cost of $1010. Thus the $10 marginal or variable cost of making 2000 units is below the
average total cost of $20 even though the predator is not below optimal plant size and does not
have excess capacity. But if output limits are less strict, marginal costs will rise less sharply and
this exception will not arise.
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necessary to justify the future pricing below average total costs that makes
entry unprofitable. 10 9 Applying the approach outlined above can provide a
more systematic resolution to the problems raised by the four typical
sources of excess capacity.
(1) We might have a declining industry. Here we would not want
to require prices that cover capital costs because that would
encourage investment and entry at a time when market
economics dictate exit. Advocates of total cost measures, like
Posner and Williamson, have tended to respond by creating a
declining-industry exception to their favored cost measure.
1t0
But a more satisfactory answer is again to be more precise
about which costs we are measuring and when we are
measuring them, rather than to use overinclusive cost measures
or make equally overinclusive exceptions. To the extent that
plant-replacement costs will not recur in the future because
finns are contracting or exiting, then the future magnitude of
those predator costs will be zero.'11 The incumbent's future
capital costs will thus be far below the past capital costs
reflected in backward-looking measures of average total
109. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 89, at 942; Scherer, supra note 7, at 871 n.12; A. Michael
Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977).
110. See POSNER, supra note 56, at 189; Williamson, supra note 7, at 322-23. They are not
the only ones who create an ad hoc exception in this circumstance. Areeda and Hovenkamp also
create an exception to their rule banning prices below average variable costs when this results
from industry-wide excess capacity. See supra text accompanying note 105 (explaining how that
issue can instead be addressed by defining the output whose costs are in question). They also
create a similar exception when a defendant builds a plant that turns out to be so costly compared
to demand that prices do not cover a standard measure of average variable costs that includes use
depreciation. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 740d5, at 437-39. Rather than creating
a special exception for this case, it is clearer to see it as just one result of the general rule that,
when the sunk costs of building the plant will not be incurred again, the future magnitude of any
such costs (whether manifested in use depreciation or otherwise) is zero. Areeda and Hovenkamp
recognize a theoretical exception in the other direction when prices exceed average variable costs
but the industry is growing and fixed costs greatly exceed variable costs. See supra note 100
(explaining how that issue can instead be resolved by assessing whether the costs are variable
during the time period of the alleged predation). They also create an exception when prices exceed
average variable costs, but fixed costs were incurred just to drive out the rival. See 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 741e1, at 449-50. Again, it is clearer to see this instead as just one
application of the general rule that the relevant variable costs are those that the firm can vary
during the period of predatory pricing in order to create the additional output that replaces rival
output.
111. One might think that predator costs can never be zero because the predator will have to
replace its plant at some point to stay in the market. But there are two possibilities. First, the
predator might have multiple plants. Then, what matters is the long-run cost of operating the
marginal (least efficient) plant(s) that can replace the victim's output. In the face of declining
market demand that produces prices that do not suffice to cover the capital costs of plant building,
the predator will close the marginal plant(s) rather than rebuild it (them), and thus it (they) will
have zero future capital costs. Second, the predator might have only one plant. Here, if demand
has declined to the extent that the predator can efficiently supply the entire market with this one
plant, then the decline has made the predator into a natural monopoly and the analysis that follows
in the text for natural monopolies would apply.
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costs."12 By instead combining the magnitude of future predator
costs with the sorts of costs that are variable for the potential
entrant during the period of predatory pricing, we can produce
the right result without having to patch up a hole in the cost
measure theory with an ad hoc exception.
(2) We might have a temporary cyclical decline in demand that
creates temporary excess capacity. But since one cannot know
whether the decline is femporary until it ends, during any
demand dip the magnitude of the alleged predator's plant-
replacement costs should be zero, as above. Pricing at that level
will defer entry, which is the right result since during that time
the entrant will be less efficient than a firm that need not incur
capital costs. But entry will not permanently be deterred if the
decline is indeed temporary.' 1 4 Nor will the predator be able to
drive out any equally efficient existing firm that also has excess
capacity with any price that exceeds their (equal) variable costs
during that temporary period."'
(3) We might have economies of scale that make it cheaper for the
largest firm to provide additional output. But once again we do
not have to create an ad hoc exception. Even if plant-
replacement costs are the sorts of costs that should be
considered variable, their magnitude is determined by the
incumbent's costs. Given economies of scale, the incumbent
monopolist would incur smaller such costs in future production
of the output that the entrant proposes to add than the entrant
would. Pricing at those future incumbent costs will deter entry,
but the entrant is not equally efficient given the relevant
economies of scale. 1
1 6
(4) The incumbent monopolist might be retaining inefficient excess
capacity on hand in order to be able to respond to entry.
Defenders of marginal or variable cost measures acknowledge
112. It is surprising that Posner did not make this point himself, since he so insightfully
pointed out the past-future divergence between average total costs and future marginal costs. See
POSNER, supra note 56, at 190.
113. Alternatively, one could say that what matters are "anticipated" average total costs, and
that neither they nor "long-run marginal costs" or "long-run incremental costs" should include
capital costs that will not recur.
114. Suppose we instead assume that it is crystal clear the demand decline is temporary, but
that entry cannot be deferred. That is unlikely, but if so, any entrant would know to discount the
temporary decline in demand and enter now, recovering entry costs when demand returns if entry
is efficient.
115. Areeda and Turner suppose that it might, but do so based on the argument about
exhausting rival financial resources that was rebutted above. Compare supra Section I.B, with 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 8, 715a, at 165-66.
116. For more extensive analysis of when the entrant will be equally efficient given declining
costs, see inJra Subsection IV.C.3.
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the difficulty, and either advocate an exception or reject one as
inadministrable and accept this as a downside of their rule." 7
But a more satisfactory approach would recognize that in such
a case the magnitude of future incumbent capital costs will
include the replacement costs of maintaining that inefficient
excess capacity even if the market is in steady state. And that
sort of cost must be included because that is the sort of cost that
is variable to the entrant. A monopolist required to price at the
requisite cost level thus will not be able to keep out an equally
efficient entrant even if the entrant believes the pricing will
persist indefinitely, and will thus have no incentive to create
excess capacity in order to make such an attempt.
E. If(as Likely) Short-Term Pricing Cannot Deter Long-Term
Investments, Then Just Use Those Predator Costs Varied
by Its Alleged Predatory Increase in Output
The preceding Section assumed the concern that short-term predatory
pricing might deter a long-term investment was serious, a proposition that is
doubtful for reasons I now take up. The main problem is the following: The
claim that pricing (or threats to price) above the alleged predator's variable
costs might deter investment or entry by equally efficient firms depends on
a crucial supposition. That supposition is that, in making its long-term
investment or entry decision, the rival will believe that such pricing will
persist in the long run, or that any threat to impose such pricing after entry
will both be carried out and persist in the long run. This supposition is what
allows an alleged predator with a short-term pricing strategy (or mere threat
to begin such pricing) to influence rival investment or entry decisions that
are made based on long-term expectations. But this supposition is dubious
because any equally efficient rival will realize that, if it incurs the sunk cost
in question, it will no longer be rational for the alleged predator to persist in
pricing that covers variable costs but not sunken capital costs, let alone to
carry out a threat to begin such pricing. The reason is that, once the sunk
cost is incurred, such pricing cannot give the equally efficient rival any
incentive to leave the market. Since the alleged predator could make more
money with pricing that covers these long-run costs, and cannot drive out
the rival with lower pricing, it would be irrational for the predator to persist
in such low pricing. The prospect of such irrational pricing thus would not
induce exit by the equally efficient rival, which would instead assume that
any unremunerative pricing would not continue.
117. AREEDA, supra note 60, at 198-99 (rejecting the exception); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 15, 741d2, at 447-49 (suggesting both); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 71, at 253-
54 (recognizing one).
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This might seem indistinguishable from the claim that an equally
efficient rival cannot be deterred or driven out by pricing below the
predator's variable costs because it would be irrational for the predator to
persist in such money-losing pricing."8 But actually the issue here is
different. Pricing below variable costs inflicts actual losses on an equally
efficient rival that would induce the rival to exit if it believes the predator
will persist, which itself might make it rational for the predator to persist in
order to drive the rival out. Here, once the rival incurs the sunk cost, pricing
above variable costs cannot inflict any future loss on the rival and thus
cannot give it any incentive to leave the market. A single-market
monopolist will thus have no reason to persist in such a pricing strategy.
1 19
It will instead raise prices to whatever level maximizes profits given that
the rival cannot be eliminated.
This means the incumbent monopolist who cannot price below variable
costs will have strong incentives to price even higher than long-run costs in
response to an equally efficient entrant. Because the entrant has committed
the sunk costs, the monopolist cannot drive the entrant out with any low
price that is above their equally efficient variable costs. The addition of the
entrant has thus converted the former monopoly to an unavoidable duopoly.
Thus, as soon as it realizes the entrant is equally efficient, the incumbent
monopolist will endeavor to accommodate entry by pricing at
supracompetitive duopoly levels rather than dropping prices to less
profitable above-cost levels in a fruitless attempt to drive out the entrant.
This has the interesting implication that, if not permitted to price below
its variable costs, the incumbent monopolists themselves will want to sort
out the equally efficient entrants from the less efficient ones as accurately
as possible, and will only attempt to drive out the latter with price cuts. If
the incumbent monopolist does react to entry with a price cut that is below
its long-run costs but above the costs of replacing the victim's output that
are variable to it during the period of alleged predatory pricing, then it must
believe the entrant is not equally efficient. Further, if that short-run price
cut fails to drive out the entrant, then the incumbent monopolist will realize
in the long run that its belief about the entrant's relative inefficiency was
mistaken, and endeavor to raise prices back to a supracompetitive duopoly
level. Given this long-run prospect, short-term price cuts to levels that are
above the incumbent's variable costs should not deter investment or entry
by equally efficient firms. 1
20
118. See supra text accompanying note 17.
119. The perhaps counterintuitive implication is that, where the incumbent and entrant are
equally efficient, pricing just barely above variable costs, but below long-run costs, is actually a
less rational predation strategy than pricing below variable costs. Cf Edlin, supra note 6, at 961-
63 (assuming that above-cost predatory pricing must be more rational than below-cost pricing).
120. Where the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, it may instead prefer to persist in
prices that are above its variable costs, but below the incumbent's variable costs, in order to drive
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True, one could try to extend some of the countertheories used to justify
bans on below-cost predatory pricing to this case where predator prices do
not cover its long-term costs. One theory is that the predator's bluff to
persist in such pricing may never be called because the short-term predatory
pricing deters investment or entry by misleading the rival (or capital
markets) into thinking the predator's efficiency is greater (or market
demand lower) than it actually is.12 ' But this would not apply to a mere
threat to lower prices in response to investment or entry. Actual lower
prices would be necessary to create the misleading impression. This theory
thus has little application to the topic of price cuts reactive to new entry.
1 22
Nor would past reactive above-cost price cuts have much future
reputational effect in the same market. Unlike a price cut below variable
costs, a price cut above those costs cannot drive out an equally efficient
entrant who has incurred the sunk costs of entry, and thus will eventually be
abandoned and fail to create the impression that the incumbent is more
efficient than entrants. Further, in the present context, the assumption that
other firms and capital markets can be fooled in the long run seems
dubious. Such pricing creates a market opportunity for any capital investors
savvy enough to realize when current prices are an unreliable indication of
future prices, especially since the actual future prospects are that the equally
efficient entrant will get a share of supracompetitive profits.123 More
important, even if actual short-term pricing that did not cover long-term
costs does fool rivals (and their providers of capital), their investment or
entry will only be deferred. To continue deterring it, the predator will have
to maintain such pricing for the long tenn. If it does so, then such pricing
below long-term total costs will become predatory because the relevant
capital costs will have become variable for the predator too during the long
the incumbent out of the market and become the new monopolist itself. But that prospect will
hardly deter entry.
121. Ordover, supra note 17, at 80-81 (synthesizing the recent literature); see also Bolton et
al., supra note 15, at 2247-49, 2285-330 (same but in greater depth).
122. On the other hand, if the entry is announced, but not yet completed because some
important capital investment remains to be made, see infra Section V.A (discussing the difficulties
of defining the moment of entry), then price cutting at that stage might deter the investment
necessary to complete entry if it misleads the entrant. But it is hard to believe entrants will be that
misled by pricing that is plainly reactive to their entry plans.
123. Any assumption about uncertainty must also be applied evenhandedly. The predator will
also be uncertain about entrant efficiency and future consumer demand. If the rival is less
efficient, pricing below total costs would sacrifice profits for no good reason since total cost
pricing would deter investment or entry anyway. If the rival is more efficient, then pricing at
incumbent variable costs may not deter investment or entry even if the entrant mistakes that price
for an indication of the incumbent's total costs. If the rival is equally efficient, the predator will
still be uncertain whether the rival (and its providers of capital) will interpret its pricing as
indicating total rather than variable costs. Uncertainty about what sort of rival or potential rival it
faces, and about how any price signal will be interpreted, thus seems sufficient to deter the
predator from pricing at levels that sacrifice profits in all cases in order to send a signal to a mere
subset of rivals, especially since that level of pricing cannot in fact inflict post-investment or post-
entry losses on equally efficient rivals.
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period of alleged predatory pricing. Thus, even if one believes capital
markets are easily misled, that is no reason to deviate from using the costs
that are variable to the predator during the relevant period.
Alternatively, one might conclude it is rational for the predator to
persist in pricing that does not cover long-term costs in one market if it is a
monopolist in many markets and wants to signal firms in other markets that
they will lose money if they enter those other markets (or incur the periodic
sunk costs necessary to stay in them).' 24 For example, suppose that after an
equally efficient firm enters one market, the incumbent responds with a
price that allows the entrant to recover the costs that are now variable to it,
but that does not allow recoupment of its sunk costs of entry. Such a price
cannot drive out the entrant for reasons described above and would thus be
irrational if only the first market were considered. But suppose the
incumbent does not set its price to drive out the first entrant. Instead, it sets
that price to deter other equally efficient firms-who have not yet incurred
entry costs-from entering the other markets. If the other potential entrants
believe the incumbent will respond with the same pricing in those other
markets, they will be deterred from entering (even though equally efficient)
because they cannot recoup their entry costs. A similar strategy might be
employed to deter the sunken investments necessary for existing rivals to
stay in multiple markets.
Or so goes the theory. But there are manifold problems with this
multimarket theory of predation through prices above variable costs. The
first is obvious. Often the alleged predator is not a monopolist in multiple
markets, making this theory utterly inapplicable. Second, it will rarely be
the case that in all the predator's markets, the predator has made sunk
investments about which rivals or potential entrants are just about to decide.
Such a strategy thus cannot help induce exit or deter entry in any markets
where the rivals have already incurred the relevant sunk cost. Third, this
pricing strategy cannot deter investment or entry by any rival that simply
invests in or enters all the remaining markets simultaneously, since then the
pricing cannot send a signal to any remaining market.125 Capital markets
should be willing to provide the financing to increase the scale of entry
because getting (or retaining) a slice of supracompetitive profits in these
markets will be highly profitable. And if no single rival can invest or enter
in all markets, multiple rivals or entrants can always organize a group of
firms to make simultaneous investments or entry.
126
124. See Easley et al., supra note 78, at 447-54, 457 (offering a multimarket model under
which an incumbent could deter entry of equally efficient entrants in subsequent markets with
prices above variable costs in the first market); Ordover, supra note 17, at 80 (reviewing the
literature).
125. Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 286-87.
126. id. at 288. Since, by definition, the firms would be in separate markets and unable to
enter them all, they would not be horizontal competitors subjecting their agreement to judicial
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Fourth, even if rivals cannot act simultaneously in multiple markets,
such a pricing strategy cannot deter investment or entry by a rival in the last
of the markets where rivals have not yet incurred the relevant sunk costs.
The reason is that carrying out and persisting in such pricing will be
irrational because it can neither drive out the last entrant nor send a signal
in any future market. Since the threat is not credible, investment and entry
by that last rival will not be deterred. Further, the rival in the next-to-last
market would likewise not be deterred because the rival would realize such
predator pricing would be irrational since it could not deter investment or
entry in the only remaining market. And so on, until by backward induction
one reaches the conclusion that the threat of initiating or continuing such
pricing could not deter investment or entry in any of the prior markets.
27
In the case of below-cost predatory pricing, some have argued that
backward induction fails because rival information is imperfect about
whether incumbents can profit from below-cost predation against an
equally efficient entrant. 128 But here that uncertainty is inapplicable since
pricing above variable costs can never profitably drive out an equally
efficient entrant. Others argue there is no clear end point at which a rival
will know it is in the last market. 129 But applying this assumption
evenhandedly implies equal ambiguity about who is in thefirst market that
begins this supposed signal-sending game. If a predator is in ten ongoing
markets and deprives a rival in only one market of the ability to recoup total
costs, rivals in other markets seem more likely to draw inferences from the
behavior in the nine markets than in the one outlier. The predator may thus
need to carry out such a scheme in most markets to send a message to those
that remain, which makes the scheme less rational (since profits will be
sacrificed in a majority of markets where driving out the equally efficient
rivals is impossible) and makes it clear to the remaining rivals that they are
the last ones (which strengthens backward-induction problems).
More important, for the signal sent from any single market to be
convincing, the predator will have to persist in the low price long enough to
actually deprive its rival of a profitable long-term return on its investment
hostility. In any event, since an agreement to make simultaneous investments or entry need not
involve any agreement on price, nor any agreement to refrain from entering or investing in each
other's territories, it does not seem to involve any per se violation. And under the rule of reason,
an agreement to add output without more would be procompetitive.
127. Reinhard Selten reaches the same conclusion for a threat of unprofitable below-cost
predatory pricing. Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 passim
(1978). If that conclusion holds there, a fortiori it will be true when variable cost pricing in the last
market cannot inflict any loss that will induce the rival in the last market to exit after it incurs the
sunk costs of investment or entry.
128. See Ordover, supra note 17, at 80 (reviewing the literature). Even in these models, there
will be an equilibrium where a below-cost pricing strategy is only sometimes credible enough to
deter investment or cntry.
129. See id. (reviewing the literature).
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or entry. If the predator just offers a price at variable costs for a short time,
then it will not send the necessary signal that the predator is willing to
persist in pricing below its total costs long enough to deprive an equally
efficient rival of any ability to recoup sunk costs even when the rival cannot
be driven out of the market. But the need to persist in such a scheme over
the long haul to create an object lesson for other markets creates two
serious problems. The first is that, by the time the incumbent has persisted
long enough to create the signal in the first market, rivals will likely have
made sunken capital investments in the other markets (which presumably
share the same rate of capital replacement). Second, and more important,
the predator's own capital costs will become variable during such a lengthy
period of predatory pricing, and thus such pricing would be illegal under a
variable costs test. Thus, any multimarket predation plan by a monopolist
must begin with conduct that would be an antitrust violation under variable
cost measures in at least the first market, and probably in most markets, in
order to send the necessary signal. The imposition of treble damages in
those markets should suffice to deter such a scheme.
If this analysis is correct, then it greatly simplifies the cost inquiry.
Courts need not determine marginal costs or make complex judgment calls
about which costs should be considered variable and which fixed and when
to use one cost measure over another. Nor need courts determine the
magnitude of the predator's costs for the sorts of costs that are variable to
the victim during the period of alleged predatory pricing, which may entail
capital costs and thus require projections about what sorts of capital costs
the incumbent will incur in the future and what their amortized magnitude
would be.1 30 Instead, the relevant incremental costs are simply the
difference between the actual total costs the incumbent incurred during the
period of alleged predation and the total costs it would have incurred
without the alleged predatory increase in output. Unless there has been
some exogenous increase in input costs, this can often be determined by
simply comparing total costs before and after the alleged predatory
behavior. Dividing this by the alleged predatory increase in output converts
this into a per-unit incremental cost, which then simply can be compared to
the per-unit price the predator charged during the alleged period of
predation.
F. Conclusion on the Proper Cost Measure
In short, it seems implausible that a predator could deter long-term
investments or entry by any equally efficient firm by use of short-term
threats or pricing strategies that exceed short-term costs. And when the
130. See supra Section I.D.
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predator pursues a long-term pricing strategy, the difference between
variable and total costs disappears because all costs are variable over the
long term. My own conclusion is thus that allowing alleged predators to
price at their own variable costs will not deter or drive out equally efficient
rivals as long as we are careful to consider all costs of the allegedly
predatory increase in output that replaces the rival's output that are variable
to the predator during the period of alleged predation. That is, we need only
consider those predator costs that are varied by the allegedly predatory
increase in output. Accordingly, prices above this properly defined variable
cost level should not be deemed predatory.
If the logic behind that conclusion were rejected, it would still be the
case that a predator could not deter or drive out an equally efficient rival if
its prices covered a cost measure reflecting the magnitude of predator costs
for the sorts of costs in replacing the rival's output that are variable to the
rival during the period of entry or investment decisions influenced by the
short-term existence or threat of such pricing. Thus, even on this somewhat
less sanguine view, prices above this somewhat higher cost level should
never be deemed predatory even if below long-run total costs. A fortiori,
prices above long-run total costs should not be predatory on any view, since
everyone acknowledges they cannot exclude equally efficient rivals.
I should emphasize that the conclusions in the remainder of this Article
hold regardless of whether I am correct about which cost measure suffices
to assure that prices at cost cannot deter or drive out an equally efficient
rival. Even if the reader disagrees with my above analysis about what
measure of costs satisfies this standard, the analysis below would support
rejecting a restriction on any price that is not below whichever cost measure
the reader believes does satisfy this standard. That is, for purposes of
establishing my general thesis, one can below substitute for the word
"costs" whichever measure of costs the reader believes suffices to prevent
an incumbent pricing at cost from deterring or driving out equally efficient
entrants. While the lowest possible cost measure that satisfies this test may
remain a matter of debate, there is consensus in the literature that a price at
or above long-run incremental cost cannot drive out an equally efficient
rival. 131 Since the proposals to restrict above-cost price cuts would all ban
131. The European Advocate General expressly agreed with the general standard that
predatory pricing law should favor "more efficient firms" and protect only firms that were
"equally [efficient as] or more efficient" than the dominant firm. Joined Cases C-395/96 P & C-
396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Beige Transps. SA v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1365 117,
132 (Opinion of Advocate Gen.). But he was of the mistaken view that selective above-cost price
cuts could somehow drive out an equally efficient firm because of "its lesser financial capacity."
Id. 122, 132, 138. In fact, this is impossible if one defines costs correctly, and certainly if one
defines them to include all long-run marginal costs. Perhaps the Advocate General had in mind
the intuition, shared by many theories, that a firm might be equally efficient in the long run, but
not in the short run, and thus might need financing to overcome its initial inefficiency. I address
that possibility below. See infra Section IV.C.
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some prices above long-run incremental costs, they can be described as
banning above-cost predatory pricing no matter which cost measure one
uses.
111. REACTIVE PRICE CUTS To DRIVE OUT ENTRANTS NEED NOT
INDICATE INCUMBENT MARKET POWER-AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR DEFINING COSTS WHERE COMMON COSTS EXIST
The premise behind the general theory for restricting reactive above-
cost price cuts that drive out entrants is that such price cuts undesirably
protect market power. After all, pricing above cost seems to meet a standard
definition of market power, given the normal premise that firms in a
competitive market price at marginal cost.132 Relatedly, standard analysis
assumes that an ability to price discriminate implies the firm must have
market power. 133 These premises have been particularly important in the
airline industry, which is the central case cited by supporters of restrictions
on reactive above-cost price cuts. Regulators and enforcement agencies
have assumed that each route is its own market and that airlines that run
hub-and-spoke systems must be exploiting market power if they charge
higher prices in routes that connect spokes to concentrated hubs than they
do on other routes with similar distance and density. 134 Given these
premises, if a hub airline responds to an entrant who sells on a route
connecting a hub-and-spoke by lowering its price on that route and driving
out that entrant, this must reflect an undesirable protection of incumbent
airline market power.
These premises have reinforced intellectual frustrations about the
seeming failure to realize the predictions of contestable market theory in the
airline industry. Contestable market theory held that in markets where entry
was very easy it would not matter whether an incumbent firm had a one-
hundred percent market share. The threat of entry alone would make the
incumbent lower prices to competitive levels. Individual airline routes were
132. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 §§ 1.0-1.22 (Sept. 10,
1992); PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 556 (5th ed. 1997); CARLTON
& PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 92; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
284 (1988); DON E. WALDMAN & ELIZABETH J. JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 40, 437,
667 (2d ed. 2001); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981).
133. See AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 132, at 437; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19,
at 277; WALDMAN & JENSEN, supra note 132, at 436; Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1578-79 (1969); Hal R. Varian,
Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 599 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
134. Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation
Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,920 (proposed Apr. 10, 1998); U.S. Appellate Brief, supra note 36, at 5-
7, 64; U.S. Summary Judgment Mcmo, supra note 36, at 40.
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considered the classic example of a contestable market because it was so
easy to move or lease planes to enter a route if an incumbent monopolist
charged prices that were too high. Thus, the expected result of airline
deregulation was that each route would be priced at competitive rates (no
higher than the cost of the most efficient potential entrant) no matter how
much any individual carrier dominated sales on that route.
1 35 When instead
hub prices turned out to be persistently higher, one intellectual hangover
was the suspicion that contestable market theory was not working because
airlines were engaged in some anticompetitive conduct to exclude entrants.
Reactive price cuts seemed one promising target. Restricting them, and
encouraging inefficient entry, had the hope of forcing airlines at least to
engage in a type of limit pricing that amounted to restoring the market to a
contestable state. Edlin's piece is clearly in this spirit, explicitly hoping that
banning reactive price cuts will make the market more "contestable."
' 36
But the problem is that these underlying premises were never true. In a
hub-and-spoke airline system, as Section A shows, each route has
interlinked demand and common costs, and thus cannot be assumed to be in
separate markets in which incumbents enjoy market power. Nor does the
existence of price discrimination, inside or outside of the airline industry,
alone prove market power, whether one defines that as an ability to price
above the "competitive" level or (more helpfully) as a power to restrict total
market output in order to increase revenue or profits.'
37 To the contrary, as
135. See generally Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets, 4 YALE
J. ON REG. 393, 395, 400-01, 403-05 (1987).
136. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 989-90.
137. Both definitions of "market power" are commonly used by courts and scholars. See
Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 363, 370, 373-
74 & n.36 (1998) (collecting sources); see also Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust:
Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 44, 71-85, 88-92 (1993) (arguing for
the latter definition). If a competitive market would price discriminate, then a firm that price
discriminates does not price above the competitive level. Likewise, if such competitive price
discrimination maximizes output by enhancing the ability of firms to incur recurring common
costs, then it does not involve the exercise of any power to restrict market output in order to raise
prices and revenue. Of course, one could instead define "market power" as the ability to price (to
any customer) above marginal costs. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 92;
TIROLE, supra note 132, at 284; WALDMAN & JENSEN, supra note 132, at 40, 437, 667. And in
markets where competitive firms do not use price discrimination to cover common costs, this
alternative definition works fine. But in the present context, the problem is that this alternative
definition presupposes just what we are investigating: whether competition forces finns to price at
cost. This definition would also be misleading both linguistically and functionally because (1) it
would define "market power" to exist even when the firm has no power over market output or
price, but rather is one of many competitive rivals with very small market shares, and (2) it would
mean that "market power" no longer indicated the ability to impose an inefficient result harmful to
consumers. One could nonetheless stick to the alternative definition with the qualifier that firms
often desirably exercise "market power" in highly competitive markets, but instead it is more
helpful to use a definition that better tracks function and ordinary understandings. See Klein,
supra, at 71-84, 88-92 (agreeing that defining market power in terms of an ability to price above
marginal cost is unhelpful). Luckily, courts and enforcement agencies do not appear to have
defined market power as an ability to price above cost. See id.; Werden, supra, at 370, 373-74 &
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Section B explains, in normal (not unrealistically "perfect") highly
competitive markets where firms face common costs in delivering goods to
buyers with different demand elasticities, price discrimination among those
buyers is frequent and predictable.' 38 Such price discrimination charges
more to the high-demand buyers, thus effectively recouping a higher share
of common costs from them. While competition will drive total economic
profits to zero, and thus make total revenue equal total costs, competition
will also force each firm to adopt, where sustainable, the price-
discrimination schedule that maximizes its profits. 139 The competitive result
thus may be a price-discrimination schedule that, by maximizing the
revenue earned from any common costs, also maximizes each firm's ability
to incur common costs, and thus maximizes industry output and aggregate
sales to the high- and low-demand buyers.
But this competitive result will not always be stable because firms or
entrants will constantly be tempted to deviate from the output-maximizing
price-discrimination schedule by serving only (or mainly) the high-paying
buyers at a lower price. If they do so, Section C points out, other firms will
have to follow suit by cutting their prices to these high-paying customers,
given that retaining them is necessary to cover common costs. Because this
deviation is inefficient, lower industry output will result as long as it lasts.
If the entrant's costs of serving only the high-paying customers are higher
than the costs of serving those customers that would be incurred by the
firms that also serve lower-paying customers, then separate provision is in
fact not as efficient as common provision. The firms that serve both sets of
buyers will thus be able to drive the entrant out with a price that is above
their costs of serving the high-demand buyers, and after they have done so,
raise prices to the high-paying buyers and restore the output-maximizing
price-discrimination schedule. That is, reactive above-cost price cuts that
drive out entrants not only do not necessarily signal the undesirable
protection of market power, they may be the normal and necessary way of
restoring efficient price discrimination in competitive markets.
n.36. In any event, whatever definitional labels we choose will not alter the substantive result that
what is being described is a desirable state of affairs, and that unilateral pricing decisions that
protect it should thus not be condemned by antitrust law.
138. See Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 6-7 (2002); William J. Baumrol, Normal and Effectively Competitive Equilibrium with
Ubiquitous Discriminatory Price Taking (Apr. 26, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); see also Klein, supra note 137, at 65-66, 71-72 (describing this phenomenon without
linking it to the need to cover common costs).
139. Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 1-6).
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A. Individual Routes in Hub-and-Spoke Systems Cannot
Be Assumed To Be Separate Markets
The premise that airline markets were properly defined by a route
between city A and city B failed to recognize that the advent of hub-and-
spoke systems of airline travel makes it problematic to separate individual
routes from a general network of airline flights. With a hub-and-spoke
system, airlines can satisfy customers who desire travel between a
multitude of city-pairs with dramatically fewer flights and less cost by
having one "hub" city with flights to each of the other "spoke" cities.
1 40
Moreover, the flights will be fuller (and thus cheaper per passenger) in the
hub-and-spoke system, and more likely to sustain a reasonable schedule of
travel on the larger jet planes that passengers prefer because of their more
comfortable ride.1 4 1 Indeed, it is clear that without hub-and-spoke systems it
would not be possible to sustain a reasonable schedule of air travel from
small cities that may have hundreds of people traveling somewhere each
day (who could thus fill a flight to a hub), but only a handful of people
traveling to any single city (who could thus not cover the cost of a schedule
of nonstop flights from their small city to all their separate destinations).1
42
The efficiencies driving this hub-and-spoke system are thus
overwhelming. But these efficiencies mean one cannot simply assume
routes between different cities are separate markets. Passengers with
different itineraries are being combined on the same flights. The market
prices for seats on a flight from hub city A to spoke city B thus turn not just
on the demand for travel between those cities, but also on the demand for
travel between city B and cities C-Z. And travel between city B and cities
C-Z might be serviced by rivals not only through the same hub, but with
nonstop flights or through other hub cities. Some passengers might be
interested only in nonstop flights between a hub and a spoke city, but in a
sense they are side beneficiaries of a system driven mainly by the need to
provide hub-and-spoke coverage. Indeed, the hub-and-spoke system makes
possible nonstop service between cities that otherwise would not be
possible.1 43 With the routes intermingled in this way, it may thus make
much more sense to think about the entire hub-and-spoke network as the
relevant product an airline provides. 144 If the hub-and-spoke network itself
is the relevant product, then the relevant price and cost would be those
140. See Levine, supra note 135, at 441-46.
141. id. at 441-42.
142. Id. at 442-43.
143. id. at 443.
144. See generally 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 §§ 1.0-1.22
(Sept. 10, 1992) (examining buyer and supplier substitution to define antitrust markets).
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earned and expended across the hub-and-spoke network, not on individual
routes.
Even if individual routes are separate markets for some purposes, their
integration into a hub-and-spoke system requires incurring large common
costs, whose allocation across the constituent routes is largely arbitrary.
45
Developing such a hub-and-spoke system requires large investments. The
airline cannot just have flights between the most attractive city-pairs to reap
the advantages of hub-and-spoke travel but must rather have a full network
of flights. It must have sufficient gate slots and ticketing offices; a fleet of
planes and equivalent maintenance facilities; baggage transfer operations; a
large team of trained personnel; and a complex system for marketing,
planning, scheduling, reserving, dispatching, and pricing across the entire
hub-and-spoke network. Perhaps more important, it must incur the costs of
maintaining flights that impact revenue on connecting flights, and incurring
increased ground time for planes in order to provide connections, which
also generally entails using more gates. 146 Moreover, in order to maintain
the reliability of its hub-and-spoke system over time, the airline probably
has to commit to covering certain routes even though they become
unprofitable over the short run.
Consideration of hub-and-spoke economics thus sharply undercuts the
intuition that reactive price cuts that drive out entrants on a particular airline
route undesirably protect market power on that route. In a hub-and-spoke
system, individual routes may not represent separate markets because of
interlinked demand and common costs. If so, then airlines should not be
considered to have market power unless they can constrain output on the
entire hub-and-spoke system to raise revenue or profits. But in fact, airlines
do not earn above normal profits, suggesting that they probably do not have
such market power. 147 Even if the price on a single route falls below the
145. See Baumol, supra note 41, at 59 (noting that any allocation of common costs is
arbitrary). Airlines sometimes allocate these common costs by simply dividing the total hub-and-
spoke costs by the number of flights or flight hours. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d
1141, 1175-77 (D. Kan. 2001). But while this may make sense for accounting or business
purposes, as an economic matter, any allocation of joint production costs is inherently arbitrary.
For example, more than fifty percent of passengers in major hubs are "connecting passengers"
(they are flying through the hub between two spokes), see Edlin, supra note 6, at 944 n. 12, which
leaves something less than fifty percent as "hub passengers" (the hub is one end point of their
travel). Thus, one could take the view that because the connecting passengers would support the
relevant flight, the incremental cost of flying the hub passengers is extremely low. See id.
Alternatively, one could take the view that because the hub passengers would support the flight,
the incremental cost of flying the connecting passengers is extremely low. The problem is that
both could be true, making any allocation of joint costs to the individual flights arbitrary.
146. An airline that does not offer connecting flights (like Southwest Airlines) has very little
turnaround time because it needs just enough time to unload one set of passengers and load the
next. It need not keep the plane waiting for connecting customers. This shorter ground time also
means it can run more flights per gate, reducing the capital costs of planes and gates,
147. See Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 8); Gary J. Dorman & William J. Baumol,
On Cures That Bring Thcir Own Diseases 4 (Apr. 14, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
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separate cost of flying that route, continuing that price can be efficient if it
increases demand on other routes in the hub-and-spoke system. In that case,
under a cost-based test, the prices a hub-and-spoke airline charges should
not be considered predatory unless the overall revenue on a hub-and-spoke
system falls below the cost of providing the entire hub-and-spoke system. 148
If demand for each route could be separated, the existence of
widespread common costs still means that prices should not be considered
predatory under a cost-based test unless either (a) prices across the system
are lower than system costs or (b) the price on the particular route falls
below a measure of separate costs that excludes all common costs of
operating the hub-and-spoke system. This is why the district court was
correct to reject predation tests that compared individual route prices to
fully allocated system costs in the American Airlines litigation. 149 An
analogy might be drawn to the pricing used to recoup the common costs of
flying a plane. As everyone who travels knows, some seats are sold for
much more than others on the same flight, which may well mean that the
lowest prices charged are well below the average cost per seat. But given
the dominance of common costs, this fact should not make prices on those
seats predatory. Instead, one must either compare the incremental revenue
for the flight to the incremental cost of making that flight,1 50 or compare the
price on the lowest priced seats to the incremental cost of serving the
additional passenger, which may well be extremely low since costs are
almost the same whether the seat is empty or full.
15 1
This is not a proposition unique to airlines, but rather is just one
instance of the more general proposition that products with common costs
should be considered below cost only if the price for any one product is
lower than its separate cost (which is unlikely since that excludes common
costs) or if the price for the combination of products falls below their
combined cost (which includes common costs). 152 Likewise, if one product
with common costs is sold at different prices to different sets of customers,
author). Such evidence is suggestive but not necessarily determinative. A firm could offset
supracompetitive profits on some routes with greater inefficiency on other routes. Or perhaps
airlines earn supracompetitive profits that they distribute to their unions. But one would think that
the inefficiency on other routes would be driven out in the long run. Also union power in other
industries does not generally eliminate supracompetitive profits, and it is difficult to explain why
airline unions would drive so many airlines to bankruptcy if they enjoyed supracompetitive
profits.
148. If the conclusions of Part 11 are accepted, the relevant costs would be the costs that are
varied by the predatory increase in output. That also is true for all references to separate or
common costs in this Section.
149. See supra Section I.A.
150. See Int'l Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 991 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1993).
151. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 740b2, at 427. In addition, one would
have to show that the predatory output increase reflected in these seats sufficed to drive out the
relevant rival output. See supra Section I.C.
152. See Baumol, supra note 41, at 59-61.
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the prices should be deemed below cost if the price to any one set of
customers is below the separate cost of producing that quantity or if the
prices recovered from the combination of customers is lower than the
combined costs of producing the aggregate quantity. 5 3 Indeed, if a
multiproduct firm cuts prices on one product (or to one set of customers),
but its prices for the combination of products (or customers) still cover all
costs (including common costs), the initial prices for the combination of
products (or customers) must have exceeded their combined cost and been
supracompetitive. Thus, the price cut on one product (or to one set of
customers) without a corresponding increase on other products (or
customers) amounts to a desirable discount from oligopoly or monopoly
prices. 114
Yet this does not mean that the existence of price discrimination across
routes shows airlines must have market power, or that all reactive above-
cost price cuts undesirably protect airline market power, for reasons
considered next.
B. Why Competitive Markets May Induce Price
Discrimination That Maximizes Output
Airlines recoup the common costs of a hub-and-spoke system not with
uniform prices, but with a complex regime of prices that vary sharply not
just from route to route, but from customer to customer and day to day.
Since passengers flying nonstop between a hub-and-spokc city get a more
valuable slice of the hub-and-spoke system (quicker, more convenient
travel), they are charged more per mile.155 Indeed, passengers on any single
flight are charged wildly different prices to recover the common costs of
operating that flight. Such price discrimination is not a feature unique to the
airline industry. It also occurs with movie theaters that (without any market
power) cover the common costs of exhibiting movies by price
discriminating among adults, seniors, and children, or with retailers that
(without any market power) cover the common costs of operating retail
space by charging different markups on different goods with the same low
153. See id. at 63-65; cf 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 724d, at 292-93,
742c, at 460-61, 742c2-d, at 464-68 (reaching similar conclusions, though sometimes, for
unclear reasons, requiring proof of both rather than either).
154. Cf 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW 1758f (1996) (establishing a similar proposition for package discounts offered 'in tying
cases).
155. This is true even though the very features that make their air travel more valuable also
might make it seem that their travel is less costly. They take a more efficient route, require fewer
takeoffs and landings, need no arrangements to make sure connections are made, and do not
require multiple sets of baggage handling. Which passengers enjoy these advantages of directness,
however, is itself a product of how the hub-and-spoke system is structured. Moreover, as noted
above, the allocation ofjoint costs is inherently arbitrary.
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marginal retailing cost) 56 Price discrimination among buyers who can be
served only by incurring common costs is thus routine even in highly
competitive markets, including hotels, computers, automobiles, books,
clothing, groceries, restaurants, telecommunications, and the vast range of
other products that offer coupons, rebates, student or senior discounts,
quantity discounts, or different prices at different times or places. 157 Indeed,
it is hard to think of industries without price discrimination, even though
most of these industries are highly competitive or contestable, and the firms
in them earn zero economic profit (i.e., a normal rate of return).
The prices charged to buyers thus vary greatly in competitive markets
where, as typical, common costs exist. At a minimum, these prices will
cover the separate costs of serving each customer-that is, the additional
cost imposed by a single customer assuming common costs have been
incurred. But if that were the only price charged to all customers, then firms
could not recover their common costs and thus would never incur them.
Accordingly, the price schedule for serving the combination of buyers will
have to cover the common costs of doing so. Where price discrimination is
sustainable, competition will force firms to adopt the price-discrimination
schedule that maximizes the revenue from customers for any common costs
that have been incurred.1 58 But competition will also assure that the total
revenue earned from both sets of buyers will not exceed total separate and
common costs, and thus economic profits will remain at zero even though
some buyers are paying a price above the separate cost of serving them.
59
That is, a price-discrimination schedule that earns positive economic profits
will be undercut by a rival or entrant in a competitive or contestable market.
But a price-discrimination schedule that maximizes the revenue from any
common costs without exceeding them cannot be undercut by a profitable
schedule of price discrimination that serves both sets of customers.
Where sustainable, this competitive price discrimination will generally
increase output. If all buyers were charged the same price, and thus
effectively covered both their separate cost and an equal share of common
costs, then sales would be lost to those buyers who are not willing to pay
that high a price but would be willing to pay a price higher than their
separate costs. This would mean an inefficient reduction in output since
156. Sometimes, as with movie seats, the products sold are identical but firms differentiate
among buyers who have different demand elasticities. Other times, product differences are created
that may even degrade some output in order to help differentiate among buyers, as with airline
flight restrictions, cars, computer equipment, and other products and services. See Klein, supra
note 137, at 65-66; Levine, supra note 138, at 20-21, 23-27; Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript
at 15-16).
157. See Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 1, 6); Klein, supra note 137, at 65-66;
Levine, supra note 138, at 2-3, 14-16, 21-29.
158. Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 3-6).
159. Id.
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their willingness to pay exceeds the marginal cost of doing so if common
costs can be covered. If instead the buyers who value the product more
highly can be charged a higher price, and thus cover a higher share of
common costs, then the buyers who value the product less highly can be
charged a lower price that does not cover their proportionate share of
common costs but remains above their separate costs. Additional sales can
be made and output will be expanded. In other words, the price-
discrimination schedule that maximizes the revenue from any common
costs that are incurred will also enable firms to incur the most common
costs and maximize industry output.
The tricky issue is explaining how such discriminatory prices can be
sustained without market power given the incentives of individual firms to
increase profits by concentrating their sales on high-demand buyers. Prior
literature has established at least two situations where such desirable price
discrimination will occur without any market power to reduce market
output in order to reap supracompetitive profits.
First, there might be economies of scale, so that some common costs
might suffice to serve the entire market (e.g., one plane suffices to serve the
route), and yet the market might be contestable in that any entrant could
costlessly enter with similar economies of scale. If so, then discriminatory
Ramsey pricing (which charges more to less elastic buyers) will prevent
any competitive entry and thus be sustainable. 160 Indeed, that threat of entry
will drive the firm to discriminatory pricing.161 Since the market can
efficiently sustain only one firm, no rival can hope to retain a
disproportionate share of high-demand buyers in the market with less
discriminatory pricing. Yet the competitive threat of entry prevents any
incumbent from cutting market output to raise revenue or from pricing in
ways that make revenue exceed total costs.
This can also describe workable competition in markets where each
firm serves some limited set of customers exclusively (like the local comer
store) but would, if any firm's total revenue exceeded costs, provoke rivals
into moving in and serving that set too. In these cases, rivals cannot
concentrate sales on the high-demand buyers because local economies of
scale effectively bundle them with low-demand buyers. One can reach
similar results with spatial models of brand preferences, where each brand's
characteristics have a particular "location" that matches the preferences of a
set of high- and low-demand buyers but that cannot earn supracompetitive
profits because, if it did, other firms would create a brand with the same
characteristics. In effect, each brand can be a contestable market. If so, then
160. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 208-17 (1982).
161. Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 1-6).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112: 681
Above-Cost Price Cuts
each brand can and will engage in discriminatory pricing to cover its
common costs (including the costs of brand advertising) even though it
competes in a larger market and cannot raise its price-discrimination
schedule to a level that reaps supracompetitive profits.1
62
Second, individual buyers may be high-demand buyers for some
products and low-demand buyers for other products that are efficient to buy
from the same seller. For example, restaurant patrons buy food and drink at
the same meal, adult moviegoers often buy tickets for themselves at the
same time that they buy tickets for their kids, and consumers often prefer
buying multiple products after making a single trip to one retailer (like a
supermarket).163 If purchases are efficiently bundled in this manner, it has
been shown that competitive sellers can maximize buyer utility by offering
a discriminatory schedule of Ramsey prices that charges higher markups on
the products for which buyers have less elastic demand, producing total
revenue that covers the common costs of operating the retail space but does
not exceed total costs.164 Rivals cannot undercut this with a less
discriminatory price schedule, for they will be offering less utility to buyers
and are thus less likely to attract buyers into making the trip to their place
of business. This probably explains why, for example, competitive
restaurants (from fast food joints to fancy restaurants) charge much higher
markups on drinks than they do on food even though the latter is more
costly and difficult to provide. Since in a competitive market the total
revenue on food and drink must match total cost, no rival can lower prices
just on the high markup drinks without raising them on food. And since the
bulk of patrons consume both food and drink in the same seating, a rival
that offers lower drink markups with compensating higher food markups
cannot normally hope to get a disproportionate share of drinkers. Rather,
because the rival has undercut the price schedule that maximizes patron
utility, it will attract fewer patrons.
We might extend this second theory beyond the retail context to the
general case where brand loyalty causes individuals to commit to one brand
for multiple products until another brand offers a more attractive package.
In the retail context, it is efficient to bundle the purchase of different
162. See Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 380, 380-81 (1985); see also Klein, supra note 137, at 72, 77-78 (arguing that almost cvery
brand faces a downward sloping demand curve that permits price discrimination).
163. This would also apply to purchases from hotels or integrated packages like computer
systems. See Christopher Bliss, A Theory of Retail Pricing, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 375, 391 (1988).
164. See Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, Competitive Price Discrimination, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 579, 580-82 (2001); Bliss, supra note 163, at 378-80, 382, 385. One could see this as a
special case of a contestable market. "A shop enjoys a limited but significant natural monopoly
over the demand of the shopper who has incurred the cost of coming to the shop." Bliss, supra
note 163, at 378. If retail shops try to earn supracompetitive profits, however, it is easy for rivals
to "enter" this market by persuading customers in the future to incur the costs of traveling to their
shop instead.
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products either because buyers enjoy them more together (food and drink,
sitting with one's kids at the movies) or because assembling goods in one
place saves consumer-transportation and -time costs.' 65 For brands, one
might similarly say that combining goods under one brand name saves
consumer-information or -search costs because positive experience with
one brand can be applied to the next. One might understand various airline
efforts to build brand loyalty, including frequent flier programs, as partly an
effort to help maintain the proportion of business and personal travelers by
shifting individual consumers (who take both business and personal flights)
from making flight-by-flight choices to instead choosing between airlines
for their full range of flight needs. To the extent such efforts are successful,
competing airlines would have incentives to engage in intrapersonal price
discrimination by offering consumers the discriminatory price schedule for
business and personal travel that maximizes their utility. In these cases,
rivals cannot concentrate sales on the high-demand buyers because their
high-demand purchases are bundled with their low-demand purchases.
Although these two situations explain some of the phenomenon, the
prior literature has not yet explained successfully just how competitive
markets can arrive at and sustain efficient output-maximizing
discriminatory pricing in markets where high- and low-demand purchases
are not bundled and multiple firms compete for the business of the same
buyers. I thus here offer two additional models to explain how such
competitive price discrimination can be maintained.
First, suppose the buyers willing to pay a low price are informed and
price-sensitive, while the buyers willing to pay a high price are uninformed
or price-insensitive (below some level) and select sellers at random. Being
uninformed really means being unwilling to incur the costs of becoming
informed about price differences. This may reflect the fact that spending
time is more costly for these buyers, or that a given information cost
matters less to them because of their relative price insensitivity. For
example, compared to tourists, business travelers might well be less price-
sensitive because they are not spending their own money or find it too
costly to spend the time investigating prices. If so, price discrimination
between them can be maintained, because a rival or entrant who undercuts
the high price will not gain a greater-than-random share of business
travelers.
Further, it seems reasonable to assume that the random choices made
by uninformed (or price-insensitive) buyers are not so much among firms as
among flights or retail outlets. That is, the buyer uninformed about (or
insensitive to) relative prices just buys whatever flight is most convenient
or from whichever retail outlet the buyer happens to enter. If so, a firm that
165. See Bliss, supra note 163, at 375, 377-78.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112:681
Above-Cost Price Cuts
incurs more increments of common costs by offering more flights or retail
outlets gains a greater share of the high-demand buyers. Since gaining a
greater share of these high-demand buyers is more profitable, each firm will
have incentives to compete by increasing the common costs it incurs.
Further, since these high-demand buyers are willing to pay more than the
average cost of fully utilized common costs, firms will be willing to expand
their increments of common costs (like number of flights) to the point
where they have some unused capacity (like empty seats). And rather than
let that unused capacity go to waste, they might as well sell it to the low-
demand (informed) buyers at a price closer to their marginal costs once
common costs are incurred. This additional revenue will lead to additional
expansion until competitive firms reach the maximum output allowed by
the use of discriminatory pricing to cover common costs. Firms whose
discriminatory price schedule produces revenue that exceeds common costs
will be undercut by a schedule that does not; likewise, firms that have
common costs that are inefficiently high can be undercut by an efficient
firm that will incur lower common costs and offer a lower price schedule at
every level.
Edlin offers a related model where (in a competitive market with low
entry barriers) retail outlets price discriminate among informed and
uninformed buyers with price-matching policies. 166 He reaches the quite
different conclusion that it will lead all firms to adopt a supracompetitive
price (with an offer to match a lower price that is never met) that will keep
inducing entry by firms that adopt the same pricing strategy, leaving each
retail store with fewer uninformed buyers, until per-unit costs rise enough
to dissipate supracompetitive profits fully. 6 7 But if his prediction actually
occurred, then each firm would have unused capacity that would create
powerful incentives for it to price discriminate--offering that unused
capacity at lower prices to the informed marginal buyers who will not buy
at the supracompetitive price. The fact that other firms will match that price
to informed buyers will not deter this because selling this unused capacity
at a lower price to some share of the informed buyers is more profitable
than letting it go to waste. Indeed, such price matching by other firms
would reinforce the conclusion that such price discrimination would spread
166. See Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and
Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 528, 529-31, 536-52, 573-75 (1997).
Professors Salop and Stiglitz earlier offered a related model whereby uninformed buyers choose
shops at random and informed buyers do not, and proved that one possible market equilibrium
was price dispersion with some shops at high prices and other shops at lower prices. See Steven
Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price
Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 493, 494, 502-07 (1977). But they assume each shop offers
only a single price, and thus do not consider the possibility that each shop might price
discriminate among informed and uninformed buyers.
167. Edlin, supra note 166, at 542-43, 547-49.
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across a competitive market. Alternatively, if existing firms have grown so
inefficient that their marginal costs have risen to match their
supracompetitive prices, then an entrant would have incentives to enter
(without adopting similar inefficiencies) with the same high price for
uninformed buyers but a lower price for informed buyers that incumbents
(given their high costs) would no longer be able to match, thus giving the
entrant all the informed buyers unwilling to pay the supracompetitive price.
Either way, competition and free entry is not consistent, as Edlin supposes,
with firms operating in such a way that their total revenue exceeds the most
efficient cost level.
Second, a different model can also explain desirable output-maximizing
competitive price discrimination even among informed buyers who can
choose among multiple firms and do not make high- and low-demand
purchases from the same firm. We need only posit three conditions (in
addition to the general assumption that firms can distinguish high- and low-
demand buyers and prevent them from reselling to each other). (1) At the
same price, the share of high-demand customers each firm receives depends
on how many increments of common costs it incurs. This seems a
reasonable assumption. The more flights or movies or retail locations a firm
offers, the greater the share of customers it should get at any equal price.
This assumption has the crucial feature that it means that (at the same price)
firms compete for high-demand customers by incurring more common
costs. (2) There is a discontinuity of demand that results in a set of high-
demand customers willing to pay more than the sum of separate costs and
an equal share of common costs, and low-demand customers who are
willing to pay less than that but something above their separate costs. (3)
The market is sufficiently competitive that supracompetitive profits
(revenue that exceeds costs) invite rapid expansion or entry, and any price
cut to high-demand customers is rapidly matched.
168
With those assumptions, one can show that firms on a competitive
market will have incentives to price discriminate in ways that expand
output. This is established in a mathematical footnote, 169 but a concrete
168. The importance and justification for the rapid price matching assumption is addressed
infra Section III.C.
169. Define the following variables. C, means the separate costs incurred per buyer. C, means
the common costs necessary to serve up to X buyers (e.g., for a flight with X seats). H is the total
number of high-demand passengers willing to pay up to C, + CJX + S, where S is whatever sum
they are willing to pay above their proportionate share of common costs. L equals the total number
of high-demand passengers willing to pay more than C, but only up to C, + C/X - T, where T is
whatever amount less than their proportionate share of common costs they are willing to pay. The
condition that they are willing to pay more than C, means CJX> T. PH means the price charged to
high-demand customers and PL means the price charged to low-demand customers. The market is
assumed to be sufficiently competitive that any P1 charged by one firm that undercuts the other
firms is immediately matched by them. See infra Section III.C. Ni means the number of
incremental common costs (like flights) incurred by the firm in question with a total of I firms,
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example may help. Suppose the common costs of flying a plane with 200
seats are $30,000 and the separate costs incurred for each additional
passenger are $50. A full plane thus costs $40,000 to fly, or $200 per
passenger. A half-full plane costs S35,000 to fly, or $350 per passenger.
Suppose there are a total of 1000 possible passengers: 500 business
travelers who will pay up to $300 per flight and 500 tourists who will pay
only up to $100 per flight. Suppose further that there are two airlines that
exhibit competitive behavior, instantly matching each other's prices and
that (at those equal prices) passengers divide up between the two firms in
proportion to the number of flights they offer. If the airlines charged a
uniform price of $200 to cover average common costs, then the 500 tourists
will not fly. The 500 business travelers will want to fly, and will fill one
flight for each airline. But neither airline (nor an entrant) can afford to fly
and N means the total number of incremental common costs incurred by all firms in a competitive
market.
Since each firm gets high-demand buyers in proportion to the common costs it incurs (e.g.,
flights it offers), the number of high-demand buyers a firm will enjoy is H*N/N. Let us call the
number of low-demand customers that firm enjoys Li. A firm will incur common costs of N, only
if PH*H*NiIN + PL*(Li) _ Ni*C, + C,*(Li + H*Ni/N). Suppose each finn charges a uniform price
that just covers common costs at full capacity, i.e., a price equal to C, + CJX. No low-demand
customers will buy at this price. Thus, Li for each firm, and L for all firms, will equal 0. Plugging
this into the above equations, we get that common costs of Ni will be incurred only if (C, +
CJ1X)*H*N/N _ N*C + C,*H*NiIN, which can be rearranged as H _ X*N. Thus, a firm will incur
common costs of N only if total demand from high-demand customers equals or exceeds total
industry capacity after Ni is added. Total capacity and output will be the largest N*X that is less
than H. Unmet demand by low-demand buyers will be L. Unmet demand from high-demand
buyers will be H- N*X.
This unmet demand by high-end customers should-unless capacity is added-bid up prices
for sales to high-demand customers up to what these high-demand customers are willing to pay, or
C, + CJX + S. This will offer supracompetitive profits. Again, Li will equal 0. Some finn or
entrant will then be willing to add capacity in order to get a greater share of the high-demand
customers by incurring common costs of N, if(C, + CJX+ S)*H*Ni/N > N*C + C,*H*NI/N. This
is the same as H + H*X*S/C, > N*X. Thus, firms will be willing to add capacity up until the point
that H + H*X*S/C > N*.. This will mean excess capacity (empty seats) of N*X- H, which is up
to H*X*'S/C,. (Even if the price to the high-demand customers is bid down somewhat, any price
that exceeds the sum of separate costs and an equal share of common costs leads to the same sorts
of results. And any price that does not exceed that sum will be bid up since demand will exceed
capacity.) Rather than allow that unused capacity (empty seats) to go to waste, each firm has
incentives to offer it at a lower (discriminatory) price to the low-demand customers.
When firms do fill the other seats with discriminatory prices, then that additional profit will
induce capacity to be added as long as PH*IN/N + PL*Li > N*C + C,*(L + H*NIN). At full
discriminatory prices, this will be true when (C, + CJX + S)*H*N,/N + (C, + C/X- T)*Li >_ Ni*C,
+ C *Li + C,*H*NM/N, which is the same as (C/X + S)*H*Ni/N + (CdX - 7)*Li > N*C,. The
number of low-demand buyers each firm serves will equal the capacity that would otherwise go
unused, which is Ni*X- H*NI,/N. Thus, the above can be expressed as (CJX + S)*H*N,/N + (CJX
- T)*(Ni*X - H*NI/N) > Ni*C, which can be rearranged as H*S/T + H > N*X. Thus, with
discriminatory pricing, firms will add capacity up to the point where H*SIT + H > N*X This
capacity and output will be greater than with maximum uniform pricing whenever H'SIT + H > H
+ H*X*S/C,, which can be rearranged as CIX> T. And that is true (as noted above) whenever the
low-demand customers are willing to pay a price above the separate costs of serving them. Thus,
output will always be higher with price discrimination that charges less to low-demand customers
as long as they are willing to pay something above their separate costs-that is, as long as they are
willing to make some contribution toward common costs.
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the other 100 on a half-full plane because the revenue ($20,000) would be
less than the cost ($35,000). Thus, unmet demand will include not only the
500 tourists but 100 business travelers. This unmet demand will bid
uniform prices up to the $300 these passengers are willing to pay. But that
would mean a per-flight revenue ($60,000) that exceeded cost ($40,000).
Those supracompetitive profits would give each firm incentives to add one
more flight each, giving each 250 total business passengers, with a per-
flight revenue ($37,500) that exceeds cost ($36,250). Neither would add the
market's fifth flight at this uniform price because that would give each
flight 100 passengers and thus produce revenue ($30,000) that was lower
than cost ($35,000). Thus, with uniform pricing, the maximum market
output is four flights and 500 passengers.
But this uniform pricing results in 75 empty seats per flight, which
gives each firm incentives to sell those empty seats at a lower price of $100
to tourists. That, in turn, raises per-flight revenue to $45,000 compared to a
cost of $40,000. Those supracompetitive profits will induce one firm (or an
entrant) to add another flight at the same level of discriminatory pricing,
creating a market total of five flights (each with 100 business passengers
paying $300 and 100 tourists paying $100) with revenue-matching costs.
Output will thus rise from four flights with 500 passengers without
discrimination to five flights with 1000 passengers with price
discrimination. Business passengers will have more flight options with
price discrimination, and tourists who otherwise could not fly will be able
to do so.
One might fear that one firm would drop flights to concentrate on the
high-demand buyers. For example, the firm with two flights could do so
figuring that flying two flights at cost is less profitable than flying one
flight of 200 business travelers at $300 and reaping $20,000 in
supracompetitive profits. But if it only offers one flight compared to the
three offered by rivals, it would only get one-fourth of the business
travelers at an equal price. Although this would look profitable if rivals did
not respond because the revenue ($45,000) would exceed cost ($40,000) for
all airlines, in a competitive market rivals would instantly respond by
adding their own flight, meaning that the airline that dropped a flight would
now only get one-fifth of the business travelers. It would thus still have
revenue that matched costs but would have cut its market share in half,
which should deter the move,1 70 and even if it did not, competitive price
discrimination would be restored.
All this may seem inconsistent with ordinary notions that the
competitive equilibrium forces pricing at marginal cost. Indeed, theorists
170. See infra Section IIT.C (discussing the parallel issue of cuts in prices to gain a
disproportionate share of high-demand buyers).
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arguing that competitive markets feature price discrimination have claimed
in part that such price discrimination is necessary to recoup nonmarginal
sunk capital costs.1 71 But this claim seems dubious. If costs are truly sunk,
they should and will be ignored by firms in pricing. This does not raise the
paradox, as is often supposed, 172 that sunk capital costs will never be
incurred. If marginal costs increase with output and firms are below average
costs, then it is true that pricing at marginal costs will prevent firms from
incurring further sunk capital costs. But they shouldn't; rather, it is more
efficient for firms to increase output with current capacity. If increasing
output eventually drives marginal costs above average costs, then pricing at
marginal cost will allow recovery of sunk capital costs, and will thus not
prevent firms from incurring those sunk costs to expand capacity.'
73
Rather, the argument that competition may require discriminatory
pricing seems appropriately limited to whichever costs are truly variable
over the relevant pricing period, though this may well include capital or
fixed costs that are recurring over time or as output rises. However, the
existence of recurring common costs means the marginal cost curve takes a
different shape than the conventional assumption that it continually slopes
upward. Where there are common costs to serving a set of customers, the
costs of incremental increases in output are lumpy and discontinuous,
featuring a large cost when the common cost is incurred (of adding a flight
or showing a movie) followed by much lower separate costs (of seating
another customer), then perhaps another large incremental common cost (if
another flight or movie is added) followed by lower separate costs, and so
on. Further, the dichotomy in demand means some buyers are above and
some below the average per-person cost of incurring the common cost at
full capacity. Thus, rather than the traditional graph, such a situation may
best be reflected in something like Figure 1.174
171. See Klein, supra note 137, at 90; Levine, supra note 138, at 8 n.21, 11-12, 17; Baumol,
supra note 138 (manuscript at 10).
172. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 138, at 11-12.
173. If instead marginal costs decline across industry output, then we have a situation of
natural monopoly. The firm that first incurs those sunk capital costs will become a monopolist,
and monopoly returns will provide ample incentive to incur those sunk costs. Subsequent firms
will not incur sunk capital costs, nor should they-because when the market is a natural monopoly
it would be wasteful for them to do so. To be sure, any government rate regulation to limit those
returns must be constructed to allow recovery of sunk costs. And the most efficient way of doing
so is to impose Ramsey pricing, which is a price-discrimination schedule that prevents monopoly
profits but charges high-demand buyers more than low-demand buyers so that the higher-demand
buyers cover a greater share of the sunk costs but the lowest-demand buyers pay prices closer to
the low marginal cost of the final units of production. See William J. Baumol, Ramsey Pricing, in
4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 49, 49-51 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
But such government imposition of a discriminatory price schedule is in no sense necessary for
the recovery of truly sunk costs.
174. These incremental common costs are for graphical purposes assumed to be constant, but
if (as typical) industry costs generally increase with output, then it is more likely that as output
increases each common cost spike will be somewhat higher than the spike that preceded it.
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If firms tried to price uniformly at the level (A) where the demand curve
intersected the marginal cost curve, then they would lose money because
they could not recover the variable common costs reflected in the first three
cost spikes.175 They thus would not incur those common costs at that price.
Note also that no single consumer has marginal demand that comes close to
the full marginal cost of taking on any incremental common cost. Rather
those common costs must always be allocated among some set of buyers
whose marginal demand is lower but who in combination have enough
demand to justify incurring the common costs. With uniform pricing, one
could try to allocate just those common costs among the high-demand
buyers reflected in the leftward portion of the demand curve. But that
would fail to include some buyers whose marginal demand does exceed
marginal costs once common costs are incurred, and thus result in lower
output. With discriminatory pricing, firms instead allocate some of the
high- and low-demand buyers to each increment of common cost, thus
covering that increment of common cost mainly with the high-demand
buyers but also selling to the low-demand consumers at prices down to
marginal cost, and efficiently expanding output up to point A. Accordingly,
such competitive price discrimination does not mean a deviation from the
normal rule that firms will price at marginal cost-it rather reflects the
175. The demand curve does not really cross the cost curve where it passes through the dotted
lines, because they reflect discontinuities in costs, so that the demand curve is always above or
below the marginal cost curve until it reaches point A.
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mechanism by which, given common costs, firms are able to achieve
marginal prices that come as close as feasible to marginal cost.
In short, price discrimination does not prove market power. Thus, no
market power is proven by the airline practice of charging higher prices on
routes that connect spokes to concentrated hubs than on other routes."'
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that price dispersion increases with
greater airline competition. 177 Instead, it may not make sense to conclude an
airline has market power unless it dominates and earns monopoly profits on
the whole set of cities connected by a hub-and-spoke system, which does
not fit the real facts. Further, competitive price discrimination will generally
be efficient and output-maximizing where feasible. None of this means
competitive discriminatory pricing will always be feasible because in a
competitive market individual firms would have a constant temptation to try
to undercut the price to high-demand customers and grab a disproportionate
share of them. But the existence of widespread price discrimination in
competitive markets suggests that such price discrimination often is
feasible. And the explanation probably lies in the fact that, in competitive
markets, firms that just try to serve the high-demand consumers are driven
out by reactive above-cost price cuts, as discussed next.
C. Why Competitive Price Discrimination Will Often
Require Reactive Above-Cost Price Cuts
If market conditions completely bundle high- and low-demand
purchases into one firm, or all high-demand purchasers are uninformed and
price-insensitive, then a rival or entrant has no incentive to undercut a
discriminatory price. But to any extent those conditions do not completely
hold, 178 then a rival or entrant has some incentives to deviate from the
output-maximizing price-discrimination schedule by offering high-demand
buyers (such as adult moviegoers or hub customers) a lower price. That
lower price can reap a disproportionate share of those customers and earn
supracompetitive profits because the lower price would still exceed the sum
of separate costs and a proportionate share of common costs. Professor
Michael Levine, in his seminal analysis of price discrimination without
176. See Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 21) (noting that this new analysis of price
discrimination has forced him to recant his prior conclusion that such differences in route prices
did indicate market power).
177. See Levine, supra note 138, at 6 (citing James D. Dana, Jr., Advance-Purchase
Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets, 106 J. POL. EcON. 395, 396 (1998)).
178. To any extent they do hold, however, they diminish competitive incentives for
undercutting the output-maximizing discriminatory price. Partial fulfillment of these conditions
thus reinforces the conclusion below that any increased short-run profits a firm might hope to earn
by undercutting this discriminatory price are sufficiently small that they can be deterred by the
fact that such cuts will provoke immediate or rapid price matching by rivals.
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market power, assumed to the contrary that all firms, including airlines, that
try to deviate from the optimal price schedule by offering lower prices to
the high-demand buyers will "tend to disappear" because they will make
less revenue. 179 And in his extension of Levine's analysis, Professor
Baumol at points tends to make the same sort of assumption that deviating
from optimal price discrimination must sacrifice revenue. 80 But while the
optimal price-discrimination schedule is revenue- and output-maximizing
for the industry as a whole given the overall proportion of high- and low-
demand buyers who exist, it does not follow that it is so for individual
firms. If the incumbents stick to the optimal schedule, a deviating entrant
can hope to profit by lowering prices to the high-demand buyers and
attracting enough to make them a disproportionate share of its own
customers. This is true even when the deviating entrant has to incur the
same common costs because the optimal price schedule will reflect a price
to the high-demand buyers that covers not only their separate costs but also
a disproportionately high share of common costs. This, by definition, can be
undercut by a lower price that remains above the sum of their separate costs
and an equal share of common costs. Thus, if a slightly lower price to the
high-demand customers shifts enough of them to the deviating firm that
more of its customers are now of the high-demand variety, then at the new
price its revenue will exceed its total costs, and it will enjoy an increase in
profits.1
81
This does not mean that optimal price-discrimination schedules can
never be maintained in competitive markets where high-demand buyers are
not completely uninformed, price insensitive, or bundled with low-demand
buyers. Rather, it means that the reason they are maintained is not that
deviations from them are, standing alone, unprofitable. The reason is
instead that, in a competitive market, incumbent firms would have to
respond to any deviation by lowering their own prices to the high-demand
179. See Levine, supra note 138, at 14, 23-24.
180. See Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 4-6). Elsewhere Professor Baumol
recognizes that prices that exceed marginal costs will invite entry. See id. (manuscript at 18-20).
But he does not link this observation to the point that a deviating entrant or rival can hope to get a
disproportionate share of the high-demand buyers, a point that implies that deviation will be most
attractive when getting such a disproportionate share is most feasible and when reactive above-
cost price cuts will not deprive a deviating firm of its disproportionate share.
181. The situation is different in the case of slaughterhouses that charge more per pound for
filet mignon than for lesser cuts of meat, on which Professor Levine focused much of his analysis.
See Levine, supra note 138, at 14-16, 18. There, a deviating slaughterhouse that charges less for
filet mignon cannot hope that such a price reduction to its high-demand buyers will increase the
proportion of meat it produces that is filet mignon. Rather, it will still produce the same
proportion of other cuts of meat but be unable to increase the price for those remaining cuts above
prevailing market prices. Since it has lowered its price for filet mignon, but cannot increase its
price for other cuts of meat, its total revenue will decline. And since the optimal price-
discrimination schedule produced revenue that barely covered the common costs of slaughtering
whole cows, this lower revenue will necessarily fail to cover the common costs, and such firms
should indeed disappear.
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buyers in order to retain a proportionate share of their patronage, for
revenue from these high-demand buyers is necessary to cover common
costs. This reaction is involuntary because the firms cannot stay in business
unless they retain a proportionate share of high-demand buyers. Indeed,
they will react in the same way to a decline in their proportion of high-
demand buyers whether or not they noticed the deviation that caused it and
even if they think their reaction will have no effect on the behavior of the
deviating firm. Because these lower prices to high-demand buyers mean
prices will now cover a smaller share of common costs, the incumbents will
effectively face higher costs when deciding whether to incur the
incremental common costs that are necessary to continue serving the low-
demand buyers. Thus, in a competitive market, such deviations mean the
incumbents will also have to raise prices to the low-demand buyers to
continue to cover all common costs. This price increase does not mean that
incumbents are exercising some market power over the low-demand buyers
that they previously failed to exercise. Rather, it results because the costs of
serving low-demand buyers have effectively increased. At the new price
schedule, firms will not only incur common costs less often, reducing total
output, but a smaller share of that output will be available for low-demand
buyers. Without any market power, this reduction in output will raise prices
for the low-demand buyers in order to balance supply and demand.
This change in the market's price-discrimination schedule means that
the deviating rival or entrant will not enjoy, in the end, a disproportionate
share of high-demand buyers. If that rival or entrant also serves the lower-
demand buyers and is equally efficient, it will also have to raise prices to
those buyers in order to cover common costs itself, and will thus go along
with the general increase in market prices to the low-demand buyers. The
deviating rival or entrant will thus end up (like the rest of the market) at a
new price-discrimination schedule. But this new lower price discrimination
will mean lower industry output and thus be inefficient and less profitable
for everyone. Efforts to undercut the output-maximizing price-
discrimination schedule will thus reap the deviating rival or entrant no
additional profit unless other firms are slow to respond to the change in
their proportion of high-demand buyers, and will lower its profits once they
do respond. If deviation is rendered unprofitable by rapid rival response,
firms or entrants will have little incentive to engage in it and thus the
output-maximizing price-discrimination schedule can be sustained in
competitive markets.
In short, the competitive practice that is necessary to maintain an
output-maximizing price-discrimination schedule is precisely that
incumbents will adopt rapid reactive above-cost price cuts that make it
unprofitable for rivals or entrants to try to serve only high-paying
customers. Rapidity is key, or deviating rivals or entrants can enjoy short-
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term profits that will destabilize this price-discrimination schedule. This
may explain why many retailers adopt announced policies of automatically
(and retroactively) matching any lower price that its rivals may offer. Some
have thought these policies are anticompetitive because they facilitate price
discrimination or oligopolistic coordination. 182 But retail markets seem far
too unconcentrated and competitive to sustain any price discrimination or
coordination that tries to raise prices above efficient cost levels. 183 A more
likely explanation is that running a retail store involves incurring common
costs every day to serve a range of high- to low-demand consumers, and the
most efficient and output-maximizing method of covering those common
costs is the widespread retail price discrimination we routinely observe,
whereby consumers of high-end products pay a much higher markup than
other consumers. But, to the extent high-demand retail buyers are not
completely uninformed, price-insensitive, or bundled with low-demand
buyers, such price discrimination would be subject to destabilization by
retailers who undercut prices to the high-end customers unless reactive
price cuts by incumbents are extremely rapid. Committing in advance to a
retroactive price-matching policy is a way of assuring such rapidity without
incurring the difficult task of monitoring numerous other retailers. In other
industries where there are fewer rivals or entrants to monitor, or a longer
lag time between deviating on price and actually obtaining customers,
incumbents might not need such an automatic price-matching policy.
Instead, they can rely on a general practice of adopting reactive above-cost
price cuts when a deviating rival or entrant tries to undercut the prices to
high-demand customers.
One might object that such price discrimination cannot be sustained on
competitive markets given game theoretic considerations. The "game" is
that each firm must make a choice between maintaining high prices to high-
demand customers or deviating from them. The objection is that each firm
would always choose deviating because this choice makes it better off no
matter what choice other firms make. If it expects its rivals to maintain the
high prices to high-demand customers, it is better off deviating because it
gets a higher share of them and supracompetitive profits. If it expects its
rivals to deviate by cutting prices to high-demand customers, it is better off
doing the same because it has to in order to cover common costs.
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183. See supra Section III.B.
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TABLE 1. THE GAME THEORY OBJECTION
Rivals
Maintain Deviate
Firm Maintain 0, 0 
-2, 1
Deviate 1,-2 -1, -1
Given this table of payoffs, for each individual firm, deviation seems a
dominant strategy that makes maintaining the optimal price-discrimination
schedule impossible.' 84 This is true even though deviation by all firms
makes each firm worse off by lowering output.
The problem with this objection is that it assumes there is some period
where the deviating firm can charge lower prices to high-demand customers
than its rivals. But if every firm has a policy of automatically and
retroactively matching any price cut by its rivals, then no firm can ever
offer a lower price than its rivals. The effect of an automatic price-matching
policy is thus to eliminate the boxes where one firm has low prices and the
other firms have high prices.
TABLE 2. PAYOFFS WITH IMMEDIATE PRICE MATCHING
Rivals
Maintain Deviate
Maintain 0, 0 N/A
Firm Deviate N/A -1,-i1
The boxes where one firm deviates while its rivals do not thus never arise
because deviating triggers immediate deviation by its rivals. Thus, the
choice is between the boxes where both maintain and both deviate, and
each firm will thus prefer to maintain the output-maximizing price-
discrimination schedule.
With airlines, the price matching is not automatic and retroactive. But
entry is foreseeable in advance, as is rival pricing, which needs to be
announced weeks ahead of flight given the planning needs of customers.
Thus, when the entrant is deciding whether to deviate by investing in entry
that serves only nonstop customers, it knows in advance that, by the time it
184. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 19-22 (3d ed. 2001) (defining dominant strategy equilibria).
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actually operates, incumbents will match its lower prices to those
customers. Indeed, the entrant knows incumbents will be forced to do so in
order to cover common costs. Likewise, when an existing firm announces
lower prices to high-demand nonstop customers for a given flight, it knows
that its rivals will have to respond by lowering their prices to those nonstop
customers, and can do so well before flight time.185 Indeed, they will
respond immediately in order to retain enough nonstop customers to cover
common costs whether or not they know what caused their drop in
bookings from nonstop customers. So again, the two boxes where one firm
can offer lower prices than its rivals drop out, and the choice is just between
universal maintenance and universal deviation.
Even if the rival price matching is not immediate, the deviating firm
will know that it will also take some time for its altered pricing to attract
more high-demand buyers, and that it will enjoy at best a very short period
of price advantage on the high-demand customers before its rivals are
forced to match that deviating price. Rather than myopically considering
only the positive consequences in that very short period, it will consider the
consequences over the longer haul. If the additional profits during that very
short period are outweighed by the losses of output, then deviating first will
not improve the firm's fortunes. Instead, the payoffs will be as follows.




Deviate -0.9,-1.1 -1, -i
In this situation, maintaining the output-maximizing price-
discrimination schedule will not be a dominant strategy, but it will be a
Nash equilibrium. It will not be a dominant strategy because maintaining
the price-discrimination schedule is not the best choice regardless of what
the firm expects its rival to do. 186 If the firm expects the rival to maintain,
then it is better off maintaining too. But if the firm expects the rival to
deviate first, then it is better off deviating right away too. But it is a Nash
equilibrium because "no player has incentives to deviate from his strategy
given that the other players do not deviate."' 187 That is, if the output-
185. In practice, hub-and-spoke airlines normally operate out of different hubs. Thus, rivals
will probably have to enter that hub with 'more capacity in order to undercut nonstop prices.
186. RASMUSEN, supra note 184, at 19.
187. Id. at 33.
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maximizing price-discrimination schedule is in place, no firm has
incentives to deviate from it. 188
None of this is consistent with the assumptions of a perfectly
competitive market, for that assumes (1) a "perfect divisibility of output"
that elides the very common cost issue of concern and (2) that firms are all
price takers who cannot lower prices because prices are at cost, and who
cannot raise prices above cost without losing all their customers. 189 But
such markets do not exist, and the above is consistent with the sort of
workable competition that actually does exist in normal competitive
markets.' 90 Moreover, while firms that engage in competitive price
discrimination are not price takers, their conduct is dictated by the market
in the sense that their pricing behavior turns on the proportion of high-
demand buyers available to them at each price and the size of their common
costs, whether or not they noticed (or think they can affect) the rival pricing
behavior that influenced that proportion.
One might relatedly object that the game theoretic argument described
above for maintaining price discrimination is really an argument about
coordination no different than an oligopoly model. But the crucial
difference is that here the anticipated response by rivals is not strategic, but
rather is forced by their need to cover costs and is thus involuntary. It does
not depend on the reacting firm noticing the deviation that caused its
proportion of high-demand customers to drop or on any expectation that its
reaction will alter the behavior of the deviating firm or even be noticed by
that firm. It is thus similar to the typical assumption in competitive markets
that a firm cannot raise prices by constricting output because rivals will
react by immediately expanding their output. In contrast, in an oligopoly
that coordinates on supracompetitive prices, rivals have incentives not to
follow a price cut immediately, because at the higher price they are earning
positive economic profits and can continue to do so unless the deviating
188. This stylized table does not itself indicate, however, that mutual price discrimination is a
unique Nash equilibrium because it suggests that, if all firms are deviating, no firm has an
incentive to move first to the output-maximizing price-discrimination schedule because it cannot
get a proportionate share of high-demand customers. If all firms are deviating, however, then
demand from the high-demand buyers will exceed output and drive up prices. At that elevated
price, competition to gain the greatest share of high-demand buyers will increase output until
unused capacity is created that will give competitive firms incentives to price discriminate, which
in turn will further increase output to the maximum level. See supra Section III.B.
189. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 57. Others also explicitly assume what
seems implicit in most perfect competition models: that "producers have production functions that
rule out increasing returns to scale." VISCusI ET AL., supra note 57, at 73. This assumes away
common costs, which mean increasing returns to scale over certain incremental output ranges.
Perfect competition models also assume perfect knowledge and continuous cost and demand
curves, which again is inconsistent with the assumptions here.
190. See AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 132, at 35-38 (noting that perfect competition
rarely exists, and discussing performance criteria for workable competition (like normal profits)
and structural criteria (like many firms and low entry barriers), criteria which would be met in the
markets under consideration).
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firm can immediately expand capacity to take all their output. They will
thus lower prices immediately only if they noticed the deviation that caused
their decreased sales and think that their immediate reaction will send a
strategic message to the deviating firm. Likewise, in a traditional oligopoly,
firms must be able to observe rival prices and assess quality differences. 91
In a market with competitive price discrimination, this is unnecessary.
Firms need only observe their own proportions of high-demand and low-
demand customers. If their proportion of high-demand customers has gone
down, whether because of changed market conditions or rival deviation
from the output-maximizing price schedule, their reaction will be the same.
They will immediately lower prices to high-demand buyers to retain enough
of them to cover common costs whether or not they know or care that a
deviating firm caused this change in proportion or think they can send a
message to the deviating firm. They will thus behave in the same way even
when there are many more firms in the market. Since such firm behavior is
not strategic in the sense of being chosen, designed to affect its rivals, or
even aware of rival behavior, it seems more accurate to call the behavior
competitive. 192
Two features make competitive price discrimination on hub-and-spoke
flight systems different than in markets such as retailing consumer products
or exhibiting movies. First, a retailer or theater need only maintain a
proportionate share of sales to high-demand buyers. In contrast, demand
and supply conditions may well mean that maintaining a hub-and-spoke
system requires an airline to retain a disproportionate share of sales to
customers who fly nonstop to or from their hub because their system
focuses around a particular hub that rivals do not share. With this
disproportionate hub share, incumbent hub-and-spoke airlines can more
plausibly be accused of having market power that they are protecting with
their reactive above-cost price cuts.
Second, airline hub-and-spoke systems of price discrimination are more
vulnerable to being undercut by rivals who provide only the high-value
slice of the system because an entrant can provide flights on a single route
without incurring the common costs of servicing the rest of the hub-and-
spoke system. Theaters or retailers may be somewhat less vulnerable to this
191. See id. at 254; George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
192. Of course, we could define our terms to call this instead a mild form of "oligopolistic
coordination," because firms are deterred from deviating by the anticipated (involuntary) response
of their rivals, and then just conclude that in this case oligopolistic coordination turns out to be
desirable, efficient, and output-maximizing. But in this context that definition would be both (1)
misleading, since it conflicts with ordinary understandings that oligopolistic coordination is
strategic and occurs among few firms, and (2) unhelpful, since it no longer would functionally
correspond to an undesirable state of affairs. See supra note 137 (offering similar reasons to reject
a definition of "market power" that would call this a desirable exercise of modest market power in
a market with many rivals).
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problem. A deviating theater may try to fill its seats entirely with adult
moviegoers, but that will be difficult to do, both because they are often
accompanied by children and because selling only to adults may not
produce enough customers to fill all a theater's showtimes and cover
common costs. Likewise, a deviating retailer may have difficulty getting the
foot traffic to cover its common costs by selling only to high-demand
consumers. Indeed, the same buyers may be high-demand consumers for
some products (movie tickets for themselves or luxury products) and low-
demand consumers for other products (tickets for their kids or commodity
products) that they prefer to buy at the same time after making a trip to a
single seller.193 Further, the differences in firm prices for movie tickets or
retail goods are sufficiently small that many high-demand buyers may not
be willing to incur the relatively labor-intensive costs of becoming
informed about them. Thus, while deviations will occur in theater and retail
markets, they are less likely to be profitable, because it is harder to gain a
disproportionate share of the high-end customers.
In contrast, an airline entrant can offer nonstop service on a single route
without incurring the common costs of running a hub-and-spoke system at
all. The differences in airline prices are also sufficiently large, and the
search costs of discovering them (especially with the Internet) sufficiently
low, that more high-demand buyers are likely to be aware of them. And
even though any given passenger may take both high- and low-demand
flights (if he sometimes flies as a business traveler and sometimes as a
tourist), he normally does not need to book those flights with the same
airline. True, airlines will try to reinforce brand loyalty with mechanisms
like frequent flier programs in order to bundle those choices, 19 4 but it is
unlikely this will be as successful as the bundling more naturally created by
the costs of traveling to retailers. Thus, airlines are more likely to have
incentives to deviate from the optimal price-discrimination schedule.
Accordingly, in a competitive market for hub-and-spoke systems, each
hub-and-spoke airline will offer the price-discrimination schedule that
maximizes the output of the entire hub-and-spoke system when they can,
but will frequently have to deviate from that schedule by sharply reducing
prices on nonstop flights to or from their hubs when less efficient entrants
try to take just that slice of the market.1 95 This above-cost price reduction
193. See supra Section III.B (explaining how in such cases sellers will compete to maximize
buyer utility by offering discriminatory Ramsey pricing).
194. See supra Section III.B.
195. If an incumbent airline faces a more efficient entrant, it will not be able to lower prices
enough to maintain a significant volume of hub passengers and will thus have to rely mainly on
connecting passengers. This is how American Airlines dealt with the lower-cost competition
provided by Southwest Airlines. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1181-82 (D.
Kan. 2001). Such a great reliance on connecting passengers may well lower the efficiency of the
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means these nonstop flights will cover a smaller share of the common costs
of the system than before. When that is the case, entry that reduces prices
for nonstop flights may not be desirable because (1) the price reduction
does not stand alone but rather reflects a transfer payment to nonstop
customers on that route from connecting customers and nonstop customers
on other routes who benefit from the flights partly supported by demand
from those connecting customers, and (2) the deviation from the optimal
price schedule lowers total flight output across the hub-and-spoke system,
including reducing the number of flight options for nonstop customers.
Indeed, competition from such entrants that forces hub-and-spoke airlines
to deviate from output-maximizing discriminatory prices makes all
consumers worse off to the extent that they take both nonstop and
connecting flights on different occasions.' 96 In any event, firms in a fully
competitive hub-and-spoke market would necessarily respond to single
route entrants by lowering prices in order to continue to cover common
costs. And if, as hub-and-spoke economics indicates, it is more efficient for
one airline to provide both the nonstop and connecting flights,1 97 then an
entrant who provides only the nonstop flight simply cannot survive in a
competitive market because a hub-and-spoke firm will be driven to
undercut it with an above-cost price cut.' 98 Those price cuts will then drive
such entrants out and allow the incumbents to raise prices on that route
back to the price that matches the output-maximizing price schedule for the
hub-and-spoke system.
In short, the observed pattern of single route entry, reactive above-cost
price cuts by hub incumbents, exit by the single route entrant, and
restoration of higher prices can be explained by fully desirable, competitive
behavior. One need not assume that the incumbent airline must have
monopoly power that it is trying to protect through strategic pricing.
Indeed, the nonmonopoly explanation seems more consistent with the
empirical evidence that the airline industry has not only failed to enjoy
monopoly profits, but has been unable to sustain even a competitive rate of
return for any five-year period since deregulation.199 The competitive
explanation also helps explain why firms do not cut prices any more when a
hub-and-spoke system as a whole, but it does shift hub passengers to a clearly more efficient
provider.
196. See Bliss, supra note 163, at 387-88 (proving the parallel point that, when grouping
products in one retail store is efficient, competition from specialty stores causes deviations from
optimal pricing that make consumers worse off).
197. See supra Section 1II.A.
198. See Bliss, supra note 163, at 387-88 (proving the parallel point that if the costs of
traveling to a store make it efficient to buy high- and low-demand products at the same retail
location, and costs are convex and homogeneous, then a specialty store that sells only the high-
demand goods cannot survive in a competitive equilibrium).
199. See Dorman & Baumol, supra note 147, at 4; see also Baumol, supra note 138
(manuscript at 8) (noting that airline investments earn a lower return than stock indexes).
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newly formed entrant enters a route than they do when an existing airline
does.
20 0
This analysis undermines the intuition that something nefarious is going
on when an incumbent airline lowers nonstop prices to above-cost levels in
response to single route entry and then raises them again after entry. Both
price changes can be explained by the simple reality that the fact of entry
(at a particular price) has changed the market price on the nonstop route and
thus requires a readjustment of the price-discrimination schedule, and the
fact of exit makes the old price-discrimination schedule optimal again. This
analysis turns on its head the intuition that reactive above-cost price cuts are
used to foil the predictions of contestable market theory. To the contrary, if
airline markets are in fact contestable, then such contestability will force
airlines to engage in revenue-maximizing discriminatory pricing to cover
common costs, 201 which can only be maintained through reactive above-
cost price cuts.
Perhaps a more profound implication is that this analysis means that-
even if proponents were entirely correct about the predicted effects of a
restriction on reactive price cuts on individual airline routes-those
predicted effects would likely be undesirable. If proponents are correct,
their restrictions will lead to lower everyday prices on nonstop flights from
concentrated hubs. But obtaining these benefits means deviating from the
price-discrimination schedule that maximizes the overall output of the hub-
and-spoke system. There is no particular reason to think that overall result
would be desirable. It would be similar to legislating lower prices for adult
movie tickets than the unregulated market would produce. Adult
moviegoers who buy at those lower prices will be better off, but prices
would have to rise for nonadults. Further, the overall output of movie
exhibitions would go down since the new price schedule would no longer
be the one that optimizes output. Likewise, even if the restrictions lowered
prices for nonstop hub flights, that would make nonstop fliers from hubs to
spokes better off, but raise prices on the rest of the hub-and-spoke system.
There is no particular warrant in antitrust law for imposing such a
distributional transfer by legally restricting competitive above-cost pricing.
Even left standing alone, these distributional effects are likely to involve an
undesirable shift from low- to high-income customers. Worse, this
distributional effect will have been purchased at the cost of imposing a
reduction in the overall output of flights between cities connected by hub-
and-spoke systems. That will lower total social efficiency and aggregate
200. See Dennis W. Carlton & Gustavo E. Bamberger, Docket No. OST-1998-3713-1709,
Reply Comments to the Department of Transportation's Proposed Enforcement Policy Regarding
Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry 5 (Sept. 24, 1998), at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf30/4382 I web.pdf.
201. See Baumol, supra note 138 (manuscript at 1-3).
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consumer welfare. Indeed, this will make all customers worse off to the
extent that they take both nonstop and connecting flights at different times.
IV. RESTRICTING ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS HAS ADVERSE EFFECTS
EVEN WHEN THE INCUMBENT DOES HAVE MARKET POWER AND
IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES ARE IGNORED
Even if we assume incumbent market power has been independently
established without relying on evidence of discriminatory pricing or
reactive price cuts, restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts still will
normally be undesirable. The traditional argument for thinking so stresses
their administrative difficulties, which are formidable and even
underestimated. But let me defer those issues until Part V. Here, I am
interested in addressing the issue whether, even if we assume away any
implementation difficulties, the proposed restrictions on reactive above-cost
price cuts would be desirable.
Although the proposed restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts
differ in their details, they all would effectively set a floor on incumbent
pricing after entry.2 °2 Professor Edlin would set that floor at the
incumbent's pre-entry price.203 Professor Williamson would instead ban an
incumbent from expanding output after entry.20 4 But every output ceiling
implies an associated price floor. The Williamson rule would allow the
incumbent to cut prices, but only to the extent necessary to maintain output
after the entrant has added it§ own output to the market. Thus, although the
Williamson output ceiling would allow prices lower than the Edlin
approach, it does set an effective floor on post-entry incumbent pricing. The
European doctrine in Compagnie Maritime and the proposals of the U.S.
Departments of Transportation and Justice would effectively set a price
floor at the level that "clearly" or "substantially" (or in the EU doctrine
maybe "selectively") falls below the price that would maximize the
incumbent's short-term profits after entry.205 Likewise, Professors Ordover
202. Professor Bauimol's proposal, which would not restrict reactive above-cost price cuts but
would require that they be quasi-permanent, is analyzed separately below in Part VI.
203. Edlin, supra note 6, at 945-46.
204. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 295-96, 333-36.
205. See supra Section I.A. The Departments would also set a ceiling on output expansions
that fail this short-term profit-maximization test, but this output ceiling also implies an associated
price floor. Which Department's proposal sets the higher price floor may depend on the
circumstances. For example, if it were 100% certain that the incumbent could make a 1% higher
profit with a higher price, then the Department of Justice position would require at least that price
(since it would "clearly" increase profits), but the Department of Transportation position would
not (since it would not increase profits "substantially"). Alternatively, if it were 51% certain that
an incumbent could make a 50% higher profit with a higher price, then the Department of
Transportation position would require at least that price, but the Department of Justice position
would not. In general, however, one would expect the proposals largely to track each other since
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112:681
Above-Cost Price Cuts
and Willig and others had earlier proposed a similar test without the
"clearly" or "substantially" or "selectively" qualifier. 20 6 Since an entrant
adds output to the market, the incumbent's normal short-term profit-
maximizing response to entry would be to constrict output somewhat, thus
usually indicating a somewhat higher price floor than the Williamson rule,
which allows the incumbent to lower prices further to maintain its pre-entry
output. 20 7 In any event, whichever sets the lowest price floor, all of them
effectively set some floor on post-entry incumbent prices.
Such a restriction on above-cost price cuts by definition cannot protect
an entrant who is not less efficient than the incumbent. 20 8 Nor do the
proponents claim their restrictions would protect entrants who are just as
efficient as, or more efficient than, the incumbent. Rather, they focus on the
claim that protecting less efficient entrants is desirable. Their essential
claim is that the restrictions will either encourage additional entry by these
less efficient entrants, or prompt incumbents to lower pre-entry prices (or
expand pre-entry output) to avoid such entry, either of which will enhance
consumer welfare and allocative efficiency by lowering prices below their
normal monopoly levels. 0 9 At points, some proponents also suggest that,
while these encouraged entrants may initially be less efficient, if protected
by the proposed restrictions, they may be able to stay in the market long
enough to become just as efficient as the incumbent. 2'0 Assessing these
claims thus requires comprehensively assessing the effects of the proposed
restrictions on the likelihood and consequences of each type of possible
entrant, and on the behavior and creation of incumbents.
Section A begins with the proponent's paradigmatic case: entrants who
are (and will remain) less efficient than the incumbent. It notes a point that
proponents have neglected: Some of these less efficient firms would have
entered with or without the restrictions. For them, the effects of the
restrictions would be entirely adverse. The restrictions would raise post-
the more substantial the expected profit difference, the more likely it is to be clear that some profit
is being sacrificed.
206. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 71, at 9-10, 15-16; see also supra note 71 (collecting
other prior authorities proposing a similar test, even when prices are above cost).
207. If demand increased sufficiently, the profit-maximizing response could be increasing
output, which might suggest the Williamson rule would require a higher price floor to prevent pre-
entry incumbent output from rising. But to avoid this result, Williamson ultimately makes his test
one of "demand-adjusted" output. See infra Part V (discussing other complications this raises). In
theory, the U.S. Departments' approach might impose a lower price floor because they only ban
prices that are "clearly" or "substantially" below the profit-maximizing level. But maintaining
output in the face of an entrant's addition to market output will normally more than satisfy this
test. Moreover, Williamson also includes his own version of a clearly-or-substantially qualifier by
allowing a ten percent increase in output over the demand-adjusted prediction in the hopes that
this will circumvent problems with ascertaining demand-adjusted output. See infra Part V.
208. See supra Part 11 (defining costs to satisfy this condition).
209. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 945-49, 973-78; Williamson, supra note 7, at 308.
210. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 975 & n.95, 977; Williamson, supra note 7, at 296, 298 n.43,
303-04, 313.
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entry prices, thus lowering output, harming consumer welfare, and causing
allocative inefficiency. Further, the restrictions would cause a shift of
production to less efficient firms, a loss of incumbent efficiency, and a
wasteful infliction of uncompensated transition costs. Other less efficient
firms might be encouraged to enter by the protection the restrictions offer.
But these less efficient entrants will be inevitably driven out when-by
passage of time or loss of monopoly power-any restriction on reactive
price cuts by the more efficient incumbent expires. Since long-run returns
are impossible, the only encouragement would be that these restrictions can
increase the length of the short-run period when they remain in the market.
But if the capital costs of entry are high, they cannot be recouped with such
short-run returns. And if the capital costs of entry are low, then less
efficient entrants would often enter anyway. At best, the restrictions may
provide some weak encouragement to less efficient entrants when entry
costs are in an intermediate range so that the additional profits from
prolonging the short-run period provide the marginal increment necessary
to make total short-run entrant profits cover entrant costs. Further, while
such entry may well lower prices from pre-entry levels for those consumers
who buy from the entrant in the short run, it can also give incumbents
perverse incentives to raise post-entry prices to speed the day when the
restriction expires, which would raise prices for the majority of consumers.
Thus, even when the restrictions do encourage additional less efficient
entry, the net effects on consumer welfare and allocative efficiency will be
mixed. Any encouraged entry would also shift production to less efficient
firms, wastefully impose uncompensated transition costs, and lower the
efficiency of incumbents.
In short, even if one focuses only on less efficient entrants, the overall
effects of the restrictions are almost certainly negative. Where the less
efficient entrant would have entered anyway, there will be negative effects
on consumer welfare and productive efficiency. Where the restriction
encourages the less efficient entrant to enter, there will be a mixed short-
term effect on consumer welfare and negative effects on productive
efficiency.
But in fact one cannot assess the full effects of the proposed restrictions
by limiting one's consideration to less efficient entrants. Rather, as Section
B points out, one must also consider the effects (ignored by proponents of
these restrictions) on entrants who are just as efficient as, or more efficient
than, the incumbent. For such entrants, the effects of the restrictions are
unambiguously adverse. They raise post-entry prices, lower output, harm
consumer welfare, and lessen allocative efficiency. Further, the restrictions
make the mix of entrants less efficient by increasing the returns to
inefficient entry and by lessening the returns to successfully creating an
entrant who is more efficient than the incumbent.
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Section C considers the possibility that entrants will become more
efficient than the incumbent over time. It concludes that this is often
undesirable because it frequently depends on a decrease in the incumbent's
efficiency. If, in contrast, it is achieved solely by an increase in entrant
efficiency, then the restrictions should be unnecessary because capital
markets would fund such entrants anyway. Further, the post-entry effects of
the restrictions for such entrants are entirely adverse.
Section D addresses the effects of the proposed restrictions on pre-entry
incumbent behavior. It concludes that it is doubtful the restrictions will
induce incumbents to lower pre-entry prices, and that even if they do so,
such a regime of enforced limit pricing is legally inconsistent with the
argument for banning reactive above-cost price cuts. More important,
proponents have neglected to take into account that, by lowering the
rewards for creating an incumbent that is more efficient than other market
options, the restrictions reduce the incentives for the innovation and
investment necessary to create those more efficient incumbents in the first
place.
Section E summarizes the effects and concludes that the trade-offs
almost certainly cut against the proposed restrictions even if one ignores
implementation difficulties. And Section F rebuts the possibility that the
problems with the restrictions can be avoided by modifying the market-
power requirement.
A. Effects on Likelihood and Consequences of
Less Efficient Entry
I begin by considering the effects of the restrictions on the likelihood
and consequences of entry by firms that are less efficient than the
incumbent throughout the period of any restriction on reactive above-cost
price cuts. Such less efficient entrants form the centerpiece of the
proponent's arguments for restrictions."' An entrant can be less efficient
because its costs are higher than the incumbent's, because its quality is
lower at the same cost, or because it offers a cost-quality trade-off that
consumers find less attractive than the incumbent's. Since the last two
amount to saying the entrant has higher costs in delivering the level of
quality that consumers prefer, I will call all three the case of a higher-cost
entrant. In the long run, the incumbent firm with a cost advantage can drive
such entrants out of the market by cutting its prices to a level above the
incumbent's costs but below the entrant's costs, which the entrant cannot
profitably match. Likewise, an incumbent with a quality advantage can
211. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 944, 955-60, 962-63, 965, 973-78; supra text accompanying
notes 1-14.
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drive the entrant out of the market in the long run by pricing at its own cost,
giving consumers either higher quality at the same cost or a quality-cost
trade-off they prefer.
Some of these less efficient entrants would have entered even without
the restrictions because the short-run profits of doing so are sufficiently
enticing. In those cases, the restrictions are unambiguously adverse for both
consumer welfare and productive efficiency. Other less efficient entrants
might have been induced to enter by the restrictions. In their case, the
restrictions will have mixed consequences for consumer welfare but a
negative effect on productive efficiency. Further, the restrictions will
encourage additional entry by relatively few less efficient entrants because
the restrictions will eventually expire and thus cannot protect less efficient
entrants in the long run.
1. Consequences for Less Efficient Entrants Who Would
Have Entered Without Any Restriction
Many less efficient entrants would have entered even without the
protection of a rule that restricts above-cost price cuts. For cases involving
such entrants, the consequences of the restriction will be unambiguously
negative.
a. Why Less Efficient Entrants Often Enter Without Any
Restriction on Reactive Above-Cost Price Cuts
Although entrants who are just as efficient as, or more efficient than,
the incumbent will not be deterred under a cost-based test, the converse
does not follow that all less efficient entrants will be deterred. To the
contrary, less efficient firms will often enter a monopoly market under a
cost-based test even without the protection of a restriction on above-cost
price cuts. After all, by hypothesis, the preexisting market was priced at
supracompetitive levels. Thus, even a less efficient entrant can offer a lower
price that exceeds its costs and reap supracompetitive profits in the short
run.
True, in the long run, the more efficient incumbent will be able to drive
out the less efficient entrant with above-cost price cuts. But the short run
may not be so short. The longer it lasts, the greater the entrant's profits will
be. And the longer lasting any price cut must be to drive out an entrant, the
more likely the incumbent would find it more profitable to accommodate
entry at higher prices rather than trying to cut prices to drive out the entrant.
This can be obscured if the airline industry is the paradigmatic case one has
in mind. While the airline industry proves a poor paradigmatic case because
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reactive price cuts there probably do not protect market power at all,2 12 the
airline industry does have a combination of features that make it more
susceptible to driving out less efficient entrants with very short-term price
cuts. Namely, in the airline industry, incumbent capacity is easy to expand,
and buyers cannot realistically engage in significant long-term contracting
or storage. In markets lacking this combination of features, a reactive price
cut designed to drive out entrants cannot be nearly so temporary, for the
following reasons.
If capacity cannot easily be expanded, then it may take the incumbent a
significant period to expand output enough to drive out a less efficient
entrant.213 True, for physical products made in plants, the incumbent may
maintain some excess capacity for just this purpose. But the costs of doing
so may not be worth bearing. 214 Moreover, even in such a plant, expanding
capacity may not be as easy as turning on a switch. Extra personnel have to
be added or trained, or if the incumbent has also kept excess workers idle,
their skills will be rusty. These problems are likely to be even greater in
service industries. The airline industry is unusual in this regard because the
relevant capital goods and personnel are so easy to move to a targeted
market.
Even if the incumbent can rapidly expand output, buyers will have
incentives to respond to any price cut they anticipate is temporary by
stockpiling as much as possible of the good. Thus, rather than the
incumbent's expanded output replacing purchases from the entrant, buyers
have incentives to buy as much as they can from both and stockpile their
purchases. This effectively makes any temporary price cut more permanent.
This is not a feasible consumer reaction in the airline industry because
future travel needs are sufficiently uncertain that it is hard to stockpile too
many tickets. But it seems far more likely to be a feasible reaction in
markets where the incumbent is just turning on plant capacity to make a
physical good, which was the one case where incumbent-output expansion
seemed likely to be faster than entrant-output expansion.
212. See supra Part Ill.
213. This generally is not an issue when, instead of protecting market power, the incumbent
is reacting to an entrant who is undercutting competitive price discrimination because in that case
the incumbent does not need to expand output. It just needs to reallocate output now going to low-
demand buyers. Indeed, overall output will likely decline. See supra Part III.
214. Williamson assumes that under any rule the incumbent will invest to maintain enough
excess capacity to be able to reduce entrant profits to zero. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 294,
297-98, 310 n.66, 314. But in many markets, this may be too costly to be profitable at all, and in
all markets it involves a trade-off between pre-entry profits and post-entry hazards that may not be
worth making. Williamson's contrary conclusion is based on what he admits is the "arbitrary
assumption" that incumbents strictly prefer avoiding post-entry hazards to earning pre-entry
profits. Id. at 314. There is no reason to think this assumption is accurate, and thus incumbents
often will not have sufficient excess capacity on hand.
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Finally, in any market where buyers engage in long-term contracting,
an entrant facing the prospect of a reactive price cut can try to contract with
enough buyers to assure its survival for long enough to recoup the costs of
entry. This is not so feasible in the airline industry, where most purchasing
is done on an effective spot market for each trip.215 But it is feasible in
many markets. Williamson recognizes long-term entrant contracting is
possible, but assumes it will be rare for three reasons. First, he assumes
long-term contracting is generally inefficient. But in many markets it is
used, suggesting it is efficient in those markets. Second, he assumes
customers will not want to commit themselves unless the entrant has
committed itself by incurring fixed costs. But any long-term contract can be
made contingent on the entrant incurring those costs or initiating actual
entry. Third, he assumes the dominant firm will contest these pre-entry
sales. True, but if so, then the "temporary" price cut will be even less
temporary, extending to pre-entry periods and beyond if the incumbent
itself offers long-term contracts to compete. At the extreme, the dominant
firm will have to keep offering competitive prices all the time to fend off
entrants.
Limits on these factors do, however, mean that sometimes relatively
short-term price cuts can drive out less efficient entrants. Stockpiling may
be impossible or costly if storage expenses are high, goods are perishable,
services are time-sensitive, or future needs are difficult to estimate.
Stockpiling will also be limited if buyers mistakenly expect the price cut to
be permanent. The more difficult or costly storage is, and the more
mistaken consumer expectations are, the more any market resembles that of
an effectively nonstorable good like airline flights.
Long-term entrant contracting will also be limited to the extent it has
inefficiencies or buyers face collective action problems. Markets with one
buyer face no collective action problem because that single buyer can itself
determine whether the entrant stays in the market. Thus, a single buyer
would compare the entrant's long-term contract price to the expected
incumbent price stream, which features a temporary cut and then monopoly
prices. But markets with many buyers face a collective action problem
because each individual buyer will correctly figure that its single long-term
contract will not significantly affect the odds that entry will occur or be
successful. Judge Frank Easterbrook concludes that any collective action
problem can be avoided by having each buyer enter a long-term contract
with the entrant at a price below pre-entry prices and contingent on the
215. Even in the airline industry, though, corporations can and do negotiate for long-term
discounts from regular prices. The main problem in that industry has been that the incumbent
airlines are the ones with those contracts, thus making it harder for entrants to break in. See United
States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1180 (D. Kan. 2001).
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entrant getting enough commitments to be successful.2 16 Alas, this does not
avoid the collective action problem. An individual buyer's decision to join
such a contract cannot make the buyer better off unless it meaningfully
changes the odds of successful entry, and this is true no matter what the
individual buyer hypothesizes the end result will be. If the entrant
ultimately will not enter, joining such a contract gains the buyer nothing. If
the entrant will enter but be driven out, then the entrant will not supply the
product in the long run, and, in the short run, the buyer will be better off
accepting the incumbent's temporary price cut to a level below the entrant
price. If the entrant will enter and succeed, the buyer need not join the
contract to get the benefit of entrant prices in the long run, and, in the short
run, the buyer will still be better off accepting the incumbent's temporary
price cut.217 Thus, although buyers collectively have an incentive to enter
long-term contracts with entrants to encourage their entry, buyers
individually may not have such an incentive in markets with many
buyers. 21 8 The greater the buyers' collective action problems and the shorter
the term of an efficient contract in their market, the more other markets will
resemble markets with little long-term contracting, like the airline industry.
Accordingly, it is hardly the case that less efficient entrants who could
undercut a monopoly price would always enter the monopoly market
regardless of the prospect of reactive above-cost price cuts. It is simply the
case that many of them would. And in these cases, the effects of the
proposed restrictions are unambiguously undesirable, as shown next.
216. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 270-71; see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note
19, at 336-37 (assuming also that buyers would be willing to contract with the entrant at a price
below pre-entry prices).
217. This is the difference between the situation here and the typical situation where
collective agreements are successful. Here, while buyers are better offwith a successful collective
agreement than without one, they are even better off if the collective agreement occurs without
their involvement. Ironically, a nonnegotiable agreement that required unanimity would be more
likely to be adopted because then joining would be costless in the sense that buyers could not hope
to do better outside the agreement than in it. But unanimity will be hard to achieve in markets with
many buyers, and in practice such agreements cannot be truly nonnegotiable, which means any
unanimity requirement creates holdout problems. Namely, the last buyer has incentives to demand
that, in exchange for joining, it get preferential terms that amount to expropriating a greater share
of the gains of the successful collective agreement. And this prospect will give all firms an
incentive to put off agreeing so that they can be the last firm, thus recreating the collective action
problem.
218. Even if there is a multitude of consumers, there may be sufficiently few buyers up the
distribution chain-like retailers or wholesalers-to enable them to enter into long-term contracts
with entrants. Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 271. On the other hand, retailers or wholesalers also
have incentives to enter into Coasean bargains with the monopolist to split the supracompetitive
surplus rather than eliminate it because increased costs can be passed on to consumers in higher
prices, and the resulting decreased volume can be made up for by getting a share of the monopoly
profits. See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 943b, at 204-06 & n.4 (rev. ed.
1998).
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b. The Undesirable Consequences
For those less efficient entrants who would enter even without a
restriction on post-entry incumbent prices or output, the restrictions can
have no positive effect on their likelihood of entry. Rather, the only
consequences will be on post-entry price competition, and those will be
unambiguously negative.
The restrictions will all limit the post-entry competition that otherwise
would have occurred between incumbents and less efficient entrants.
Below-cost price cuts would be prohibited even without the restrictions.
Thus, where the restrictions have bite, they will prevent incumbents from
making above-cost price cuts that lower their price as much as they
otherwise would have.21 9 Indeed, an unrecognized cost of the restrictions is
that they would give incumbents affirmative incentives to raise prices. The
reason is that these restrictions would all expire once the incumbent loses
enough market share to fall below whatever threshold is deemed necessary
to establish monopoly or market power in that market.220 Accordingly,
since the incumbent can drive the less efficient entrant out after the
restriction expires but not before, it has perverse incentives to lose market
share to the entrant as rapidly as possible to bring closer the day when the
restriction expires and it can drive the entrant out and restore monopoly
pricing. One natural way to lose market share will be to increase prices to a
level that is more profitable on any sales that the incumbent does make. The
incumbent will even have incentives to raise prices above its short-term
profit-maximizing level because that speeds the return of long-run
monopoly profits. Note the irony. The concern prompting restrictions on
above-cost price cuts is that the incumbent might lower prices in ways that
sacrifice short-run profits in order to reap long-term profits from excluding
the entrant. But such restrictions can instead cause the incumbent to raise
prices in ways that sacrifice short-run profits in order to reap long-term
profits from excluding the entrant. This perverse incentive will exacerbate
219. Depending on market circumstances, it might be that the price floors set by the
Williamson or short-term profit-maximization rules are below the price an unrestricted incumbent
would want to charge post-entry anyway. In those cases, though, the restrictions have no bite.
220. Edlin stipulates that his proposed price floor applies only "until the entrant's share
grows enough so that the monopoly loses its dominance." Edlin, supra note 6, at 945, 968-69.
Williamson applies his rule only to dominant firms, which he defines as having a market share of
at least sixty percent and enjoying significant entry barriers. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 292-
93. Although Williamson's initial statement of his rule also applied to collusive oligopolies, see
id., he later recognized that applying his rule to such cases would have the undesirable effect of
aiding oligopolistic coordination and thus seemed to abandon that extension, see Williamson,
supra note 80, at 1195. Likewise, U.S. and European antitrust laws and the proposed Department
of Transportation regulation all require some level of monopoly or dominant market power. See
supra Section IA; infra Section MVE.
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the tendency of the proposed above-cost floors on incumbent post-entry
prices to raise prices and harm consumer welfare and allocative efficiency.
Consumers buying from the entrant will also pay higher prices than
they would have paid without the above-cost floors on incumbent post-
entry pricing. This is because, with the protection of the incumbent price
floor, the entrant has little incentive to lower prices all the way down to its
costs. Under the Edlin rule, the entrant will not offer any price below a
twenty percent discount from pre-entry prices since it knows the incumbent
cannot cut prices. Under the Williamson or profit-maximization price
floors, the entrant has incentives to charge a price just below that price
floor, even though unrestricted competition would have driven it to price
lower. Even if the entrant is not initially sure just where the incumbent's
price floor will be, the entrant can reveal that floor by setting its opening
price high, and then very slightly undercutting each incumbent price cut
until it arrives at a price just below the lowest price the incumbent can
charge. Thus, not only will the entrant's ultimate price be no lower than a
price just below the price floor, but the restrictions will give the entrant
incentives to set its initial prices even higher to reveal that price floor.
In short, those who purchase either from the incumbent or the less
efficient entrant will pay higher prices. This harms consumer welfare. It
also harms allocative efficiency since the precluded lower prices would
have been above cost.
The effects on productive efficiency are also unambiguously adverse.
Where they have bite, the restrictions will prevent the more efficient
incumbent from expanding its output as much as it otherwise would have,
thus shifting production to the less efficient entrant. This shift of post-entry
output to a less efficient producer alone necessarily lowers productive
efficiency.
Further, unless market demand sharply increases with entry, the
incumbent will have to lower its output significantly from pre-entry levels
because the entrant is taking a large share of market output and the
restrictions generally prevent the incumbent from lowering prices in order
to maintain its old output. This is certainly true under the Edlin rule, which
forbids any reduction in pre-entry prices. It also follows under a short-term
profit-maximization rule even if we assume that, both before and after
entry, the incumbent monopolist sets a short-term profit-maximizing price
that implies subcompetitive output levels. The reason is that whatever
output the entrant takes away causes a leftward shift in the incumbent's
residual demand and thus (absent an offsetting increase in total market
demand) implies that a lower incumbent output will maximize its short-run
profits. An even more dramatic reduction in output will result if we take
into account two additional factors. First, sometimes the pre-entry price will
be an (unsuccessful) limit price rather than a profit-maximizing price, and
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thus the restriction can affirmatively require the incumbent to raise prices
to comply with the post-entry price floor. Second, the restriction, as noted
above, gives incumbents perverse incentives to charge a post-entry price
above the profit-maximizing level to speed the end of the restriction.
Although the Williamson rule does not require a post-entry output
reduction, it will often induce one. After all, it sets a ceiling on output, so
output can only stay the same or go down. On average, then, incumbent
output has to decline somewhat. More important, the incumbent has
affirmative incentives to reduce output in any case where the output ceiling
actually protects an entrant from being driven out of the market in the short
run. There are three reasons for this. First, reducing output will likely
increase the incumbent's short-term profits given that the entrant is now
taking up some market demand. Second, where maintaining output cannot
drive out this entrant and restore monopoly profits, the incumbent has no
reason to sacrifice short-term profits by maintaining output. Third, to the
contrary, it is reducing output that will bring closer the day when the
incumbent's market share erodes sufficiently to lift the restriction and allow
the incumbent to drive out the entrant. This means that under the
Williamson rule, the incumbent who is prevented by the output ceiling from
driving out an entrant actually has incentives to speed the day when the rule
expires by pricing above the short-term maximizing price, which means
setting output below that level. The result is that, in any case where it
actually has bite-that is, actually protects the entrant from being driven out
by above-cost prices-the incumbent will set the same short-term price
under the Williamson output ceiling as under a profit-maximizing price
floor. Williamson sees the first factor but apparently not the other two and,
in any event, effectively excludes all of them from his model by simply
assuming that in response to entry the incumbent will always set the
maximum output allowed by the legal rule.22 But we must assume
incumbents will be dynamic not just in their responses to entry but also in
their responses to legal rules that frustrate efforts to make entry
unprofitable. Thus, the Williamson rule will produce on average a reduction
in post-entry output and, in fact, will do so in every case where the rule
prevents the incumbent from driving out the entrant.
To the extent the restrictions do make the incumbent reduce its output
from pre-entry levels, this subjects the incumbent to a wasteful process of
contracting production during the restriction period, which it then has to
turn around and expand after the restriction expires. That may entail costly
and disruptive layoffs, contractual breaches or changes, idling and
221. Williamson himself assumes his rule would never protect a less efficient entrant, but he
is mistaken for reasons explained infra text accompanying notes 231-234.
222. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 294-95 & n.35, 297-98, 310 n.66.
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maintaining capacity, building renovations and the like. Such contractions
and closings are a necessary cost of competitive markets, where they have
the virtue of signaling when resources should switch from one firm or
industry to another. But they constitute sheer waste when a more efficient
firm is being forced by regulation to mothball capacity that ultimately will
return to the market. Even when the infliction of these transition costs does
not affect the operating efficiency of the incumbent, they nonetheless
reflect real costs that will be visited on owners, workers, and others who
contract with the incumbent. This will increase the costs of contracting with
the incumbent, thus elevating the contract prices the incumbent must pay
and reducing the returns for having created an efficient incumbent.
Indeed, if the restriction causes a post-entry reduction in incumbent
output, this will probably affirmatively reduce the incumbent's operating
efficiency for various reasons. First, to the extent the incumbent's
efficiency advantage results because of economies of scale or scope that
still apply at large outputs, a reduction in its scale or scope will make it less
efficient. 223 Second, the incumbent has presumably selected a plant size that
minimizes the short-run costs of producing its pre-entry output. Thus, any
decline in output increases its short-run costs. 2 24 Third, because the
restriction on reactive price cuts may require the incumbent to mothball
capacity and layoff workers in the short run, it may disrupt an efficient
operation. Machines that were well-oiled may become rusted, or new
workers may need to be hired and trained. When full production starts up
again, the costs may thus be higher or the quality lower. If any of these
three factors hold, then, a restriction that causes the incumbent's output to
drop will also decrease its productive efficiency. That would mean that the
restriction would effectively have shifted the entire market to less efficient
production: either to the less efficient entrant or to an incumbent who is less
efficient than it otherwise would have been.
In sum, for those less efficient entrants who would have entered
without any post-entry above-cost floor on incumbent prices, all the
restrictions would inflict harm to consumer welfare, a loss of allocative
efficiency, a loss of productive efficiency, and the wasteful imposition of
uncompensated transition costs.
223. An economy of scale results when average costs for a product fall as firm output
increases, whereas an economy of scope results when two products can be produced more
efficiently together than separately. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 35-40, 50-52.
224. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 297, 300-02, 309-10 (assuming that the incumbent
plant size minimizes the short-run costs of making the pre-entry output, so that any decrease or
increase in incumbent output necessarily reduces its efficiency and raises its costs).
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2. Effects for Less Efficient Entrants Whom the
Restrictions Encourage To Enter
Other less efficient entrants might be encouraged to enter because the
restrictions set an above-cost floor on incumbent post-entry pricing. But
this encouragement will be relatively weak because such restrictions cannot
prevent such less efficient entrants from being driven out of the market in
the long run. Where the restrictions do encourage entry by less efficient
entrants, the consequences will be mixed. Consumers who buy from the
entrant will pay lower prices than they otherwise would have. But the
majority of consumers stuck buying from the incumbent may pay more.
Further, productive efficiency will suffer and wasteful uncompensated
transition costs will be imposed.
a. Why Restrictions on Reactive Above-Cost Price
Cuts Can Provide Weak Encouragement to
Entry by Less Efficient Firms
Less efficient entrants will sometimes be encouraged to enter by
restrictions that set an above-cost floor on incumbent post-entry pricing.
The reason is that such restrictions can effectively lengthen the short-run
period when a less efficient entrant can hope to sell at prices that exceed its
own costs. This will sometimes provide the marginal increment of
additional profits that the less efficient entrant needs to make its total
expected short-run profits higher than the capital costs of entry.
But this encouragement will be weak because the additional increment
is relatively small and short-term. As noted above, less efficient entrants
will often be able to survive in the market for some short-run period. The
restrictions will increase the prospective profits from entry by increasing
the length of this short-run period. But the restrictions cannot offer less
efficient entrants any long-term protection. The Edlin and Williamson rules
would expire in twelve to eighteen months. At that point, the more efficient
incumbent can offer above-cost price cuts that will drive the entrant out.
Further, all the restrictions would expire once the entrant expands enough to
deprive the incumbent of whatever market share is necessary to establish its
monopoly or market power. That may be far less than twelve to eighteen
months when the incumbent cannot match an entrant price that undercuts it.
Consumers are likely to switch rapidly to the lower-priced entrant,
especially when (as under the Edlin rule) the entrant price is a full twenty
percent below the incumbent price floor. The incumbent's market share will
accordingly plummet quickly below whatever market share is necessary to
trigger the post-entry price floor, and then the incumbent will be free to
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adopt above-cost price cuts that drive the less efficient entrant out of the
market.
In markets where there are few physical limitations on entrant
expansion, the drop in incumbent market share may be nearly
instantaneous. In particular, in the airline industry, which was the genesis of
these proposals, airplanes are relatively easy to move when demand
increases on some routes, and relatively easy to lease if total demand for the
airline rises. There thus may be no effective barrier to an entrant expanding
to take all the consumer demand that might respond to its lower prices. In
many technology or intangible markets, there may likewise be few physical
limitations to expanding entrant market share, as when output expansion
merely requires more software downloads.
Even if the less efficient entrant must ramp up its capacity over time, an
entrant with a price advantage will sooner or later take enough market share
to deprive the incumbent of its monopoly share. It seems likely to be sooner
rather than later when one considers four additional points. First,
monopolists rarely have a hundred percent market share, but rather
normally begin the post-entry period with a market share only somewhat
above whatever threshold defines monopoly power. They thus need not lose
much market share to lose their monopoly power. Second, as noted above,
such post-entry price floors give incumbents incentives to raise prices and
lose market share as rapidly as possible to bring closer the day when the
restriction expires and they can drive the entrant out and restore monopoly
pricing. Third, while efficient firms are limited in number, the world of less
efficient firms is hardly scarce, so that if the restriction encourages entry by
any of them, it is likely to encourage entry by lots of them, all of which can
ramp up capacity simultaneously.
Fourth, the relevant set of entrants is likely to be in industries that
permit rapid expansion. That relevant set consists of those less efficient
entrants whose entry might actually be caused by an above-cost floor on
post-entry incumbent pricing. That causal link requires two things. (a)
These must be entrants that would not have entered without the restriction.
And that, as noted above, is disproportionately likely to be in industries
where capacity can be expanded rapidly, because that permits incumbents
to drive out entrants quickly with temporary price cuts. Where capacity
cannot be expanded so rapidly, then the restrictions on reactive above-cost
price cuts will last longer, but are less likely to have been necessary to
encourage the less efficient entrant to enter at all. Thus, the very factor that
makes a post-entry price floor likely to encourage less efficient entrants-
an industry where capacity can be expanded rapidly-also tends to mean
that any post-entry price floor will be very short-lived. (b) It must be the
case that the restrictions do provide a meaningful inducement to less
efficient entry. Because the restrictions only offer protection for a limited
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time (twelve to eighteen months at the outside under the Edlin and
Williamson rules), they are unlikely to encourage less efficient firms to
enter when entry requires large capital investments that cannot be recouped
in a short period. Yet such large capital investments are the major reason
why entrants might need time to ramp up capacity. Thus, the set of less
efficient entrants whom the restrictions might actually encourage to enter
probably did not need large capital investments and are thus more likely to
be easily expandable.
In short, while the proposed above-cost floors on incumbent post-entry
prices should encourage some additional entry by less efficient firms, that
encouragement will be relatively weak because the incremental protection
offered by such price floors will be short-lived. Less efficient firms will
realize that the restrictions will not enable them to stay in the market in the
long run. Thus, they will be encouraged to enter only when this marginal
prolongation in the short-run period during which they can profitably
remain in the market provides the additional increment necessary to make
total short-run profits exceed the sunk costs of entry. Where entry costs are
significant, this will be rare, because large entry costs cannot be covered
with short-run profits. Where entry costs are small, this is unlikely, given
that less efficient entrants will generally not be discouraged by the prospect
of reactive above-cost price cuts anyway because they can cover small
entry costs with short-term profits. 225 Further, in industries that require so
little capital investment, incumbents are unlikely to have any market
advantage that makes them more efficient than entrants at all. Thus, the
restrictions will encourage entry only when entry costs are in an
intermediate range that is large enough to deter less efficient entry given the
short-run profits that could be made without the restriction, but not so large
to deter entry given the slightly larger short-run profits that could be made
with the restriction.
There is an additional reason why the Williamson and short-term profit-
maximizing rules would provide weak encouragement to less efficient
entry. Namely, these rules set a post-entry price floor that is often too low
to prevent the incumbent from driving out the less efficient entrant with an
above-cost price cut.2 26 In such cases, those rules cannot offer any
protection to less efficient entrants that might encourage their entry. Since
they will be ineffectual in protecting less efficient entrants, their only post-
entry effect in such cases will be the harmful one of sometimes preventing
225. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 337 (noting that predatory strategies cannot
succeed against entrants when entry costs are low).
226. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 957-59, 977-78, 981-82 (rejecting the short-term profit-
maximization test because a price at that level can sometimes drive out less efficient entrants);
Williamson, supra note 7, at 297-98 (modeling the case where maintaining the incumbent's pre-
entry output level does not leave sufficient market output for the entrant to operate at a large
enough scale to profit at a lower price).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112:681
Above-Cost Price Cuts
the incumbent from cutting prices even further (that is, below the price
floor), which would have benefited consumer welfare and increased
allocative efficiency.227
Indeed, Professors Ordover and Willig assumed their short-term profit-
maximization test could never protect a less efficient entrant.22 8 Their
reasoning was that if the incumbent priced above entrant costs, it would
lose all production to the entrant. Thus, pricing slightly below a less
efficient entrant's costs would always be the more profitable alternative.
But if the entrant is capacity-constrained over the short run, then the entrant
will not be able to take all market output. Instead, the incumbent will be left
with a residual demand curve determined by subtracting entrant output from
the total market demand curve, and pricing above cost will likely maximize
the incumbent's short-run profits. Professors Ordover and Willig would
also apply their test to condemn an above-cost price cut in one product if it
diverted sufficient profits from another substitute product made by the
incumbent.229 But if the substitute product enjoys any supracompetitive
profit margin, this test would prevent what is effectively an efficient price
cut that brings the price on the combination of products closer to their cost,
and would protect (quite undesirably) a less efficient entrant in one product
to preserve the incumbent's supracompetitive profits in the other product.
Still, if the entrant is not capacity-constrained and such substitution effects
are irrelevant, Ordover and Willig appear to be correct that their price floor
cannot protect less efficient entrants absent erroneous application. Further,
even if an entrant begins with a capacity constraint, eventually its output
will rise sufficiently to raise this problem absent substitution effects. This
confirms the point above that the short-term profit-maximization test cannot
offer any long-term protection to a less efficient entrant. And if the goal is
to deny protection to less efficient entrants, a price-cost comparison test
will be better because it denies protection to less efficient entrants when
capacity constraints or substitution effects matter and is generally easier to
apply accurately.23 °
Likewise, Williamson also assumes his rule will never encourage entry
by a less efficient firm. He reaches this conclusion by assuming that the
incumbent always has the knowledge and desire to set pre-entry output
sufficiently high that maintaining that output after entry will make entry
227. Any benefits in such cases would instead have to be based on the claim that the rule
encourages a pre-entry incumbent-output expansion that amounts to a form of limit pricing. See
infra Section IV.D.
228. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 71, at 18-19.
229. Id. at 20-21.
230. See supra Part 11; infra Part V.
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unprofitable. 231 But these assumptions about incumbent knowledge and
desire are both false. Williamson himself recognizes that in fact no
incumbent is that prescient. Instead, there is a range of probabilities so that
the incumbent will have to set pre-entry output at an average that will
sometimes make entry unprofitable but sometimes will not.232 Second, his
premise that the incumbent will always want to set pre-entry output high
enough to make entry unprofitable rests on what Williamson acknowledges
is the "arbitrary assumption" that incumbents strictly prefer avoiding post-
entry hazards to earning pre-entry profits.233 If we instead adopt the more
rational assumption that the incumbent attaches some positive value to pre-
entry profits, they will make trade-offs that lower pre-entry output
somewhat, and will thus sometimes be unable to drive out a less efficient
entrant under a rule that prohibits output expansions. Indeed, incumbents
would have strong incentives to do so since any increased pre-entry profits
will not have the time and uncertainty discount applied to fears of a decline
in post-entry profits.234 Thus, although the encouragement to entry will be
weak, the Williamson output ceiling will sometimes prevent the incumbent
from being able to drive out a less efficient entrant.
The lack of encouragement to entry by less efficient firms will be even
greater if the restriction is rendered ineffective (as discussed below) either
by buffer zones established to escape the difficulty of adjusting for demand
or cost shifts, or by a failure to regulate nonprice reactions.235 It will also be
even more ineffective if the restriction is defined to begin at a moment of
entry that is not sufficiently early (and long-lasting) to restrain reactive
price cuts that anticipate entry. 236 Nor can these likely sources of regulatory
ineffectiveness be easily avoided since doing so requires incurring the
serious adverse effects of mistaken adjustments in price controls, freezing
innovation, or a lengthier distortion of prices and innovation."'
b. The Effects of(Weakly) Encouraging This Additional
Less Efficient Entry
Since any encouraged less efficient entrant cannot survive in the market
once the restriction expires, the restriction cannot have any long-term
231. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 294, 297-98, 310 n.66. Williamson assumes that an
entrant with the same cost curve as the incumbent will be left at zero profits, which means a less
efficient entrant with a higher cost curve would suffer an actual loss.
232. Id. at 294 n.33.
233. Id. at 314.
234. See infra Subsection IV.D. I (noting other reasons why the incumbent may not keep pre-
entry output so high).
235. See infra Sections V.B-C.
236. See infra Section V.A.
237. See infra Part V.
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beneficial effect on post-entry market pricing. Further, any short-run effects
may be very short indeed given the reasons noted above for thinking the
restrictions will expire relatively quickly.
But such restrictions will have one clear positive short-run effect.
Namely, those buyers who purchase from the less efficient entrant during
this short-run period will pay a lower price than they would have paid if
that entrant had not been induced to enter by the restriction.
However, those buyers who continue to purchase from the incumbent
during this short-run period may or may not pay a lower price than they
otherwise would have. The reasons are several. First, as noted above,
incumbent monopolists have incentives to respond strategically to such
restrictions by raising their prices to lose market share and speed the day
when the restriction expires. The restrictions even give incumbents perverse
incentives to raise prices above their short-run profit-maximizing level.238
Sometimes these perverse incentives can cause the incumbent to increase
prices above its pre-entry level. It will not always do so because the
addition of entrant output will itself lower the short-term profit-maximizing
price of the incumbent by leaving less residual demand for the incumbent
(absent an offsetting increase in total market demand). Thus, if the pre-
entry price was at the short-term profit-maximizing level, then that same
price is (absent a demand increase) likely to be already above the post-entry
short-term profit-maximizing level. Whether going even further above that
profit-maximizing level will be a cost-effective way to speed the expiration
of the restriction will depend on the particular facts.
Second, as also noted above, the restrictions will generally require a
reduction from the incumbent's pre-entry output level that can reduce the
incumbent's productive efficiency. Increased incumbent costs will thus
increase the incumbent's short-term profit-maximizing price. Especially in
combination with the fact that the restriction would give the incumbent
incentives to raise prices above short-term profit-maximizing levels, this
will further increase the likelihood that the incumbent will raise prices
above pre-entry levels.
Third, sometimes the incumbent's pre-entry price will reflect an
attempted limit price (that the incumbent mistakenly set a bit too high to
deter entry) that was below the short-term profit-maximizing level from the
start.239 Because the restriction (in any case where it encouraged entry)
makes it impossible to drive out the entrant, the incumbent will have no
reason not to raise post-entry prices to at least the short-term profit-
maximizing level until the restriction expires. Combined with the likely
238. See supra text accompanying note 220.
239. A limit price is an above-cost price deliberately set by a monopolist below its short-term
profit-maximizing level in order to preclude entrants. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 57, at 168-
70.
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increase in that level because of increased incumbent costs and its
incentives to charge over that level to speed the end of the restriction, this
means the restrictions are especially likely to increase incumbent prices
above pre-entry levels when pre-entry prices reflected attempted limit
prices.
Accordingly, buyers who purchase from the encouraged less efficient
entrant will pay less post-entry, but those who continue to purchase from
the incumbent may pay more. And more buyers will be in the latter camp
than the former. The reason is that the restrictions only apply as long as the
incumbents have a monopoly or dominant market share. This normally
means that the incumbent will have over a 50% market share during the
period of any restriction, and that most consumers will accordingly be
buying from the incumbent. Indeed, if monopoly power is required,
probably the great majority of consumers will be buying from the
incumbent, given most definitions of monopoly-share thresholds. To be
concrete, suppose that in a particular industry the incumbent has 100%
market share and the minimal market share at which a firm will be said to
have monopoly power triggering the relevant restriction is 70%. In the short
run before the incumbent drops below its monopoly share, the restriction
would allow the entrant to ramp up from 0% to 30% market share and cause
the incumbent to ramp down from 100% to 70%. If the rate at which the
incumbent loses market share is constant, then during this period an average
of 85% of buyers will continue to buy from the incumbent.
The fact that most buyers will continue purchasing from the incumbent
makes it more likely that the net effects are negative for consumer welfare.
In this example, on average only 15% of buyers would benefit from lower
entrant prices during this short-run period. If the pre-entry price were $100,
and the entrant priced at $80 (as it would under Edlin's 20% discount rule),
there will be a net harm to consumer welfare if the desire to speed the
demise of the entrant causes the incumbent to raise prices to any level
above $103.53.
Further, to avoid making the restrictions entirely ineffectual, they have
to begin when entry is first foreseeable, rather than when the entrant first
sells, or else the incumbent would just cut prices before entrant sales
begin. 24 Thus, the period during which incumbent prices will be elevated
by the restriction will last longer than the period during which consumers
will enjoy lower entrant prices.
In short, even in the case where the restrictions do encourage the entry
of a less efficient firm that otherwise would not have occurred, the net
effect on post-entry consumer welfare is mixed, and thus so too is the
predicted effect on allocative efficiency. Other effects of the restrictions in
240. See infra Section V.A.
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such a case are unambiguously negative. Productive efficiency will suffer
because, by hypothesis, the restriction here has resulted in a shift of market
production to a less efficient firm. Further, the reduction in the incumbent's
pre-entry output will inflict wasteful transition costs and likely decrease the
incumbent's productive efficiency.24'
Finally, the capital costs of entry will be wasted because the less
efficient entrant who was encouraged by the restriction to enter will
eventually be driven from the market. Indeed, the less efficient entry
encouraged by the restrictions would amount to a form of wasteful rent-
seeking. The entrant will be encouraged to expend those capital costs only
because of the short-term profits it earns by shifting producer surplus from
the more efficient incumbent to itself. As we will see below, this transfer in
the rewards for creating a more efficient product or method of production
from the firm that created it to another firm that did not will reduce the
incentives to invest in such efficient creation.242 But here the point is that
some, and at the extreme all, of this transferred producer surplus will be
dissipated by the expenditure of entry costs that otherwise would have been
avoided.243 Such dissipation results in an efficiency loss.
B. Effects on Likelihood and Consequences of Efficient Entry
Proponents of restrictions on above-cost pricing have analyzed their
effects on less efficient entrants and, to a lesser extent, on entrants that are
initially less efficient but grow more efficient with time.2 4 4 But they have
ignored the effects of their proposed restrictions when entrants are just as
efficient as, or more efficient than, the incumbent. This one cannot do if one
wishes to understand the full effects of these restrictions because equal or
greater efficiency characterizes many entrants. After all, long-term
prospects of at least remaining in the market, if not besting the incumbent,
are normally what motivates entry and persuades capital markets to fund it.
Indeed, given the weak encouragement the proposed restrictions would give
to less efficient entrants, it would seem that the lion's share of entrants
would continue to be efficient even if the restrictions were adopted. And the
restrictions do have serious effects on efficient entrants.
To be sure, the restrictions will not affect the likelihood of entry by a
created entrant that is at least as efficient as the incumbent. To the contrary,
if we have set our cost measure correctly, then by definition such an entrant
241. See supra Subsection 1V.A.I.b.
242. See infra Section IV.D.
243. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
807 (1975) (noting that monopoly rents will tend to be dissipated by costly competition over
which producer gets those rents, unless that competition has socially valuable by-products).
244. See supra Section IV.A; infra Section IV.C.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
could not have been deterred by the prospect that the incumbent might react
to entry with an above-cost price cut.24 5 We thus need to turn to post-entry
effects and the ex ante incentives to create efficient entrants.
1. Post-Entry Effects
The restrictions will all limit the post-entry competition that otherwise
would have occurred between incumbents and efficient entrants. As in the
case of less efficient entrants, here too the price floors, where they have
bite, will prevent the incumbent from adopting above-cost price cuts that
lower prices as much as they otherwise would have. Likewise, the
restrictions will give efficient entrants incentives to price no lower than the
incumbent's price floor, and perhaps even to begin with a higher price until
they can test where that price floor is, even when pricing down to their own
costs would have produced a lower price. Consumers who buy from either
the incumbent or the entrant will thus pay higher above-cost prices than
they would have paid without the floor on incumbent post-entry above-cost
pricing. This will harm both consumer welfare and allocative efficiency.
The restrictions can also lower incumbent productive efficiency.
Indeed, for efficient entrants, the effects are even more likely to be
harmful for three reasons. First, because more efficient entrants have lower
costs, it is more likely they would have otherwise set a price further below
this price umbrella. Second, their lower costs mean the prices they
otherwise would have set would have been lower. Third, for efficient
entrants, these negative offsets are not possibly offset by encouraging
additional entry. Instead, the effects on entry are on balance negative.
2. Ex Ante Effects on Creation of More Efficient Entrants
While the proposed restrictions would have no positive ex ante effects
on entry by efficient entrants, that does not end the ex ante analysis. Rather,
we need to take it one further step ex ante, to consider what effects such
restrictions have on ex ante incentives to create these more efficient
entrants. Entrants who are more efficient than incumbents are not magically
generated. They require creative effort and capital investments. Both are
scarce. We must thus consider the likely effect the proposed restrictions
would have on whether this scarce effort and capital will be allocated to
these or other forms of entrants.
245. See supra Part II. Even if the reader does not agree with my particular cost measure, the
conclusions here follow under whatever definition of costs the reader does believe suffices to
meet this condition.
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To the extent proponents are right that these restrictions do encourage
entry, it will be by less efficient entrants. 246 Since effort and capital is
scarce, this increased entry by less efficient entrants must divert effort or
capital that otherwise would have gone to the more efficient entrant. Of
course, if investors knew one entrant was less efficient and the other was
more efficient, they would all choose the latter. But, in fact, there will often
be a probabilistic judgment, where a new firm has, say, fifty percent odds of
being more efficient and fifty percent odds of not being more efficient. The
proposed restrictions effectively reduce the difference in returns between
less efficient and more efficient entrants, and thus at the margins induce
more investment in less efficient entrants as compared to others that might
be more efficient.
True, any diversion of effort or capital to a less efficient entrant will be
offset to the extent that, by increasing the short-run returns to entry, the
restrictions increase the total effort and capital that flow to all entrants from
other areas of the economy. But if we generally thought that such an
indiscriminate subsidy to entrants, whether efficient or not, were warranted,
then it would cut far beyond the present context to suggest a general "infant
firm" policy of subsidizing entrants. 24 7 Moreover, an additional factor
means the restrictions would likely decrease the overall returns to more
efficient entrants and further discourage the creation of efficient entrants.
Creating an entrant to challenge an incumbent is always risky, and thus a
major motive for making such a risky investment will often be the prospect
of long-term supracompetitive profits if the entry is successful. In
particular, investors often invest to create a more efficient entrant based
partly on the prospect that, if the entrant truly is more efficient than the
incumbent, it can displace that incumbent and become the new monopolist
(with lower costs or better quality) and reap supracompetitive profits itself.
But to the extent the restrictions do protect and encourage more entry by
less efficient entrants, they will, as proponents stress, reduce the
profitability of firms that enjoy monopoly profits as a result of their greater
efficiency.248 This effect will reduce the potential upside of making an
investment that succeeds in creating a more efficient entrant, and thus will
lessen the incentives to make risky investments that are necessary to create
more efficient firms at all. This effective reduction in the rewards for
improving market efficiency will naturally lead to fewer such
improvements, resulting in a loss of productive efficiency and fewer more
efficient entrants.
246. See supra Section IV.A.
247. See infra Subsection IV.C.2.
248. See infra Subsection IV.D.2.
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Consider the inventor who is deciding whether to devote her time to
research that has a 50% chance of resulting in a more desirable or efficient
product, and a 50% chance of coming up empty. Or consider the venture
capitalist who is deciding whether to make an investment in a new
technology that has a 50% chance of being preferred by buyers to the
incumbent product, but a 50% chance of flopping. In either case, whether
the inventor or venture capitalist makes the necessary investment of time
and money will depend on how great the returns are if the product does turn
out to be better or cheaper. If the returns of a successful product are higher,
they are more likely to make investments that lead to more efficient
entrants. If the returns are lower, they are less likely.
In short, to the extent the proposed restrictions succeed in their goal of
encouraging less efficient entry and inducing limit pricing on firms that
acquire market power, they will tend to lessen the creation of more efficient
entrants by diverting some effort and capital and by lessening the long-run
return on successfully creating a more efficient entrant. Any reduced
creation of efficient entrants will cause unambiguous harm to consumer
welfare, allocative efficiency, and productive efficiency since entry by
efficient entrants not only undercuts monopoly prices but can actually lower
costs or improve product quality. Further, these harms will be permanent
and long-term whenever a more efficient entrant is discouraged, as opposed
to the possible (mixed) benefits when a less efficient entrant is encouraged,
which can only last for the short term before the restriction expires.
Proponents of restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts have
ignored these ex ante effects on the creation of more efficient entrants.
They tend to assume instead that entrants either have an inherent
inefficiency disadvantage, or one that just depends on where their output is
located on a cost curve equally available to entrant and incumbent.2 49 This
assumes away competition in making the sorts of innovations and
investments that can lower cost curves and raise demand curves. Thus,
though these models pride themselves on taking dynamic account of
strategic intertemporal considerations, 25 and do improve on prior static
models in that regard, they end up being very static in their assumptions
about where the cost and demand curves lie, and they ignore the dynamic
possibility that those curves might be changed by innovation or investment.
If one instead takes those dynamic effects into account, the effects of the
restrictions become even more negative.
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3. The Restrictions Cannot Reasonably Be Construed or
Modified To Eliminate Their Adverse Effects
on Efficient Entrants
Although the other restrictions on their face apply regardless of the
efficiency of the entrant, one might think Edlin has avoided adverse effects
on efficient entrants by providing that his ban only applies in cases where
the "incumbent monopoly enjoys significant advantages over potential
entrants.,, 2 1 This sounds like it excludes any protection for more efficient
entrants, and perhaps even for entrants whose efficiency disadvantage is
small enough to make it plausible that they will overcome it. But Edlin later
disavows any such limitation, arguing for a ban on reactive price cuts that
applies to any incumbent monopoly.252
Still, one might be tempted to modify any of the restrictions on reactive
above-cost price cuts by defining them to exclude cases where entrants are
not initially less efficient. But such modifications would face numerous
difficulties.
First, neither regulators nor antitrust litigation would seem likely to
gauge accurately when an entrant is less efficient than an incumbent. A
cost-based predation test allows market pricing and competition to sort out
the efficient entrants from the inefficient ones naturally. But if regulators or
antitrust litigation were to apply a cost-bascd test to efficient entrants and
an above-cost price floor for inefficient entrants, then they would have to
make freestanding assessments of the efficiency of an entrant. This would
be a difficult assessment to make, especially since entrants would have
incentives to pretend to be less efficient than they really are in order to get
the benefit of a price umbrella. To the extent regulators or litigation
erroneously determined entrants were less efficient when they were not, or
firms predicted they would err, the effects would be unambiguously
adverse.
Second, any modification that resulted in a rule whose substance
differed depending on whether a regulator or antitrust litigation would
conclude that the entrant was less efficient would violate fundamental rule-
of-law norms of providing notice to incumbents about how to conform their
behavior to legal dictates. A cost-based test may be complex but provides
some notice. The incumbent has access to information about its own costs
and prices and by considering it can conform its behavior to the law. But a
rule whereby the cost-based test did not apply when the entrant was less
efficient would make the substantive rule turn on information about the
entrant that the incumbent may not know. Indeed, it might well be that it is
251. Edlin, supra note 6, at 945.
252. Id. at 967-68.
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only by making above-cost price cuts that an incumbent could reveal
whether or not the entrant were less efficient. But once it has made such
price cuts, it might discover from the market effect on the entrant that its
price cut was illegal. Not only would this violate rule-of-law norms, it
would lead risk-averse incumbents to avoid above-cost price cuts whenever
the relative efficiency of the entrant seemed at all ambiguous.
Third, even if an exception for efficient entrants could be applied with
perfect accuracy and predictability, this would not eliminate-and indeed
would exacerbate-the adverse effect of the restrictions on the creation of
efficient entrants. It would not eliminate this adverse effect because it
would flow from the application of the restrictions to less efficient entrants,
which at the margin would divert some effort and capital away from the
creation of more efficient entrants and reduce the long-run returns to
creating a more efficient entrant. It would instead exacerbate this adverse
effect because it would give less efficient entrants an extra return from a
short-term price umbrella that would be unavailable to more efficient
entrants, thus increasing the tendency of the restriction to divert effort and
capital from more efficient entrants to less efficient entrants. Indeed,
entrants might even have incentives to lower, at least temporarily, their
efficiency to try to gain the advantage of such a price umbrella. This would
only worsen the effects of the restriction.
C. Effects for Entrants Who Can Overcome Their
Initial Efficiency Disadvantage
Although the proposals to restrict reactive above-cost price cuts have
mainly been based on the premise that the entrant has an insurmountable
efficiency disadvantage, they have also sometimes cited the hope that over
time the entrant can overcome this efficiency disadvantage. 253 There are
two reasons this might happen: The efficiency of the entrant might increase,
or the efficiency of the incumbent might deteriorate. Those advocating the
restrictions have emphasized the former. And it has some basis. There
might be economies of scale or scope at low output that are only available
over time as production is ramped up. Or experience in the industry might
lower costs or improve quality. But, as noted above, there are also various
reasons incumbent efficiency might deteriorate when faced with a less
efficient entrant under the proposed restrictions. 254 We must thus consider
both of these reasons why an entrant might with time be able to overcome
an incumbent's initial efficiency advantage.
253. See id. at 975 & n.95, 977; Williamson, supra note 7, at 296, 298 n.43, 303-04, 313.
254. See supra Subsection IV.A.l.b.
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1. When Overcoming Incumbent Efficiency Advantage
Necessitates Some Deterioration in
Incumbent Efficiency
One possibility is that any increased entrant efficiency does not alone
suffice to overcome the initial efficiency disadvantage, but that the
combination of any increased entrant efficiency with the deterioration in
incumbent efficiency caused by the restriction does suffice. Because in
these cases the degradation of incumbent efficiency was necessary to
overcome the initial efficiency advantage, the final efficiency of both the
entrant and incumbent must be less than the initial efficiency of the
incumbent.
255
Such entry will indeed be encouraged by the restriction, for without the
restriction the entrant never would have been able to compete effectively
with the incumbent. The incumbent would just have lowered its post-entry
price to an above-cost level that enabled it to maintain output and fend off
any efficiency degradation, while still undercutting the entrant and driving
it out of the market.
But the consequences of encouraging such entry are likely to be
undesirable. It effectively changes an efficient monopoly market into a
market with two or more inefficient firms. It is highly unlikely that this will
be socially desirable. First, the two inefficient firms may engage in duopoly
pricing that is just as supracompetitive as monopoly pricing but that,
because costs are higher, means higher prices.
Second, even if enough other less efficient firms entered to make the
market competitive, productive efficiency generally matters much more
than allocative efficiency. Even in static models, the efficiency gains from a
small cost reduction usually offset the efficiency loss from a large price
increase.256 The basic reason is that the cost reduction creates efficiency
gains for all output, whereas the price increase produces an efficiency loss
only for the marginal reduction in output. True, it is a disputed issue
whether antitrust law does (or should) protect just consumer surplus or total
255. In the extreme, some of these cases will be ones where the entrant experienced no
efficiency improvement but was able to overcome its initial efficiency disadvantage solely
because of deteriorating incumbent efficiency.
256. Professor Williamson has shown that even at a very high demand elasticity of 2, a cost
decrease of 0.25% offsets a price increase of 5%, and a cost decrease of 9% offsets a price
increase of 30%. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 22-23 (1968). At a more normal demand elasticity of 1, it takes
half the cost decrease to offset the same price increases: A 0.12% cost decrease offsets a 5% price
increase, and a 4.5% cost decrease offsets a 30% price increase. Id. At a lower demand elasticity
of 0.5, a 0.06% cost decrease offsets a 5% price increase, and a 2.25% cost decrease offsets a 30%
price increase. Id.
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efficiency (measured by the sum of consumer and producer surplus). 2 57
Judge Robert Bork's argument for the latter was roundly critiqued as based
on the premise that monopolists are owned by shareholders who are
consumers too.258 But Bork's proposition seems more distributionally
attractive now that most workers are invested in stocks through their
pension plans. More persuasively, one might add that the per capita income
of any nation must in the end rest on its productivity. More productive
efficiency thus generally means higher wages for workers. Accordingly,
increases in productive efficiency benefit consumers both as employees and
investors, making it more likely that consumers will be better off when the
productive efficiency gain outweighs the loss in consumer surplus. The
odds increase even further when onc takes into account that any increased
productive efficiency will also increase tax receipts that benefit the general
citizenry. Indeed, some argue that taxes can generally achieve any
redistributive aim better than substantive law, and that therefore substantive
law should focus solely on wealth-maximizing efficiency and leave the
redistribution to taxation.
259
Third, increased productive efficiency may eliminate any harm to
consumer welfare because lower costs tend to offset any tendency of
monopolies to increase prices. 260 That might be one reason the evidence
turns out to be quite disputed about the degree to which high market shares
even produce higher prices.2 6 ' Some conclude that the degree to which
market shares fluctuate influences market performance far more than the
size of market shares. 262 Professor Richard Schmalensee's review of the
257. Compare Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68-70 (1982), with ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
107-15 (1978).
258. BORK, supra note 257, at 110.
259. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
260. The monopolist price will reflect a markup over cost that depends on demand elasticity.
See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 40, at 339. Thus, any reduction in cost reduces the
difference between the monopoly and competitive prices. If the monopoly has sufficiently lower
costs, the monopoly price will be less than the competitive price. See, e.g., 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 § 4 (Sept. 10, 1992) (establishing that a merger that
creates market power has a defense if it creates increased efficiencies that fully offset the tendency
of the market power to increase prices).
261. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 258-59; Harold Demsetz, Industry
Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973); Harold Demsetz, Two
Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164
(Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974); Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial
Concentration, 20 J L. & ECON. 229 (1977); Ky P. Ewing, Jr., The Soft Underbelly of Antitrust:
Some Challenging Thoughts for the New Millennium, ANTITRUST REP., Sept. 1999, at 2; Barry C.
Harris & David D. Smith, The Merger Guidelines v. Economics: A Survey of Economic Studies,
ANTITRUST REP., Sept. 1999, at 23.
262. See R.E. Caves & M.E. Porter, Market Structure, Oligopoly, and Stability of Market
Shares, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 289 (1978); Mariko Sakakibara & Michael E. Porter, Competing at
tHome To Win Abroad: Evidence from Japanese Industry, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 310, 312
(2001).
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literature concludes that while the "relation, if any, between seller
concentration and profitability is weak statistically" in studies comparing
the concentrations in different industries, "[i]n cross-section comparisons
involving markets in the same industry, seller concentration is positively
related to the level of price."263 Since efficiencies are more likely to differ
between industries than within the same industry for a firm operating in
different geographic markets, this observation is consistent with the
conclusion that concentration earned by greater efficiency generally does
not increase prices, but concentration produced by other (nonmerit) factors
does. Since here the initial incumbent is (by hypothesis) more efficient,
there is little reason to think its replacement with less efficient firms would
benefit buyers with lower prices even in the short run.
Fourth, if one moves away from static models to dynamic ones, it is
clear that in the long run the pace of innovation advances consumer welfare
far more than maintaining allocative efficiency. 264 Indeed, it has been
shown that nations with better market performance generally compete by
innovation and differentiation rather than by price and imitation.
265
Replacing an efficient incumbent with less efficient firms would reverse
this dynamic process. And those less efficient firms are likely to be less
innovative. Schumpeter goes even further to argue that firms with higher
market power are more likely to innovate because they can reap a larger
share of the benefits of their innovation, whereas if there were perfect
competition no one would have the incentives to invest in unpatentable
product improvements. 266 Whether or not that is generally true, it certainly
seems likely when the firm with market power is (by hypothesis) more
efficient.
263. Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 133, at 951, 988.
264. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 720a, at 255 & n.3 (collecting sources);
AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 132, at 31; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 84-92, 99-106 (3d ed. 1950); see also Moses Abramovitz, Resource and
Output Trends in the United States Since 1870, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (1956); Robert M. Solow, A
Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65 (1956); Robert M. Solow,
Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REv. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957).
265. Michael E. Porter, The Current Competitiveness Index: Measuring the Microeconomic
Foundations of Prosperity, in THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 40, 45 (2000).
266. SCHUMPETER, supra note 264, at 87-92, 99-106. Professors Areeda and Kaplow have
disputed this hypothesis with evidence that firms with market power do not obtain more patents or
spend more on research and development. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 132, at 31-33. But this
misapprehends Schumpeter's point, which was that innovation includes not just technological
progress but changes in organization, distribution, or scale that are not protected by patents and
would thus go unrewarded without some degree of market power. SCHUMPETER, supra note 264,
at 84-85, 88-89. The huge investments necessary to create hub-and-spoke airline systems would
be just such an example. See supra Section III.A. Indeed, properly understood, Schumpeter's
theory would predict firms that lack market power would have greater incentives to shift their
innovation investments toward research and development designed to obtain patents because that
is the only form of innovation for which they can exclude competition and obtain rewards.
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In sum, when entrants can overcome their initial efficiency
disadvantage only if the restrictions somewhat lessen the incumbent's
efficiency, then the effects on prices and thus on consumer welfare are
ambiguous, but the effects on productive efficiency are clearly negative.
2. When Increased Entrant Efficiency Suffices To Overcome
Incumbent Efficiency Advantage
The other possibility is that entrant efficiencies alone will increase
sufficiently with time to overcome its initial efficiency disadvantage before
the restriction on reactive price cuts expires. This can include cases where
incumbent efficiency declines, as long as the final efficiency of the entrant
exceeds or equals the initial efficiency of the incumbent. This might be true
when there are economies of scale the entrant can only access over time,
and the minimum efficient scale is less than half the potential market
output. It might also happen when the increased entrant efficiencies come
from experience and learning by doing, which need not come at the expense
of incumbent efficiency.
But the analysis that follows shows such entrants do not need
encouragement from a restriction on reactive above-cost price cuts. Thus,
the effects of a restriction in their case are undesirable.
a. Why Such Entrants Would Generally Enter Without
Any Restriction on Reactive Above-Cost Price Cuts
If it is possible to ascertain when increased entrant efficiency alone will
allow it to overcome the incumbent's initial efficiency advantages, then
such entrants should be able to persuade capital markets to lend them
enough money to get established without the protection of any restriction
on reactive above-cost price cuts. True, the initially less efficient entrant
will suffer start-up losses if the incumbent's above-cost price is below the
entrant's initial costs. This can force the entrant to charge a below-cost
price to remain in the market, which is one more reason to allow entrants to
charge promotional prices.26 7 But this initial need for a fund to cover start-
up losses will simply be one of the many capital costs of entry that must be
considered and that any entrant would anticipate.
When the initial inefficiency results from inexperience, the investment
will effectively be in human capital, the cost of which requires funding the
losses necessary to get that experience. But there is no reason to treat
investments in the human capital necessary to enter a market successfully
any differently from investments in the physical capital necessary for
267. See infra Subsection IV.C.3.
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successful entry. Nor is this entry cost an artificial one, since it reflects a
real societal loss of efficiency from shifting production in initial stages to a
less efficient firm. If the entrant cannot earn a sufficient return to cover this
entry cost, there is no more reason to think its entry desirable than it would
be for an entrant that cannot cover the capital cost of building a plant. Thus,
if entry by an initially less efficient firm is itself efficient and desirable, the
capital markets should be willing to provide the necessary capital to cover
start-up losses, just like they cover other capitalized entry costs.
26 8
One might think that capital markets would not cover these start-up
costs because the long-term result will be competition between the entrant
and incumbent with both pricing at long-run costs. But here cost has the
economic definition that includes a normal rate of return on capital
investment (including human capital), and if entry is efficient, that normal
rate of return should suffice at a minimum to recoup this and other entry
costs. Indeed, as soon as it realizes the entrant cannot be driven out, the
incumbent monopolist will have incentives to accommodate entry by
pricing at supracompetitive duopoly levels,2 69 which should more than
suffice to cover the entrant's capital investment of bearing the initial
inefficiency loss. Accordingly, once the initially less efficient entrant raises
the capital to cover initial inefficiency losses, that itself should assure that
the incumbent's reactive pricing will eventually be high enough that those
initial losses will at least be recouped and may even be immediately high
enough that those initial losses will never be incurred.270 If the entrant
anticipates eventually becoming more efficient than the incumbent, then it
will even be able to drive out the incumbent and reap its own monopoly
profits, thus amply covering these start-up entry costs.
Another concern might be the general concern about any sunk entry
cost that the threat of the incumbent pricing at its variable costs will
suffice to deter entry by an equally efficient entrant. But since this is a
general problem, there is no reason to adopt a special doctrine to deal with
those sunk entry costs that happen to take the form of initial inefficiency
losses due to inexperience. Instead, a more general doctrine must be
developed to deal with this issue. For reasons analyzed above, it turns out
that an incumbent threat to price at whatever costs are variable to it during
any pricing period will not suffice to deter an equally efficient entrant
268. Below-cost incumbent pricing is a different story because it might mislead prospective
entrants or capital markets into thinking incumbent efficiencies are greater (or market conditions
are worse) than they actually are. See Bolton et al., supra note 15, at 2247-49, 2285-330
(synthesizing the recent literature).
269. See supra Section IE.
270. They will be immediately that high when the incumbent shares the belief of the capital
markets that the entrant will eventually be as efficient. The incumbent will have incentives to be
as accurate as it can in such predictions since, if the entrant will eventually be as efficient,
immediately higher prices will maximize the incumbent's profits.
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because, once the sunk entry costs are incurred, such pricing cannot drive
out the entrant and would thus be irrational. 27 1 Even if one did not accept
this reasoning, the solution would not be to replace a cost-based test with a
restriction on above-cost price cuts. Instead, the solution would simply be
to define the cost measure to include the magnitude of the predator's costs
for the sorts of sunk entry costs that are variable to the entrant when it
decides whether to enter. 272 The start-up sunk costs in human or physical
capital necessary to achieve equal efficiency with the incumbent would be
included in the sort of costs variable to the entrant. But the magnitude of
those costs to the incumbent must be determined in a future-oriented
way.273 And since these are start-up losses, they are nonrecurring by
definition and thus the incumbent will not face these costs in the future.
That is, incurring start-up losses to replace the incumbent's output with the
entrant's involves a real efficiency loss if the remainder of their future costs
is really identical. Unless the entrant can cover those costs from market
returns, then its entry will not really be efficient.
2 74
Thus, entrants who in the long run will be just as efficient as the
incumbent should enter without any restriction on reactive above-cost price
cuts. The only reason to expect any difference would be if courts are
somehow better than firms and capital markets at identifying entrants who
have this characteristic, which is surely implausible. Not only do capital
markets have far more expertise on this matter, they have a lot more
incentive to make correct decisions. Indeed, whether or not they on average
are better at identifying good entrants, the capital markets will drive those
who prove to be bad at making this identification out of the market, leaving
only those who do better.
Williamson points out that capital markets might wrongly fail to
provide funds because it is too costly for entrants to disclose their actual
state of competitiveness persuasively to potential investors.275 But that
information cost is a real societal cost of entry, and, absent more precise
information, the capital markets should rely on the average competitiveness
of such an entrant, which they can gauge at least as accurately as courts and
juries. Williamson's rule (and the other restrictions) would effectively
protect all entrants without incurring the cost of becoming any more
informed. This will induce the entry of some firms that prove to be
271. See supra Section II.E.
272. See supra Section II.D.
273. See supra Section II.D.
274. If one also rejected this future-oriented conclusion, the solution still would not be to
restrict above-cost price cuts. It would instead be to define the cost measure to include the
amortized cost of the sorts of sunk entry costs that are variable to the entrant when it decides
whether to enter. See supra Section II.D. That measure would then include any start-up sunk costs
in human or physical capital necessary to achieve equal efficiency with the incumbent.
275. Williamson, supra note 7, at 304 n.58.
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competitive, but will also induce the entry of many firms that are not, and
on average will induce more of the latter entry than the former in any case
where capital markets were not willing to make the investment given the
average competitiveness of the class of entrants.
To put it another way, one could accurately characterize the various
restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts as mandatory consumer
financing of the new entrant. Instead of having the financing provided by
capital markets, the financing is provided by consumers in the form of
higher post-entry prices. And instead of having the financing decision made
voluntarily by experts on capital markets, it would be made involuntarily,
based either on a regulatory or litigation assessment of the particular entrant
or on a mistaken blanket rule that includes all entrants. Indeed, the Edlin
and Williamson proposals include a twelve- to eighteen-month limit only as
a rule specification of the more general standard that the period of price
restriction should last long enough to allow the entrant "sufficient time to
recover its entry costs and become viable. 2 76 But the persons from whom
the entrant is "recovering" its entry costs will be the consumers who are
paying higher post-entry prices than they otherwise would have. And unless
there is a (mistaken) global judgment that all entrants can do so, the person
making the judgment whether the entrant will become viable (i.e., efficient
in the long run) will be the regulator, judge, or jury. There is no reason to
think it desirable to have such government-ordered consumer financing of
entrants that cannot get financing on capital markets.
If there were good reasons to think capital markets were so imperfect
that mandatory consumer financing were desirable, there would be no
reason to limit that proposition to the particular set of cases where entrants
face incumbents with market power who are likely to drive them out with
reactive above-cost price cuts. The proposition would justify protecting all
entrants with government subsidization, tariffs, or post-entry price floors
and output ceilings. If such "infant firm" arguments for protecting entrants
are not persuasive generally, there is no greater reason to find them
persuasive here.
In short, any entrant who is likely to experience a sufficient efficiency
improvement to overcome an initial efficiency disadvantage will likely get
the financing to enter without any restriction and thus cannot have its entry
encouraged by the restriction. The restriction is likely to encourage entry
only in cases where the government and capital markets diverge in their
prediction of whether an entrant's efficiency will rise enough to overcome
its initial inefficiency. And the most likely reason for such divergence is
that the government has erroneously overestimated the ability of the
particular entrant's efficiency to rise or has erroneously overincluded all
276. Edlin, supra note 6, at 969; see also Williamson, supra note 7, at 296.
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entrants. Thus, the restriction is more likely to encourage entry by firms that
in fact will never overcome the efficiency disadvantage than to encourage
entry by firms that will.
Further, even in such cases, the encouragement to entry will be weak.
This is because the capital markets by hypothesis will regard the entrant as
permanently less efficient and thus unlikely to survive in the market in the
long run. Accordingly, the restriction would only cause the capital markets
to fund the entrant in the rare case where the anticipated additional profits
during the relatively short period of any restriction on reactive above-cost
price cuts provide the marginal difference necessary to overcome capital
entry costs.
277
b. The Undesirable Consequences
In short, if capital markets are reasonably efficient, entrants who will
become with time as efficient as the incumbent should enter even without
any restriction. The effect of a restriction on such entrants will thus be
adverse. During whatever initial period the entrant remains less efficient
than the incumbent, the effects will be much the same as those described
above for less efficient entrants who would enter without any restriction.
278
Consumers who purchase from either the incumbent or entrant will pay
higher prices. Where the restrictions have bite, increased production will be
shifted to a less efficient producer, and the incumbent will suffer a
decreased output that lowers its own efficiency. Thus, both consumer
welfare and productive efficiency will suffer. After the entrant becomes just
as efficient as (or more efficient than) the incumbent, the effects will be
those described for the application of the restrictions to efficient entrants.2
79
Consumers will pay higher prices, reducing consumer welfare and
producing a lower output harmful to allocative efficiency.
3. Entrants That Share the Incumbent's
Declining Cost Curve
One important case to consider is where entrants have the same cost
curve as the incumbent, but the curve is declining, so that costs are higher at
low firm outputs than at high firm outputs. Not only is the case a recurring
one, but it forms the centerpiece of Williamson's famous model, which
merits special attention because it purports to prove that a rule prohibiting
output expansions in reaction to entry will always have favorable welfare
277. See generally supra Subsection IV.A.2.a (explaining why restrictions only provide weak
encouragement to less efficient entrants).
278. See supra Subsection lV.A.l.b.
279. See supra Subsection IV.B.1.
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effects. In particular, Williamson concludes that his output limitation rule
has no effect on post-entry price or output when the entrant's efficiency
would (with increased output) increase to match the incumbent's. 280 Rather,
he concludes that the only post-entry effect of his rule will be to lower
incumbent costs because his output ceiling bars the incumbent from
reacting to entry by exceeding its optimal plant output.
281
But his model depends on various questionable assumptions.
Williamson reaches the conclusion that post-cntry prices and outputs will
be unchanged because he assumes that-no matter what the rule-the
incumbent will do the same thing post-entry: produce the level of output
that, given an assumed categorical consumer preference for the incumbent,
leaves an entrant selling at the same price with a low residual output where
it has high costs and cannot earn profits.28 2 His assumptions about
incumbent behavior depend heavily on his premises that incumbents have
perfect knowledge about the cost curves of potential entrants, that all
entrants have identical cost curves, and that the incumbent does not care
about pre-entry profits at all and thus picks whatever pre-entry output level
minimizes post-entry hazards.8 3 Since those assumptions in fact are not
true, the incumbent's actual pre-entry output will reflect average
expectations and profit trade-offs, and thus an output-limitation rule will
sometimes set an effective price floor that prevents decreases in price and
increases in output.
More importantly, Williamson's conclusions depend on the critical
assumption that, if the entrant and incumbent have identical prices, the
incumbent will be able to sell all its output first, leaving the entrant with
only the residual demand.284 This is the necessary premise for his
conclusion that, even if the entire cost-output curve is immediately
available to the entrant, the incumbent will nonetheless (under any rule) be
able to set an output that leaves the entrant at the high-cost portion of the
curve. 285 That is, if we refer to his graph., reproduced as Figure 2, this
assumption is what allows him to conclude that the incumbent will choose a
280. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 309-10.
281. Any increase or decrease in incumbent output necessarily increases short-run incumbent
costs on Williamson's reasonable assumption that incumbent plant size was set to minimize the
short-run costs of making the pre-entry output. See id. at 297, 300-02, 309-10. Thus, if current law
allows an incumbent to increase short-run output in response to entry, it necessarily increases
incumbent short-run costs compared to the pre-entry period. But current law only increases firm
costs compared to the Williamson rule on his further assumptions that incumbent output will be
unchanged under his rule and that entrant output is the same under any rule. Those assumptions
are dubious for reasons noted previously. See supra text accompanying notes 221-222, 230-234.
282. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 294, 295 n.35, 297-98, 310 n.66, 314.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 221-222, 230-234.
284. Williamson, supra note 7, at 294, 295 n.35, 297-98, 310 n.66.
285. Id. at 295, 297-98, 313.
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price PT at which the incumbent will sell all its initial output Qo, leaving the






But if, as Williamson assumes, the full cost curves were really equally
available to the entrant, one could have equally adopted the opposite
assumption that the entrant sells all the output it can at an equal price,
leaving the incumbent with the residual demand and thus at the low-output,
high-cost portion of the curve. That is, Williamson provides no reason to
think that at equal price PT the entrant would not instead produce output Qo
and leave the incumbent at QT. After all, dominant-firm models typically
make such an assumption when they assume the dominant firm faces a
residual demand curve determined by subtracting the output of the fringe
287firms at any given price.
Indeed, in this context, there are good reasons to make such an
assumption because buyers would all have an affirmative interest in making
sure that the entrant stays in the market, and at an equal price buyers would
suffer no individual detriment from dealing with the entrant that might
286. Id. at 297,310 n.66.
287 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 113-15.
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create collective action problems for them.288 If long-term contracting is
possible, the entrant with the same cost curve should indeed be able to lock
up a sufficient share of the market to put it at least at the minimum efficient
scale. 289 But even if long-term contracting is not possible, each buyer on the
spot market has an incentive to deal with the entrant at any equal price to
keep the competition going. If so, the entrant would also reach the low-cost
portion of its cost curve and would instead fit the profile of an equally
efficient entrant.
Perhaps Williamson is implicitly assuming that the incumbent has a
brand-name advantage or familiarity that will lead buyers to choose it at the
same price. But if that is the case, it means that, according to the buyers'
revealed preferences, the incumbent good is actually more valuable than the
entrant's. Because brand-name advantages may not have any concrete
manifestation in product quality, they are sometimes dismissed as
insubstantial. However, if people are willing to pay more for certain brand
names, that means they value the greater predictability and peace of mind
that comes with that choice. That is one reason they prefer to buy at
McDonald's rather than the unknown hamburger joint. We have no warrant
for second-guessing what consumers choose to value, and thus no more
reason to question their preference for brand names than to question their
preference for vanilla ice cream over pistachio. The revealed preferences of
buyers show that brand-name goods are of higher quality in the only sense
that is meaningful on a market: Consumers are willing to pay more for it.
Thus, if such a brand-name advantage exists, then the two firms either have
different demand curves or one must adjust their cost curves to take into
account the fact that the cost of producing an equally valued product is
higher for the entrant. Either way, Williamson's model would no longer
hold. Instead, we would have an entrant who is (at least initially) less
efficient at every output level.
Or, rather than adopting either extreme assumption, one could assume
buyers have no categorical preference for either the incumbent or the
entrant, but would buy from them equally if the price were equal. If that
were the case, the entrant could respond to any above-cost incumbent price
with a lower entrant price, expanding total market output until half of that
output put the entrant on the flat portion of the cost curve. That is, if the
incumbent tried to drive out the entrant by selling at PT as Williamson
posits, the entrant would be able to sell at the same price half of total
market output, or around Q*, which, given Williamson's particular drawing,
would put the entrant beyond its minimum efficient scale and make entrant
288. Cf. supra Subsection IV.A.I.a (noting that collective action problems would be raised if
the incumbent could offer a lower price than a less efficient entrant).
289. See supra Subsection IV.A.I.a.
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sales profitable. 290 If the incumbent tried to respond by undercutting that
price, the entrant could keep matching or undercutting the incumbent price
all the way down to Pc, below which the incumbent could not go without
pricing below cost. At that price, the entrant would capture an output of
Qc, which by definition will be on the low, flat portion of the cost curve
for any drawing that describes a market where the minimum efficient scale
is below half of total market output at that price.
In a sense, this is a product of how Williamson drew his demand and
cost curves because in his drawing a price equal to the minimum long-run
cost produces a total market output that is more than double the minimum
efficient scale where an individual firm can enjoy that cost minimum. But
this is no graphical artifact because if his curves were not drawn that way,
then the market would be a natural monopoly because only one firm could
stay in the market at the minimum efficient scale. And if the market is a
natural monopoly, there can be no successful competition between the
entrant and incumbent in the long run. Instead, the situation would be that
described above of an initially less efficient entrant that can never become
as efficient as the incumbent even though its entry degrades incumbent
efficiency and raises entrant efficiency. 291 For any market that does have the
sort of demand and cost curves that Williamson posits, an entrant with
immediate access to the same declining cost curve as the incumbent is not
really an initially less efficient firm at all, but rather a firm that is equally
efficient from the beginning, and thus could not be deterred by any
incumbent price at or above cost.
Finally, even if one thought customers did have a generic preference for
incumbents at the same price, an entrant with the same cost curve as the
incumbent could overcome that because, unlike the incumbent, the entrant
can offer a promotional below-cost price. 92 The entrant need only make the
small additional investment of offering a promotional price slightly below
cost, which the incumbent could not match since it is constrained to price at
cost. The small price advantage will bring enough sales to the entrant to
bring its production to the minimum efficient scale. 293 This is a powerful
290. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 297.
291. See supra Section V.A.
292. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 746a, at 492-95 (noting that the
promotional price defense is available only when a firm lacks market power).
293. Using Williamson's model, the entrant would offer a price of Pc - E (where E is
whatever small discount is necessary to overcome consumer inertia to choose an entrant product
over an equally valuable incumbent product). Williamson, supra note 7, at 297. Given how
Williamson draws his model, a one-penny discount would suffice. At a promotional price, the
entrant could sell all the output it wanted. But presumably the entrant would stop once it got to an
output above the minimum efficient scale since it loses some (albeit small) amount on any sales
past that point, and would no longer be able to offer a promotional price if its output got so large
that it would be deemed to have enough market power to make the ban on below-cost predatory
pricing apply to it, See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 746a, at 494-95. Thus, once
the promotional price has brought the entrant to the minimum efficient scale, the entrant will raise
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justification for allowing entrants to offer promotional prices, but provides
no justification for condemning above-cost incumbent prices. Indeed, it
confirms the conclusion that cases fitting the Williamson model are (even
with his assumption of a categorical consumer preference for incumbent
output at the same price) effectively the same as the case of an equally
efficient entrant described above.
Thus, if one assumes either that incumbents do not enjoy a categorical
consumer preference at an equal price or that any preference can be
overcome with promotional pricing, then the growth of an entrant that has
the same declining cost curve as the incumbent cannot be contained by just
lowering incumbent prices to a level that leaves the incumbent above-cost
and the entrant on the high-cost part of the curve. And if incumbents cannot
set a price that either drives out the entrant or contains its growth, then the
incumbent's incentives will instead lead it to raise post-entry prices in order
to maximize short-term profits. This is another reason the Williamson rule
in fact would produce an average decline in post-entry output, with
corresponding ill effects that include a likely increase in incumbent costs.
In short, if economies of scale and scope are equally available to both
entrant and incumbent from the moment of entry, so that they both have the
same declining cost curve, there are two possibilities. If the minimum
efficient scale is below half the maximum market output, the case is
actually one where the incumbent and entrant are equally efficient from the
beginning, and the Williamson rule will have all the adverse effects
described for such entrants. 9 If the minimum efficient scale is higher than
half the maximum market output, we have a natural monopoly, with no
possibility of long-term competition. The entrant efficiency will increase
with its increasing output, but never to the level of the incumbent. The case
will thus have all the adverse effects described for a less efficient entrant,
with the additional adverse effects that flow from the deteriorating
incumbent efficiency.
295
prices to cost and both the entrant and the incumbent will be competing with the same costs in the
same market.
294. See supra Section IV.B.
295. See supra Section IV.A. A similar analysis applies if both the entrant and incumbent
have economies of scale available from the moment of entry, but their cost curves differ so that at
high output one has lower costs than the other If it is the entrant that has lower costs at high
output, it has no need of protection from a ban on above-cost predatory pricing. Without any such
ban, the entrant could have entered at a price below the lowest cost of the incumbent and taken
over all market output. All the ban can do is raise incumbent prices in the meantime, and perhaps
entrant prices, too. The long-run effect will be unchanged-an entrant monopoly-because this is
the case of a more efficient entrant. If it is the incumbent that has lower costs at high output,
protecting the entrant cannot help in the long run. Even though the entrant's efficiency increases
with its growing output, it will not increase to a level that matches incumbent efficiency.
Whenever the restriction expires, the incumbent will just lower its price to match its lower cost at
high output, drive out the less efficient entrant, and take over the market. In the short run, there
will be all the adverse effects described above for less efficient entrants who decrease incumbent
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Alternatively, one might assume that the entrant can only access the
low-cost portion of his cost curve over time, perhaps because the entrant
needs time to ramp up his capacity or engage in learning by doing.
Although they do not actually model that case, Williamson and Edlin
express such a view.296 If so, then we do not have the case of an entrant
who is initially just as efficient as the incumbent. Rather, the transfer of
output to the entrant will be inefficient in the short run, and the case is
actually one where entrant efficiency improves with passage of time rather
than just output. In that sort of case, start-up costs have to be incurred to
gain the human capital (experience) necessary to achieve the lower cost
curve, and the effects will be as described in the previous two
Subsections.297
D. Ex Ante Effects on Incumbent Incentives
The proposed restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts do more
than affect the likelihood of entry and the nature of post-entry competition.
They also affect incumbent behavior pre-entry. Proponents have stressed
the argument that the restriction's protection of entry by less efficient firms
will force incumbent monopolists to lower everyday prices from a
monopoly price to a limit price that is just low enough to keep out less
efficient entrants. 298 But while the restrictions may weakly encourage
somewhat lower pre-entry prices, it is doubtful they will generally induce
such incumbent limit pricing or that such a regime of enforced limit pricing
is legally consistent with the argument for banning reactive above-cost
price cuts. Further, proponents have ignored the other effect on pre-entry
incumbent behavior-namely, that the restrictions reduce the incentives to
create products that are so socially valuable that they make incumbents
more efficient and earn them monopoly power. Such incentives will be
reduced not only to the extent that the restrictions do induce lower pre-entry
incumbent prices, but also because the restrictions will lower incumbent
profits in the event of entry.
1. The Likelihood and Legality of Encouraging Limit Pricing
The proponent's conclusion that a restriction on reactive price cuts will
lead to limit pricing (or a parallel increase in pre-entry output) depends on
efficiency in a way that does not suffice to overcome the incumbent's initial efficiency advantage.
See supra Section IVA.
296. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 975 & n.95, 977; Williamson, supra note 7, at 296, 298 n.43,
303-04, 313.
297. See supra Subsections IV.C.1-2.
298. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 946-47, 973-78; Williamson, supra note 7, at 308.
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the premise that the restrictions will generally induce incumbent limit
pricing that otherwise would not have occurred. This premise is dubious for
several reasons.
First, not all prospective entrants will be less efficient. To the extent
incumbents anticipate that some new entrants will be as efficient as (or
more efficient than) the incumbent, those entrants are likely to enter no
matter what above-cost pre-entry price the incumbent sets. This is also true
for initially less efficient entrants who can raise the capital necessary to
gain the experience to overcome their initial inefficiency. An above-cost
limit price or output thus would sacrifice current monopoly profits without
helping deter efficient entrants. 299 Given the weak encouragement the
restrictions provide to less efficient entrants, the lion's share of entrants will
not be less efficient and thus incumbents will have little incentive to engage
in pre-entry limit pricing.
Second, even if we restrict our attention to less efficient entrants, the
restrictions are unlikely to increase significantly the likelihood that
incumbents would adopt limit pricing. Incumbents contemplating limit
pricing must calculate a trade-off between lowering their pre-entry profits
and decreasing the risk that entry will lower their post-entry profits.
Williamson assumed the latter would always govern but admitted that this
was based on an "arbitrary assumption" that incumbents strictly prefer
avoiding post-entry hazards to earning pre-entry profits.
300 In fact, the
preference is likely to run strongly in the other direction.
In part, this is because the pro-entry profits are earned in the present
with certainty and thus should not have the time and uncertainty discounts a
firm would rationally apply to any risk of a decline in post-entry 
profits. 30 1
Present value calculations can make the discounted value of any future loss
of income from entry relatively small. Further, in a dynamic model,
incumbents would not assume that today's cost and demand curves and
entrant characteristics will prevail tomorrow. The market may be entirely
changed by Schumpeterian competition, increases in entrant efficiency,
decreases in barriers to entry, changes in consumer preferences, or sudden
cost shifts. This uncertainty makes it rational to discount further any future
profits that might be gained by deterring entry.
More important, though, is the low degree and magnitude of the
additional risk of entry created by the restrictions on above-cost price
299. Those limit-pricing models that do conclude incumbents can keep out equally efficient
entrants with above-cost prices, see, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 19, at 343-44
(summarizing the literature), use essentially the same model as Williamson, and thus fail for the
reasons stated in Subsection IV.C.3, which rebuts the claim that a limit output or price will deter
entry by a firm that shares the same declining cost curve.
300. Williamson, supra note 7, at 314.
301. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 56, at 1343-44.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
cuts. 30 2 Incumbents will come to realize that less efficient entrants
encouraged to enter by the restriction will be rare because their entry is
futile in the long run. Further, incumbents will realize that if less efficient
firms do enter, the incumbent (even with the restriction) can drive them out
with a relatively minor time delay. It is highly unlikely it would be rational
for the incumbent to sacrifice everyday high pre-entry profits to avoid this
low additional risk of a brief interruption in those profits. That would
require the incumbent to forgo permanently present certain monopoly
profits on all its sales, in order to produce a small reduction in the uncertain
risk that future entry will make the incumbent temporarily forgo a fraction
of its sales. It would almost surely be more rational for the incumbent to
fatten up on pre-entry monopoly profits, as such a strategy not only
maximizes the incumbent's expected wealth but also assures enough
reserves to deal with the wasteful losses from mothballing capacity that will
occur when less efficient entry happens.
Pre-entry limit pricing would be even less attractive when the rational
response to entry under a restriction will be not to try to compete with the
less efficient entrant but rather to raise incumbent prices to hasten the time
when prices can be reduced to drive out the entrant.30 3 In those cases, entry
will not pose a risk of even temporarily lowered prices, though it will pose
a risk of a temporary output decrease.
Still, while any encouragement to lower pre-entry incumbent prices will
be weak, it does seem like restrictions protecting less efficient entrants at
the margins may encourage created incumbents to charge lower pre-entry
prices than they otherwise would have. This is because whatever
calculation an incumbent makes in deciding whether to engage in limit
pricing will include a somewhat larger likelihood of less efficient entry and
larger costs when they do enter. Thus, sometimes lower pre-entry
incumbent prices should result. Standing alone this will benefit consumer
welfare. But, as the next Subsection shows, the restrictions also diminish
the incentives to create incumbents with greater efficiency and lower costs,
which will tend to increase pre-entry prices. Thus, the net effect on pre-
entry consumer welfare is mixed.
There is also a legal oddity to the Edlin and Department of Justice
position. As noted above, they argue that reactive above-cost pricing is
predatory because it fits the Grinnell test of being designed to exclude
rivals and maintain monopoly power.30 4 But that characterization would be
equally true of the limit pricing they seek to induce incumbents to make.
302. To the extent that firms would engage in limit pricing with or without such a restriction,
their limit pricing can hardly be claimed as a benefit of the restriction. It is only any increased
likelihood of limiting pricing that matters.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 220, 238.
304. See supra Section I.B.
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Setting a limit price has precisely the same effect on entrants and the same
goal of maintaining monopoly power as a reactive price cut to the same
price level.
Indeed, this led earlier courts that were attracted to the proposition that
reactive above-cost price cuts could be predatory to the conclusion that
limit pricing could also be predatory. 30 5 This conclusion is surely misguided.
We do not want antitrust courts in the business of forcing monopolists to raise
their everyday prices. That would amount to a scheme of enforced monopoly
pricing. But it does confirm that one cannot properly deduce whether pricing
is predatory simply by determining whether it tends to keep rivals out of the
market and maintain monopoly power.
The Grinnell test thus cannot itself support restricting reactive above-
cost price cuts in order to enforce a regime of limit pricing. By the same
token, the fact that current law permits limit pricing does not mean that
limit pricing is affirmatively desirable or that we would want to force firms
to adopt it. The lack of a legal ban merely means that trying to prohibit limit
pricing would have undesirable consequences. In fact, affirmatively trying
to require limit pricing would likely be undesirable, in part for the reasons
discussed next.
2. Reduced Incentives To Create Efficient Incumbents
One must go one more ex ante step backward in time to consider the
effects these restrictions would have on the incentives to create more
efficient incumbents. The very premise that entrants are less efficient
presupposes that this more efficient incumbent exists. But more efficient
firns do not simply drop from the heavens. Someonc had to make the risky
investments necessary to create them in the first place. And their incentives
to make those risky investments will be smaller if the law lowers the
rewards for successfully creating a more efficient firm.
The proposed restrictions would lessen the rewards from creating a
more efficient incumbent in numerous ways. First, to the extent proponents
are correct that the enhanced threat of less efficient entry will induce
incumbents to lower their everyday prices to keep out these entrants, then
more efficient incumbents will reap lower everyday profits. Second, when a
less efficient entrant does enter, the restrictions will prevent incumbents
from adopting the above-cost prices that maximize their long-run profits.
Where this has bite, it must lower the incumbent's expected profits and thus
its rewards for having created a more efficient firm. Third, when faced with
entrants that are equally efficient (or whose initial inefficiency will be
overcome), the Edlin and Williamson restrictions will sometimes prevent
305. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9thCir. 1983).
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monopolists from offering the short-run profit-maximizing price post-entry,
and thus will lower its returns. Fourth, when faced with efficient or
inefficient entry, all the restrictions are likely to reduce the productive
efficiency of the incumbent. This will also lower the incumbent's expected
profits.
All this will lower the rewards for creating a more efficient incumbent.
Faced with those lower returns, firms and investors will necessarily
undertake less investment and innovation to try to create the next more
efficient incumbent. Thus, the creation of more efficient firms will be
reduced. This dynamic reduction in efforts to improve efficiency will lower
productive efficiency and harm consumer welfare.
One might object that all this amounts to arguing that the law should
not act to reduce monopoly profits. And so it does-when the monopoly
profits are the fruit of having created a more efficient firm through desirable
investment and innovation.30 6 We must remember that monopoly power is
not itself undesirable. Market power simply means that the firm holding
that power has a product so much more desirable or cheaper to provide than
rival options that those other options do not constrain the firm from
reducing output in order to raise prices and profits.3 °7 And monopoly power
just means a "substantial" or "significant" degree of market power, 30 8 which
merely means the firm has a product that is substantially more desirable or
cheaper to provide than rival options. Creating a product that is
substantially better or cheaper than rival options is highly desirable, since it
leaves society far better off than it would have been had the product not
been created.
Such monopoly power does not arise out of thin air. Someone had to
invest or innovate under conditions of uncertainty to create a substantially
better or cheaper product. And their incentives to take risks, invest, and
innovate will be grcater the larger their profits when they are successful.
The ordinary rewards for doing so are the prospect of monopoly profits. We
thus must be careful not to act as if the purpose of antitrust laws were to
eliminate monopoly profits themselves. Such profits are an extremely
valuable inducement to the creation of better or cheaper products.
This problem is particularly serious in high-technology markets, where
such investments and innovation have the promise of not only creating
something so valuable that it confers market power over preexisting rival
306. Of course, monopoly power can also be created in various anticompetitive ways, but if the
antitrust laws are operating properly the incumbent monopolies should have achieved their monopolies
through desirable means. And if the laws are not properly preventing the anticompetitive creation of
monopoly power, then those laws are what need to be fixed.
307. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 §§ 1.0-1.22 (Sept. 10, 1992);
AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 132, at 556.
308. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 967 (10th Cit. 1990);
AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 132, at 448.
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options, but may even generate a new market by creating a product much
more desirable than preexisting market options. But the adverse effect on ex
ante incentives is not limited to high-technology markets. It also exists
whenever a firm has to decide whether to make investments in some old
technology that will create a new facility that buyers will consider
irreplaceable because of standard factors like transportation costs, or that
will create market power because it satisfies a market niche that was
previously unrecognized. Investments in changes in distributional methods
or organizational form, personnel training, or the sheer creation of large-
scale production methods can also lower costs or improve product quality
in ways otherwise unattainable.3 °9 In short, monopoly power can be
desirably created in many low-tech and high-tech ways, and both of them
will be discouraged if the ability to reap monopoly profits when successful
is curtailed. This is true whether or not the innovation is patented, for the
various restrictions on reactive price cuts would reduce monopoly profits on
innovations whether or not they are manifested in patents.
To use the concrete illustration most important for predatory pricing
purposes, consider the various market advantages that Edlin and the
Departments describe incumbents as having in the airline industry: frequent
daily flights, available connecting flights, economies of scale and scope,
and brand-name advantages. 310 These are certainly advantages, but it is not
as if they are undesirable or unearned. They rather reflect the desirable
consequence of the incumbent making the necessary investments to
produce a more valuable (or cheaper) product than its rivals. 31 ' This is
clearly true of developing a big enough network of flights to offer frequent
and connecting flights and to take advantage of economies of scale and
scope. It is even true for the market advantage that attends having created a
more recognizable brand name, for any consumer willingness to pay more
for a brand-name product indicates that the product is of higher quality as
judged by consumers' revealed preferences.
312
To be sure, society would be even better off if it could have the more
desirable or cheaper product and have it produced at cost. But that is a false
309. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 264, at 84-85, 88-89.
310. See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (D. Kan. 2001);
Memorandum of the United States, AMR Corp. (No. 99-1180-JTM), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4800/4859.htrn; Edlin, supra note 6, at 943 n. 12,959.
311. More suspect are other advantages: for example, frequent flier programs and overrides paid
to travel agents. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. Both of these can be characterized as kickbacks
that take advantage of agency problems to induce passengers to take less efficient flights. The frequent
flier programs arguably induce individuals to spend more on business travel (the cost of which is billed
to someone else or is shared with the government through tax deductions) in return for free personal
travel. The travel overrides arguably reward travel agents with larger commissions for advising their
clients to take more costly flights. But if either of these characterizations is true, then the proper
remedy is not to ban above-cost price cuts but to ban the frequent flier programs and travel agent
overrides that put passengers on higher-priced flights.
312. See supra Subsection IV.C.3.
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choice. Unless given a high rate of return, firms will not invest to create the
substantially more desirable or cheaper product. The monopoly power we
are tempted to restrain will then never be created, but society will be worse
off since it will be relegated to substantially worse or more costly market
options. This problem with restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts is
really just a special case of the more general point that regulation (inside
and outside antitrust) cannot take into account only the ex post effects that
regulation has once a market and market power already exist. Regulation
must also take into account any negative effect regulation has on ex ante
incentives to invest and innovate to create something so valuable that it
confers market power (over preexisting rival options) and may even
generate a new market (by creating a product much more desirable than
preexisting market options).
Limiting monopoly profits might seem desirable in a static model that
focuses only on allocative efficiency. But in a dynamic model, such limits
on monopoly returns will reduce productive efficiency, innovation and
investment, and Schumpeterian competition to acquire temporary
monopolies and the associated monopoly profits.313 Moreover, here much
of the reduction in monopoly profits does not result from improved
allocative efficiency. Rather, the restrictions reduce monopoly returns in
many ways that fail to confer such allocative efficiency.
The above concerns have tended to be missed by those advocating bans
on above-cost predatory pricing because they adopt static assumptions
about demand and cost curves and often seem to assume implicitly that the
current incumbent is merely the undeserving beneficiary of those static
market conditions. Indeed, as Baumol pointed out, limit pricing is generally
only possible if an incumbent is a natural monopolist. 31 4 If a firm is truly a
natural monopoly, antitrust law has little to contribute because it is
impossible to create competition in such a market. Antitrust law can
generally only contribute by protecting or restoring competition in markets
that can support multiple firms, or by keeping free the even more important
competition to create new product advantages that confer temporary
monopoly power. Natural monopolies are by definition more durable. For
them, the only real role of antitrust is to protect competition to become the
natural monopolist. Such competition provides a market test that the
monopoly really is natural, and that it remains so since today's natural
monopoly can become tomorrow's temporary one if technology, costs, or
demand changes sufficiently. Such competition also assures that the most
efficient firm becomes the monopolist. But the hypothesis in these
proposals is that the incumbent is as efficient as, or more efficient than, the
313. See generally SCItUMPETER, supra note 264, at 84-92, 99-106.
314. Baurnol, supra note 7, at 11.
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entrant (or else the entrant would hardly need protection), so such concerns
are not at issue.
Instead, in natural monopolies inhabited by the most efficient firm, the
grounds for regulating price are really no different than the traditional
grounds for utility rate regulation. Not surprisingly, where for whatever
reason the government has failed to institute such rate regulation, people
who are otherwise attracted to such rate regulation might favor employing
predatory pricing theory to try to fill in gaps in natural monopoly markets.
But the most likely reason that rate regulation does not exist for any
particular industry is that the government was not persuaded by the
arguments for it. And if one thought such natural monopoly rate regulation
were warranted, there would be no reason to limit it to cases in that industry
where some claim of reactive price cuts provides the pretext. Moreover,
triggering price regulation for all reactive price cuts risks applying it in
cases that do not truly involve natural monopolies. It also means conducting
such regulation through adversarial litigation and judges and juries who
lack the ongoing involvement or expertise of utility regulators, or through
other regulators who have not yet persuaded the legislature to give them the
authority to engage in such general rate regulation.
One might imagine a different sort of objection that has not yet been
made in writing by those proposing restrictions on reactive above-cost price
cuts: Without a restriction, firms will engage in excessive investment and
innovation. The argument could go as follows. With a restriction, those who
create more desirable market options will still earn above-normal returns,
but that return will be limited to the difference in efficiency between the
newly created market option and other market options (for example, the
next most efficient entrant). Without a restriction, monopolists will instead
enjoy evcn higher prices, thus giving them a return greater than the value of
the improvement over preexisting options that they created. This will give
them incentives to make excessive investments in innovation, and thus
dissipate the gains those investments confer.
The problem with this objection is twofold. First, innovations confer
significant positive externalities that are not enjoyed by the innovator. Even
innovators who get a patent only gain a right to exclude rivals for a limited
number of years; after that, the social value of their improvement is
completely appropriated by others. Further, innovations build on past
innovations, meaning new innovations have a multiplier effect on future
social benefits. Even during the patent period, patents can be invented
around, or be faced with competing patents or independent innovations, so
that no one who incurs the risk of investing in innovation is guaranteed a
monopoly return. One could reply that this simply reflects the trade-offs
(between rewarding innovation and disseminating its benefits) that the
legislature made in defining patent law. But that argument cuts the other
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way, for in making those trade-offs the legislature did not know that courts
might later restrict patent holders who make above-cost price cuts, and thus
the existing legislative trade-off assumes they get the full monopoly reward
for their innovation. Moreover, many investments and innovations that
create market power do not enjoy intellectual property rights at all. They
may reflect improvements in methods of doing business that are
nonpatentable or can be copied long before a patent period expires, and thus
confer large positive externalities, the benefits of which will not be
reflected in business decisions to invest. There is thus little reason to think
firms would have excessive incentives to innovate unless their reward were
limited to the difference between their costs (or product value) and the costs
(or value) of the next-most-efficient firm. Rather, the process whereby each
firm is rewarded with monopoly returns for making a product or production
process that is better than preexisting options, and thus has incentives to
engage in dynamic competition to replace each other over time, is more
likely to be socially beneficial.315
The second objection is that such excessive investments and innovation
would be largely self-deterring. If the objection were true, it posits
something like the following. Existing firms have costs of C. The innovator
is thinking of making an investment that will give it costs of C - 1, where I
is the innovative improvement. 316 But after it drives out the existing firns,
it will raise prices to M, thus enjoying a reward of M-(C-/), or
I + M- C, rather than just L Thus, instead of making a (risk-adjusted and
amortized) investment of up to I to create this innovation, it will invest
more than I, up to I + M- C. But if the innovator did make an excessive
investment E that cost more than I, then it could only recoup that
investment with an expected price of E + C - I, which (since E >1) must be
greater than C and thus greater than the cost of the existing firms and
prevailing market prices. An investment that is expected to be unprofitable
at prevailing market prices is unlikely to garner much capital funding. To
anticipate that such excessive investments would be profitable, the firm
would have to expect instead that it would initially price its product below a
cost measure that included its investment costs in order to drive out the
existing firms, and then raise prices to a higher level later. But such pricing
could itself be challenged as below-cost predatory pricing, certainly under a
total-cost approach and also under the approach laid out above, since those
investment costs would be varied by the relevant alleged predatory increase
315. See supra Subsection IV.C.I.
316. One can make the same calculation for quality improvements. Assume that all firms
have the same costs, that existing firms' product has a value V = C, and that the innovator invests
in an innovation that offers a value V + 1. But instead of pricing it at V + 1, and thus enjoying a
return of I, it prices it at M, enjoying a return of M - V > I. If it thus invests more than 1 in
innovation, it will have to price at higher than V+ Ito recoup that investment.
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in output, which is everything the firm produces. 31 7 Further, a firm tempted
to make such excessive investments in innovation must take into account
the risk that other firms might innovate and improve their efficiency equally
or more, thus restricting its anticipated monopoly returns. It will thus not
have strong motives to invest in innovation with expected costs (of both the
investment and postinnovation production) that exceed prevailing prices.
E. Summary of Effects and Assessment of Possible Trade-Offs
We can summarize the effects of a restriction on reactive above-cost
price cuts in the following table:
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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TABLE 4. EFFECTS OR RESTRICTIONS ON REACTIVE
ABOVE-COST PRICE CUTS
On Productive
On Consumer Welfare EfficieEfficiency
Negative. Production
shifted to less efficient
For Less Efficient Entry both incumbent and entrant. Incumbent
by Firms That Would bothancumbentiandr suffers uncompensated
Enter Anyway entrant pay higher transition costs andpost-entry prices, decreased operating
efficiency.
Negative. Production
shifted to less efficientMixed. Consumers who etat nubn
For Less Efficient Entry buy from entrant pay less suffers 
uncompensated
(Weakly) Encouraged in short run. 
Consumers
by the Restriction who buy from incumbent 
transition costs and
decreased operating
may pay less or more. deradopatnefficiency. Entry costs
dissipated.
Negative. Decreased
Negative. Consumers of post-entry incumbent
both incumbent and efficiency. Mixed but
entrant pay higher short- likely negative effect on
term post-entry prices, incentives to create more
efficient entrants.
For Entrants That Can Mixed. Depends on Negative. Production
Become Equally whether increased shifted to less efficient
Efficient Only If allocative efficiency entrant, and incumbent
Incumbent Efficiency offset by increased costs, efficiency declines.
Deteriorates
For Entrants That Can NNegative. Production
Become Equally Negative. Consumers of shifted to less efficientBecoe qallyboth incumbent and
Efficient Only by entrant pay higher post- entrant in very short run,
Increasing Own entryand incumbent suffers
Efficiency lower efficiency.
Mixed. May weakly Negative. Decreased
encourage lower pre- long-run incentives to
For Incumbent Pre- entry prices, but also create incumbents that
Entry Behavior lessens incentives to are more efficient than
create low-cost pre-existing market
incumbents. options.
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These conclusions differ from those of traditional analyses, which
generally have assumed instead that restrictions on above-cost price cuts
exchange certain short-term post-entry costs for an uncertain long-term
post-entry gain. 318 Instead, the restrictions confer no long-term post-entry
gain and can inflict long-term costs, and while they may sometimes confer
a short-term post-entry gain, on other-and more frequent--occasions they
inflict a short-term post-entry cost. Further, the restrictions may lower or
raise pre-entry prices, but also impose serious pre-entry costs by reducing
the creation of more efficient incumbents and entrants.
While these effects cannot logically exclude the possibility that the
restrictions may have net desirable effects in some cases, they do suggest
that it is extremely unlikely that the overall results of the restriction would
be desirable. First, the possibly beneficial effects on pricing are mixed,
whereas most of the negative effects are unambiguous. Second, where these
mixed effects do prove on balance beneficial, the effects are weak because
the restrictions encourage little additional entry by less efficient firms. In
contrast, the lion's share of firms will be efficient, and for them the effects
on pricing are unambiguously negative. Third, the possible benefit to post-
entry pricing in the case of the encouraged less efficient entrants is short-
run, since they cannot survive in the long run once the restriction on above-
cost price cuts expires. In contrast, the harms to pricing that result from
discouraging the creation of more efficient entrants and incumbents are
long-term.
Fourth, even if there were a net benefit to consumer pricing, it would
have to be weighed against the clear loss to productive efficiency. For
reasons discussed above, trading off increased consumer welfare for
lowered productive efficiency is generally not desirable even if we assume
a straight trade-off between productive and allocative efficiency over a
similar time frame. It is even less likely to be desirable when the consumer
welfare benefits are mixed, weak, and short-run, and apply in a limited set
of cases compared to a clear loss in productive efficiency over a longer
period that covers a broader set of cases. Fifth, the loss of productive
efficiency is not merely static but dynamic, undermining a competitive
process of innovation whereby each firm has incentives to lower costs
further or improve product performance, a process that confers enormous
positive externalities on society.
Indeed, Richard Schmalensee showed some time ago that "privately
profitable entry may not be socially desirable if the entrant's costs exceed
those of existing firms" because it can worsen productive efficiency more
318. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
(Breyer, J.) (analogizing the restrictions to sacrificing a bird in the hand for two in the bush); Harold
Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 47, 56 (1982) (same); sources cited supra note 60.
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than it improves consumer surplus. 319 He concluded that it could well be
that "[s]ociety as a whole would be better off if existing firms were allowed
to bribe potential [higher cost] entrants not to enter, or if entry were
restricted by government regulation of some sort., 320 And this was under
the assumptions that such entry was permanent, expended no entry costs,
and inflicted no transition costs or efficiency losses on incumbents, and free
post-entry price competition was allowed. Where instead the less efficient
entry is induced by a temporary price umbrella that worsens short-term
price effects, makes long-term benefits futile, dissipates entry costs, and
may reduce incumbent efficiency or discourage its creation, there is even
more reason for skepticism. And the trade-off is even more likely to be
negative when one also considers the effects on efficient entrants.
Finally, to the extent there are beneficial effects, they basically boil
down either to the "infant firm" argument that new firms need to be
encouraged because capital markets underrate them, or the case of a natural
monopolist who cannot be threatened by an entrant who is equally or more
efficient, and is thus a good candidate for utility rate regulation. But the
proposed restrictions are poorly tailored to advance those goals. They apply
even to industries where entrants need no encouragement, and fail to protect
new firms that do not face incumbent monopolists who make reactive price
cuts. And they extend well beyond natural monopoly cases, do not cover all
the natural monopoly cases one might wish to regulate under such a theory,
and are less likely to induce the correct rate. Thus, these benefits can more
readily and accurately be achieved either through general rules to protect or
subsidize new firms or through utility rate regulation. Where such
regulation already exists, the proposed restrictions will not have these
possible benefits. Where it does not exist, it would seem to reflect a societal
judgment that protecting entrants or regulating rates is unwise-a judgment
we have no warrant for overturning through antitrust law.
F. The Restrictions Cannot Reasonably Be Construed or Modified
To Eliminate or Suspend the Market-Power Requirement
As the above analysis indicates, one key problem with the restrictions is
that, because monopoly or market power is required before a firm's prices
can be regulated under any antitrust or competition law, any restriction on
above-cost predatory pricing that hopes to protect less efficient entrants
must be futile in the long run. One might thus be tempted to dispense with
the monopoly or market-power requirement. But this would require a
319. See Richard Schmalensee, Is More Competition Necessarily Good?, 4 INDUS. ORG. REV.
120, 120.(1976).
320. Id.
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statutory or treaty amendment. Further, as we shall see, this requirement is
not merely an artifact of the particular proposals made. It is rather a
necessary feature of any doctrine of predatory pricing. Nor would any such
modification eliminate all the adverse effects of a restriction on above-cost
incumbent pricing.
To begin with, monopoly or market power is required by existing
competition law, which does not restrict even below-cost predatory pricing
unless the actor has monopoly or market power. To be sure, we could
change that law. But we could not do so through case law. It would require
a statutory amendment in the United States or a treaty amendment in
Europe. Under U.S. law, a claim that unilateral pricing decisions constitute
monopolization (or attempted monopolization) under section 2 of the
Sherman Act requires proof not just of predatory pricing but of monopoly
power (or enough market power to create a dangerous probability of
acquiring monopoly power). 32' Likewise, European law requires proof of a
dominant position to make predatory pricing actionable under Article 86.322
More important, any amendment eliminating the market-power
requirement would be unwise. Without such a requirement, a doctrine of
predatory pricing would effectively aim to regulate all reactive pricing on
competitive markets. Such competitive pricing is precisely what the
antitrust laws seek to foster on the grounds that competitive markets can
best set prices. Competitive firms are supposed to compete by each trying
321. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222
(1993) (defining predatory pricing in terms of monopolization); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
506 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1993) (dcfming attempted monopolization); United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (defining monopolization). Some have argued that the recoupment
requirement itself seems to impose a higher market-power requirement, and may thus eliminate or
constrict any claim of attempted monopolization through predatory pricing. See 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 724a-b, at 284-85, 728b. Monopoly power is not necessary under
the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act, but even it requires some level of market power. Brooke, 509 U.S. at
222 (stating that the defendant must have enough market power that its predatory pricing creates at
least "a reasonable possibility of substantial injury to competition"). The recoupment requirement may
elevate the market-power requirement even further. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
724a-b, at 284-85, 728b. Moreover, the Robinson-Patman Act has various statutory limitations
that make it a poor vehicle for generally policing predatory pricing. In particular, the Robinson-Patman
Act is limited to price discrimination (and thus does not cover a uniformly predatory price) and
commodities (and thus would not cover airline transportation or other services). 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(2000). Further amendments would be necessary to restrict above-cost predatory pricing. In particular,
the Robinson-Patman Act specifically allows price cuts to match competition in good faith, id. § 13(b),
which directly contradicts the core of these proposals to restrict reactive above-cost pricing, The Act
also allows different prices based on varying costs or market conditions. Id. § 13(a).
322. See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359 [ 34-74
(E.C.J.). That decision held that a market share over fifty percent would suffice. Id. 60. Market
shares below fifty percent might also constitute a dominant position depending on other structural
factors that affect the degree to which market shares imply market power. See Joined Cases C-68/94 &
C-30/95, French Republic v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375 IM 111, 242-248 (E.C.J.); Case T-
102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753 IM 202, 239-263 (Ct. First Instance); IVO
VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 248-
252 (3d ed. 1994).
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to match and then beat the price and quality of their rivals. To interfere with
this dynamic is to interfere with the "central nervous system of the
economy, 323 and to "set sail on a sea of doubt" by requiring courts to
determine what reasonable prices are on competitive markets. 324 Moreover,
once one dispenses with the market-power requirement, it is not clear which
firm in any given market would be subject to the restriction on reactive
above-cost predatory pricing, since all the firms in the competitive market
are reacting to each other. One could try to ban all firms from reacting to
new entrants, but then one faces the question why the law should so favor
entrants (which would seem to lead to inefficient overinvestment in entry
into competitive markets), and whether any new entrant would not then
become immediately an incumbent forbidden from engaging in reactive
price cuts. The result would be to ossify and distort pricing on competitive
markets. Further, while such a rule would preserve the long-term existence
of the entrant, all the other ill effects from imposing post-entry price floors
would continue to apply.
Another possible modification would concede that any price restriction
must expire when the monopoly power erodes, but provide that once the
incumbent's postexpiration above-cost price cut causes the incumbent's
market share to grow back over the monopoly threshold, that above-cost
price would amount to attempted monopolization. One might hope through
this sort of regulation to keep the incumbent perpetually shy of a monopoly
share. But this modified approach would raise new problems because the
illegal pricing decision would be neither a price cut nor reactive to entry.
Since the incumbent's postexpiration price cut would initially be legal, the
law would have to make illegal the incumbent's failure to impose a price
increase (or output decrease) once the incumbent got back to a market share
close to monopoly power. This hardly seems likely to promote consumer
welfare. Other problems would result because the rule would no longer be
triggered by a reaction to entry. The moment that retriggers price regulation
would become obscure, with the modified rule putting the incumbent at
great peril for not guessing accurately when a court or jury would deem it
on the verge of crossing the line into monopoly power again. Nor would the
right baseline for a legal price or output be clear, since it would no longer
be the price or output that just preceded the moment of illegality. And
again, while any benefits from entry would no longer be merely short-run,
all the adverse effects of the restrictions would continue to apply.
One might be tempted to respond to this problem with an amendment
providing that, while the bans on above-cost predatory pricing apply only to
323. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
324. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
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incumbents who begin with monopoly or market power, those bans
continue to restrict those incumbents even after they lose their monopoly or
market power. However, the effects of such a modified proposal would be
even worse. The short-run effects would be the same as the existing
proposals. But the long-run effects would differ. If never able to cut prices
to match or beat the entrant, the incumbents would necessarily be driven
from the market in a way that will not permit reentry. The market will thus
be left to the new entrant who is, by hypothesis, less efficient. That new
entrant will have incentives to raise prices to its own monopoly level, which
will be higher than pre-entry incumbent prices because its marginal costs
are higher. Thus, in the long run, rather than just being futile (like the
existing proposals), the modified proposal would affirmatively harm
productive efficiency and consumer welfare. In the even longer run, under
this modified proposal, other less efficient entrants might enter and produce
a competitive market full of less efficient firms. If so, a low-cost monopoly
would be replaced by a high-cost unconcentrated market, which is unlikely
to be desirable for reasons discussed above.325
Alternatively, one might try an amendment providing that the
restriction on above-cost predatory pricing applies only to incumbents who
begin with monopoly and market power, and persists even after they lose
that power, but lasts only for some fixed period of time, like the twelve to
eighteen months suggested by Edlin. But there are two possibilities under
such a proposal. The first is that being forced to mothball its capacity for
this time has reduced the incumbent's efficiency to the point that it no
longer has an efficiency advantage over the entrant. If so, then such a
modified proposal would have the same effect as a permanent restriction on
above-cost price cuts. The second is that this enforced mothballing of
incumbent capacity has not eliminated its efficiency advantage. If so, then
the regulation would again be futile because at the expiration of twelve to
eighteen months (or whatever period is specified) the incumbent would
again lower prices and drive out the entrant. The restriction will still have
unambiguously negative effects on productive efficiency and inflict a
wasteful contraction of production that will just have to be reexpanded. The
effects on allocative efficiency will also remain unambiguously adverse for
any entrants who would have entered even without the restriction, and the
encouragement for additional entry by less efficient firms will remain weak.
It would be the case, however, that when a less efficient entrant is
encouraged to enter, the effects on allocative efficiency would be positive,
since such a modified proposal at least would not give the incumbent
affirmative incentives to raise prices in order to speed the day when the
restriction expires.
325. See supra Subsection [V.C.I.
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V. UNAVOIDABLE IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES
WORSEN THE ABOVE EFFECTS
In addition to the above fundamental problems posed by any restriction
on reactive above-cost prices, the restrictions also raise many
implementation difficulties that worsen their likely effects. But this is not
because the restrictions are poorly formulated. It is because any formulation
must make choices about how to deal with unavoidable problems that will
bedevil any effort to regulate above-cost predatory pricing. No matter what
system is adopted, it would somehow have to ascertain the moment of entry
that triggers the restriction, deal with quality changes designed to evade it,
and define a post-entry price floor (or output ceiling) that will lead to
inefficiencies unless precisely adjusted for changing market conditions. In
doing so, there are no perfect choices. Rather, any choice will inflict some
significant distorting effect on entry, innovation, and efficient pricing. One
can try to adjust the restrictions to minimize these additional inefficiencies,
but one cannot eliminate them, and they will worsen the adverse effects of
the proposed restrictions. These additional inefficiencies are sufficiently
large that they would offset any gains from such restrictions even if,
contrary to the above analysis, such net gains likely existed.
Past attention has focused on administrative problems in defining the
post-entry price floors and output ceilings. But even bigger problems result
from difficulties in defining the moment of entry and controlling for
possible quality distortions. If the moment of entry that triggers the
restriction is defined to be when the entrant actually begins sales (or at any
other time after entry is foreseeable), the incumbent will simply be able to
cut prices beforehand, rendering the restriction ineffectual and even less
likely to encourage entry. If the moment of entry that triggers the restriction
is defined to be when entry is first foreseeable, then the law would be
raising incumbent prices during a period where this is not offset by lower
entrant prices, thus worsening the likely mix of effects. Further, if the
moment of entry is given such an early definition, then either a twelve- to
eighteen-month period of restriction would often expire by the time the
entry starts (making the restriction ineffectual), or the period during which
incumbent prices are restricted will have to be lengthened, worsening the
inefficiencies that result from creating price or output inflexibility in the
face of changing market conditions. Another huge problem is that any price
or output floor will provoke inefficient increases in product quality, and any
effort to clamp down on that by restricting product enhancements will
hamper productive efficiency.
Further, the administrative problems with defining the price floors and
output ceiling are underappreciated in two ways. First, it is not merely a
matter of judgment whether the administrative problems with any flexible
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price floor or output ceiling outweigh the administrative problems with a
cost-based rule-rather, any flexible floor or ceiling necessarily creates
larger administrative costs because implementing it requires assessing
price-output possibilities up and down supply and demand curves that
change over time rather than comparing one price to costs at a given output
level. Second, these administrative problems cannot be avoided by
tweaking the proposals. They are rather an inherent consequence of trying
to regulate incumbent pricing or output. Whether the law uses a flexible
standard or rule, the regulated price or output will often fail to reflect
changing market conditions accurately and will thus produce additional
inefficiencies.
A. When Is the Moment of Entry?
Under all the approaches for restricting reactive above-cost price cuts
(or output increases), the restrictions are triggered by entry. But the moment
of entry is not so easy to define. Is it when the entrant first announces its
entry? When it first applies for a permit or license? When it begins
construction on a new plant? When it begins its marketing campaign?
When it sells its first test product? Or when it first attempts a substantial
quantity of sales? Edlin is the only proponent to address this definitional
difficulty, and he takes varying positions on it. In analyzing one case, he
states that the attempt to enter did not qualify because the entrant never got
to the point where it actually produced the product.326 In another case, he
concludes that beginning construction suffices to trigger the ban even
though the entrant had not yet sold the product.327 Either position raises
problems, which are only exacerbated by ad hoc shifts from one position to
the other.
Suppose one picks one of the later moments as the true moment of
entry. Then the problem is that at one of the earlier moments the incumbent
will know entry is forthcoming and thus can lower prices (or expand
output) in anticipation. The restriction on reactive price cuts will be
toothless because the incumbent can react before the defined moment
triggers the restriction. For example, if the entry is defined by actual
production, then the incumbent can just wait until construction is almost
completed and cut prices before the entrant ever sells anything. If so, the
restriction becomes ineffectual and is even less likely to encourage entry or
have any beneficial effect.
To deal with this problem, Edlin effectively creates an ad hoc rule. In
one case, cutting prices before the entrant makes any sales is inappropriate
326. Edlin, supra note 6, at 987-88.
327. Id. at 988.
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because the entrant's construction plans made it "substantial. 328 In another
case, cutting prices before the entrant makes any sales is acceptable because
one can infer the entrant was "insubstantial" from the fact that a buyer with
fifty-percent market share accepted a five- to ten-percent price cut from the
incumbent.3 29 Edlin bases the latter conclusion on the assumption that such
a big buyer's incentives are largely aligned with consumer welfare. 330 But
this inference of efficiency is probably untrue because powerful buyers
often have incentives to cut deals that benefit themselves even though they
create seller market power. 331 In any event, this approach introduces
additional sources of great uncertainty. Just which buyers are large enough
that their acceptance of a reactive price cut justifies deeming entrants
"insubstantial," and what are the other situations where an inference of
efficiency will justify suspending the ban on reactive price cuts?
Suppose one instead picks one of the earlier moments of entry, such as
announcing entry or applying for a permit or license. This raises many other
problems. First, with such an early definition of the moment of entry, the
restriction will impose an incumbent price floor, with all the adverse effects
on pricing and efficiency, well before the entrant actually makes any sales.
This reduces further any likelihood that the benefits resulting from
encouraging entry will outweigh the adverse effects, for the period of
possible benefit will be shorter than the period of adverse effects.
Second, such an early definition of the moment of entry may also make
the restriction ineffectual. In particular, any definition that tracks an entry
announcement, application, or even construction will often mean that the
moment of entry occurs more than eighteen months before the entrant
actually seriously sells its product. But the Edlin and Williamson
restrictions only last twelve to eighteen months at the outside. Thus, with
such an early definition of the moment of entry, these restrictions would be
likely to expire before the entrant ever seriously sells its product, and thus
cannot prevent an incumbent from adopting a reactive price cut after the
entrant starts selling.
The profit-maximizing price floors do not raise this problem since they
set no expiration time. But they produce a different anomaly. The
incumbent's prices would have to be monitored for a long period of time
before actual entrant sales commenced in order to make sure the incumbent
came sufficiently close to maximizing short-term profits. Such monitoring
is costly. Moreover, since the entrant would not yet be making sales, the
328. id.
329. Id. at 987-88.
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., 4 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 218, 943b, at 204-06 & n.4; Herbert Hovenkamp,
Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1369, 1375-76 (1991). This is just an application of the Coase
Theorem. A powerful buyer and seller will have incentives to make an agreement that preserves
supracompetitive pricing and divides the profits among them.
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price that maximizes short-term profits would be the monopoly price. Thus,
such a restriction would mean that for a substantial period the government
would be mandating monopoly pricing. Even if we want to encourage
entry, it is hard to believe we want to do so by giving potential entrants an
entitlement to require incumbents to charge monopoly prices before the
entrant makes any sales. Further, lengthening the period of restriction will
only worsen all the administrative problems of applying such price floors in
the face of changing market conditions.
332
Third, any early definition of the moment of entry will make the
restrictions vulnerable to strategic exploitation. By merely announcing
entry or making an application, any firm can restrict the prices of another
firm (and under the Edlin proposal can freeze their prices and quality too).
If one tries to avoid this by restricting the moment of entry to credible
announcements or committed applications, then one has the ambiguity of
just which announcements or applications are credible or committed
enough to trigger the restriction, and just how incumbent firms are
supposed to predict what antitrust litigation will in the future conclude on
that topic. Picking some middle moment like actual construction of a new
facility might work for some markets, but even when it does, it lends itself
to reactive price cuts after the announcement or application but right before
construction begins. And just when construction begins might itself be
ambiguous.
Moreover, even if the prospect of future entry has been made certain by
the announcement or application, how can an incumbent know whether the
coming entrant will actually offer the twenty-percent discount necessary to
trigger the Edlin rule? This seems especially uncertain since, under Edlin's
own analysis, differences in quality might make a nominal twenty-percent
price difference insufficient.333 Even if the entrant says it will offer a
twenty-percent price discount and the same quality, such announcements
are unreliable, nonbinding, and may be made purely strategically to freeze
their rivals. Here Edlin creates another ad hoc exception. Although no
twenty-percent price discount has been offered, the "substantial" entry
requirement should be deemed satisfied if the entrant has construction plans
to serve most of the market, with the price freeze lifted if the entrant turns
out not to sell at a twenty-percent discount.334 This allows entrants to freeze
rival prices by mere construction even though they have not undercut
incumbent prices at all, and the creation of another ad hoc exception again
undermines any certainty the rule might have had.
332. See itfra Section V.C.
333. See infra Section V.C.
334. Edlin, supra note 6, at 988.
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All these problems are multiplied if one triggers the restrictions not
only in cases of actual entry but, as Williamson would, in cases where a
"fringe firm[]" makes a "new investment" significant enough to be
considered tantamount to entry.335 The impulse is understandable because
the economic effects of such investments and entry may be the same. But it
exacerbates uncertainty when incumbents cannot be sure which rival
investments will be considered significant enough to trigger above-cost
restrictions, and it widens opportunities for strategic gaming when
announcing any new investment might freeze the output of a dominant firm.
The problem is not an avoidable one. To make them plausible, all the
proposals have to start with some moment of entry to trigger the restriction
on reactive price cuts. Otherwise, they would amount to a general
regulation of pricing that is entirely inconsistent with a market approach.
But no matter which moment one picks, the restriction either becomes
toothless (eliminating any benefits) or lengthens the period of adverse
effects and produces strategic behavior and anomalous results. If the
moment of entry is defined to occur either when actual sales are made, or
earlier when entry is planned with a short period of restriction, then the rule
cannot really prevent the incumbent from adopting reactive price cuts. If the
moment of entry is defined to occur earlier than when sales are made, then
the period during which consumer prices are elevated by the price floor will
exceed the period during which the entrant might lower prices, and
anomalies and strategic abuses become possible. And any early definition
that lengthens the period of restriction would worsen the difficulties in
defining the incumbent price floor or output ceiling.
B. Post-Entry Quality Changes
Whenever prices are regulated, firms predictably shift to nonprice
competition. For example, back when airline prices were thoroughly
regulated, airlines competed with fancy meals and more frequent, less
crowded flights. More generally, one can expect firms whose prices are
regulated at above-cost levels to compete by improving the quality of their
product.336 This complies with the restrictions on price cuts but effectively
lowers the quality-adjusted price in a way that still allows the incumbent to
drive out the less efficient entrant. But because the restriction prevents price
cuts that otherwise would occur, it inevitably induces the creation of
products that make a different quality-price trade-off than buyers would
prefer on a free market, and these quality improvements are thus inefficient.
335. Williamson, supra note 7, at292 n.26.
336. They might also increase advertising or service levels in a way that is equivalent to a
quality increase.
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The U.S. Departments' proposals were partially responsive to this
problem, regulating not just prices but airline capacity. Airlines would thus
not be able to respond to an entrant by just adding planes to provide a more
convenient schedule, which is one way of improving quality. But airlines
could still have evaded this restriction by offering more frequent flights on
smaller planes, which would be inefficient but still offer fliers more
flexibility while complying with the capacity limit. Or airlines could
inefficiently improve quality in other ways, with fancier meals or service.
All these quality improvements would be inefficient because (to the extent
the restriction on price cuts has bite) they would be replacing a price cut
that consumers would prefer to the quality enhancement.
Thus, the U.S. Departments' approach has the problem that generally
bedevils efforts to restrict nonprice competition. Whenever one tries to
clamp down on one form of nonprice competition, the underlying
incentives drive firms to whatever forms remain unregulated. For example,
when airline regulators tried to make their price regulations meaningful by
clamping down on nonprice competition, they specified that airlines could
only offer "sandwiches" on international economy flights. Airlines
responded with such tactics as putting duck A l'orange on one slice of bread
for an open-faced "sandwich." The Williamson output-ceiling faces similar
problems. Firms will have incentives to evade the output ceiling (and the
effective price floor that it implies) by increasing quality.
A firm might even have incentives to change its product so much that it
can argue it has a new product that is not subject to the price or output
restriction. This can create incentives to inefficiently improve or even
worsen the product. If courts respond by subjecting new products to the
restrictions imposed on old, related ones, then the rule will deter genuine
innovation.
Edlin attempts to address this problem by banning incumbents not only
from cutting prices but also from making any "significant product
enhancements. 33 7 But this creates severe administrability problems. Just
how is the antitrust court or jury supposed to decide which product
enhancements are "significant," or more to the point, how is the incumbent
supposed to be able to predict what a future unknown judge or jury will
later decide was "significant"? Further, what is a court supposed to do if the
incumbent says it is not enhancing the old product but introducing a new
one?
Moreover, to the extent this restriction on product enhancements is
administrable, it is undesirable. It achieves the aim of lessening nonprice
competition that might undermine a price floor at the cost of lessening all
product innovation. Even if the price floor did seem well designed to
337. Edlin, supra note 6, at 945.
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benefit consumer welfare by restraining monopoly pricing, that rarely is as
important as the efficiency benefits of product innovation.338 But where, as
here, the price floor's contribution to consumer welfare is probably harmful
(or at least questionable), there is no sensible reason to sacrifice the
productivity gains of innovation in order to maintain the price floor.
Indeed, under the Edlin approach, a less efficient firm that realizes a
wave of innovation is forthcoming has incentives to enter in order to trigger
the prohibition on incumbent product enhancements. This not only has
undesirable effects on incumbent innovation, it also encourages costly and
inefficient entry by a firm that would not enter but for the ability to freeze
the innovation of others. This is undesirable enough when the innovation
affects only one market. Because innovation in one market in fact often
ends up having applications to other markets and sometimes even redefines
the markets, it raises the even graver concern that a firm in a related market
might enter the incumbent's market to freeze innovation that might pose a
competitive threat in that related market. This worsens the likely effects of
any encouraged entry.
Again, the problem is an unavoidable one. One can leave quality
competition largely unconstrained, which makes the price or output
regulation ineffective at achieving its goal of encouraging entrants but
harms customers by depriving them of the lower price-quality trade-offs
they prefer. Or, one can really ciamp down on quality competition, which
makes the regulation more effective, but at the excessive cost of eliminating
product innovation.
C. Difficulties in Defining the Incumbent Price Floor or
Output Ceiling
The approaches that set the incumbent's post-entry price floor in
relation to the price that would maximize short-term profits raise plain
administrability problems. Determining which price maximizes profits is
highly uncertain and variable over time. True, critics of cost-based tests are
correct that judging incremental costs can also be administratively difficult.
But determining the profit-maximizing price requires determining not just
the costs that were incurred at the marginal output level, but the costs all
along the supply curve at every possible output level. Thus, such profit-
maximizing price floors multiply all the complex problems about projecting
costs, distinguishing between fixed and incremental costs, allocating
common costs, and evaluating capital costs and risk. Worse, determining
the profit-maximizing price also requires ascertaining the incumbent's
demand curve at each price and output point, as well as the extent of
338. See supra Sections IV.C-D.
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incumbent market power, to determine just what price equilibrates marginal
revenue and cost. And determining the incumbent's demand curve
necessitates knowledge not just of total buyer demand at each price (which
will turn not only on their inherent preferences, but their willingness to
switch to substitute products or markets as well), but also of what outputs
and prices rivals would offer at each incumbent price. Further, each of those
curves, and thus the profit-maximizing price, will change from day to day
as market conditions or technologies change.
In short, it is not merely a matter of judgment whether the
administrative problems with any flexible price floor outweigh the
administrative problems with a cost-based rule, even if one does not agree
with my effort in Part II to clarify cost measurements. Any flexible floor
must take into account changing market conditions and consider price-
output possibilities up and down the changing demand and cost curves. A
cost-based rule need only compare, at one actual output point, the
incumbent's price to its actual costs.
Given these difficulties, there is probably no practical way to determine
any difference between an above-cost price and the short-term profit-
maximizing price.339 Firms have trouble enough in making such judgments,
but they are in the business of doing so and in the end are policed by
markets that weed out the firms that tend to guess wrong. Regulators are
not. Worse, if made an antitrust claim, the issue will be left to antitrust
courts that will have even greater difficulty since they are not (like a
regulator might be) a single entity with the expertise and power to
continuously monitor and prospectively approve price levels. Instead,
antitrust courts will be regulating prices through the clumsy vehicle of
adversarial lawsuits that involve varying judges and juries asked to
retroactively assess claims that a particular set of prices was too low. Such a
cumbersome litigation process would be highly burdensome on courts and
impose direct costs that firms would pass on to customers. It would also
cause uncertainty that, to avoid the risk of treble damages, will incline
incumbents to charge higher prices than they otherwise would have, thus
harming consumer welfare.34 °
The U.S. Departments tried to avoid these problems by banning price
cuts only if they are "clearly" or "substantially" lower than the short-term
profit-maximizing price.341 This should make incumbents less risk-averse
339. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234-35 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer,
J.); 3 ARFFDA & HovENKAmp, supra note 15, 736c2, at 381-83; Joskow & Klevorick, szipra note
71, at 255.
340. Antitrust courts have consistently rejected any legal theory that requires them to monitor the
day-to-day reasonableness of prices under changing market conditions as inadministrable for courts,
burdensome on litigation, and too uncertain for business planning. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton
Pottcries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
341. See supra Section I.A.
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about pricing down to their short-term profit-maximizing level. But around
any price floor there will be an inevitable zone of uncertainty. And here the
zone is great because it depends not only on just what adjudication might
conclude about the short-term profit-maximizing level, but also on the
vague terms "clearly" or "substantially," which will likely mean something
different to every adjudicator or juror who applies them. This approach
does not eliminate the ambiguity; it just moves the ambiguity to a different
price point, and worsens the degree of ambiguity to boot.
The U.S. Department of Justice also emphasized that American Airlines
was forgoing an option it had itself decided was more profitable in the short
run.342 But to the extent the rule hinges on the availability of such internal
documents, all it will do is drive profit calculations underground, thus
leaving the rule ineffectual. If it does not hinge on the existence of internal
documents, then the rule will remain inadministrable and uncertain,
deterring incumbents from making desirable price cuts. These effects will
be particularly undesirable in the cases of entry that really matter for the
long run: when the entrant is (or soon will be) just as efficient as the
incumbent.
The European cases may likewise be trying to escape these problems
with their emphasis on the selectivity of the price cuts. 343 But the rationale
for this possible limitation is unclear. If a selective price cut really does not
alter prices elsewhere, it must be because the selected area is its own
market. The price cut is then simply occurring in the market where entry
occurred, which is not much of a limitation. Perhaps the European
authorities have in mind that the selectivity of the price cut means that the
uncut prices in other areas provide an objective benchmark as to what price
level does maximize short-run profits. However, while such selectivity (as
those authorities at points suggested) helps dismiss the possibility that the
price cut was prompted by some cost reduction rather than by entry, the fact
is that the short-term profit-maximizing price in a market with an entrant
will differ from that price in other areas where there is no competitor. So
the selectivity of price cuts cannot avoid the administrability problem of
determining what the short-term profit-maximizing level is. And it adds the
administrability problem of determining just when pricing is sufficiently
"selective" to invoke the rule.
Edlin tries to get around these well-known problems with a flat rule.
The incumbent cannot charge any price lower than its pre-entry price if the
entrant has offered a 20% discount. But this also has serious problems.
Even if the nominal price is clear, the effective price will vary with
differences in service, credit, or delivery associated with the product. There
342. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1152-53, 1155,1181 (D. Kan. 2001).
343. See supra Section LA.
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will also be ambiguities about the nominal price whenever the incumbent
varies prices or sells a variegated product. For example, in the airline
industry that provoked these proposals, a seat on a plane is sold at widely
disparate rates depending on purchaser identity, advance purchase, Saturday
stayovers, restrictions on changes, and the competing demand from
customers in all the other cities that fly through that route. The last factor
means that the price for a seat from the hub city to spoke city A turns not
just on demand for travel between the hub and spoke A, but also on demand
for travel between spoke cities B-Z and spoke city A.3" There is no one
single price to pick. If courts tried to pick an average price, they would raise
prices for the whole array (roughly half) of customers who otherwise would
have paid a lower price. Similar problems would apply if the incumbent
varied financing or credit terms for different buyers.
These problems are multiplied by the need to compare the pre-entry
incumbent schedule of prices to entrant prices to determine whether the
entrant prices are 20% lower. Indeed, the need for that comparison
introduces a new problem: The entrant product might be of lower quality.
Edlin recognizes that this will require a quality adjustment to determine
whether the entrant has offered a "20% quality-adjusted discount."3 45 These
quality adjustments are significant enough that a 25%-40% price difference
only "probably" qualifies as a 20% discount.346 But once one introduces
this vague assessment of quality adjustments, any supposed administrative
simplicity vanishes. The problem is even worse if one resorts to Edlin's
alternative standard that the entry has offered a "substantial" discount,34 7 a
vague placeholder whose definition can vary widely from tribunal to
tribunal.
More importantly, to the extent the pre-entry price and 20% discount
trigger can be established, setting a price floor for the incumbent (and price
ceiling for the entrant) has obvious inefficiencies. Prices in all markets vary
with rapidly changing costs, technologies, and demand. Requiring firms to
stick to price floors and ceilings thus rapidly produces inefficiency. For
example, if demand or costs go up sharply, it might be efficient for the
entrant to raise its prices. But it may not do so because going above a price
20% below the pre-entry incumbent price will free the incumbent from its
own price floor. The entrant will thus bear some inefficiency in its pricing
to get the benefits of imposing an inefficient price on the incumbent. From
the incumbent's perspective, the existence of the entrant is only one factor
that might influence its pricing. To set a price floor at pre-entry levels
344. See supra Section IlI.A.
345. Edlin, supra note 6, at 982.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 945, 967.
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ignores all the other reasons for lowering prices, like technological changes
or drops in demand or costs. This will invariably produce inefficiency.
One need only recall all the distortions under Nixon's wage and price
controls, which caused inefficiencies that took the rest of the decade to sort
out. Or consider specifically the airline industry that provoked these
proposals. There, costs routinely change sharply with shifts in fuel or labor
costs and demand not only varies with economic cycles but predictably
varies seasonally. Sometimes the shifts are even sharper. Imagine how
disastrous it would have been to freeze airline prices right before the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically reduced demand for
airline flights. Further, freezing into place inefficient prices on a route
between the hub city and spoke city A not only causes inefficiency in that
market, but spreads inefficiency to all the connecting flights from spokes B-
Z to the hub that in part transport customers who travel on to spoke A.
Edlin attempts to address the problem of changing market conditions in
two ways. First, he allows for an exception when after-entry costs fall
"dramatically," which he defines as falling by at least 20%.348 But this does
not alter the inefficiency of the price floor for any cost reduction below
20%, nor the inefficiency of the effective price ceiling on the entrant if
costs increase. Nor does it alter the inefficiency of the price floor (and
ceiling) if there have been changes in demand rather than cost. And it
renders the Edlin restriction ineffectual whenever costs do go down by 20%
or more.
Second, Edlin sets a twelve- to eighteen-month outside limit on his ban
on reactive price cuts.3 49 But this does not eliminate the problem during that
twelve- to eighteen-month period. Any changes in market conditions that
do occur will make the short-term pricing freeze inefficient. Nixon's wage
and price freeze, after all, only lasted three months.350 Moreover, setting the
twelve- to eighteen-month outside limit only reinforces the long-run futility
of the ban on reactive price cuts, and, if the moment of entry is defined to
be when entry is first foreseeable to make the restrictions effective, this
may mean the restriction expires before the entrant even sells its product.
35
1
The Williamson rule might seem to be a flat rule like the Edlin rule,
only substituting pre-entry output for pre-entry price. But, seeing one of the
problems of changing market conditions, Williamson recognizes that such a
flat rule would be a disaster if demand increased. So, in the end, he
348. Id. at 970-
349. Id. at 945-46, 969.
350. See JACK E. MEYER, WAGE-PRICE STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC POLICY 67 (1982). The
additional problems created by the more flexible wage and price controls applied in the months after
the freeze was lifted give testament to the difficulty of making price adjustments based on changing
economic conditions. Id. at 67-69.
351. See supra Section V.A.
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proposes that the output ceiling be "demand adjusted., 352 But this creates
all sorts of new problems. Just how is one supposed to know how much of
an adjustment in output to make when demand has increased? Williamson
tries to get around this problem in various ways.
353
First, Williamson suggests projecting future demand from past trends.
But there is no reason to think this chartist approach works any better for
projecting demand than for predicting future stock prices. Demand goes up
and down depending on changes in consumer income, preferences,
innovation, prices, and quality, as well as on the availability, price, and
quality of substitutes. Courts cannot accurately project future demand from
a past trend. Nor will that inquiry give an unambiguous answer since every
trend will depend on the dates one picks and adjustments one makes. 354 In
any event, the extent to which increased demand will justify increased
output depends on the intersection of that new demand curve with the
incumbent's cost curve. Thus, adjusting for demand cannot avoid the
problems of inquiry into costs; rather, it multiplies them by requiring
inquiry up and down the cost-output curve. Perhaps most worrisome,
limiting future output based on past demand trends discourages incumbents
from making investments in innovation and product improvements
designed to accelerate any trend of increased demand.
Second, given inaccuracies in trend projection, Williamson changes his
test to allow an output increase up to 10% above the projected demand. But
this 10% buffer makes his restriction ineffective at protecting entrants (and
thus unambiguously harmful) when demand has not increased by that
amount. Further, it has the same flaw as the U.S. Departments' approach. It
does not eliminate the ambiguity; it just moves the ambiguity to a new
point. Now the ambiguity will be about whether or not the incumbent is at a
point 10% above an ambiguous demand-adjusted output. These ambiguities
are worsened if, as Williamson did in response to criticism, one varies the
percentage buffer from case to case based on the estimated degree of
projection error.3 5
Third, Williamson says that when predatory pricing is alleged in one of
many multiple geographic markets, then a simple comparison will tell us
whether output in one of those markets has increased "disproportionately."
352- Williamson, supra note 7, at 305-06, 333-34.
353. Id. at 305-06.
354. Williamson suggests relying on internal incumbent records. But since incumbents do not
have a crystal ball either, they will often err in their projections. This is not so costly when firms can
adjust to future realities, but if firms are bound by projections, even when erroneous, the costs are
much higher. It is not clear why we want to visit such high antitrust penalties on those projections that
do not pan out. Further, any rule based on incumbent documents simply invites the strategic drafting of
documents in response to the rule. Although Williamson assumes firms will set actual output and
prices in response to legal rules, he is oddly dismissive of the notion that they will take the less costly
tack of changing the wording of their documents in response to legal rules. Id. at 305-06, 333-34.
355. Williamson, supra note 80, at 1192 n.40.
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Obviously, that only applies when the incumbent is in multiple geographic
markets and has monopoly power only in some. And even when it does
apply, the ambiguities remain great. It will generally be unclear whether
one can properly analogize between demand in different geographic
markets. They have different consumers with different consumer
preferences and incomes. Quality might differ. The markets might have
different input costs, or different degrees of market power, both of which
influence prices and thus affect realized demand for the good. Likewise,
substitutes might differ in price and quality, and often their availability will
differ because some geographic markets are further from substitutes than
others. There is thus no general reason to think that demand will rise by the
same amount in different geographic markets, or that courts can accurately
quantify the differences. And all these ambiguities are exacerbated if the
court is asked whether the difference is "disproportionate," which will
mean varying things to varying judges and jurors.
True, these problems are somewhat reduced because, like Edlin,
Williamson sets a twelve- to eighteen-month limit on his rule. But this does
not eliminate the problem during that period, and it reinforces the long-term
futility of the restriction. There are also other problems. Although
Williamson adjusts for an increase in demand, he makes no adjustment for
a decrease in costs, even though that too would indicate the efficiency of an
expansion in output. Furthermore, where a product is variegated or
changing, it may be difficult to determine what even the baseline pre-entry
"output" was. The Williamson rule raises particularly difficult problems
when a firm responds to an output ceiling by introducing a "new" product
that is similar to the old product, but varies from it somewhat.
But the problem is not with these particular adjustments. The problem
is that no effort to tweak these restrictions can eliminate the underlying
problems. Those problems are rather an inherent consequence of trying to
regulate incumbent pricing or output. There are two basic methods of
implementing such regulation.356 One can, like Edlin, use a bright-line rule
that, as stated, is over- and underinclusive and thus sacrifices facial
correlation to the factors that affect its social desirability in light of
changing market conditions. Or one can, like the European doctrine, the
U.S. Departments, and Williamson, use a standard that correlates better to
such social desirability criteria but cannot be applied as precisely, and thus
will also be over- and underinclusive in actual application. Whichever
method one chooses, the regulated price will often fail to reflect changing
market conditions accurately and thus produce additional inefficiencies.
356. See Stephen MeG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge Abou Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 261,267-79 (1993).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112: 681
Above-Cost Price Cuts
D. Conclusion on Implementation Difficulties
The fundamental problems posed by restrictions on above-cost pricing
are exacerbated by other problems whose precise nature varies with the
specific restriction but that cannot be avoided in one form or the other. The
moment of entry that begins the period of restriction will either be defined
in a way that makes the price restriction ineffectual, or in a way that makes
the period of price restriction longer than the period of entrant pricing,
exacerbating its adverse effects on pricing and innovation. Quality changes
will either be left unregulated, which makes the price restriction even more
ineffectual and encourages inefficiently high levels of quality, or will also
be restrained, squelching desirable innovation. The price floor will either be
fixed, freezing prices at levels that become inefficient as market conditions
change, or uncertain, causing similar inefficiencies because of imprecise
application and driving up prices because of risk aversion. All these are
serious adverse effects that make it even less likely that the restrictions will
have beneficial effects.
VI. THE BAUMOL BAN ON IMPERMANENT REACTIVE PRICE CUTS
Professor Baumol offers a somewhat different rule from those that
would prohibit certain reactive above-cost price cuts. He would allow an
incumbent monopolist to make reactive price cuts, but forbid those reduced
prices from being raised after the entrant leaves the market unless costs or
demand have changed.357 He would apply this price ceiling for a quasi-
permanent period, and suggests five years as a possible choice. 358 This rule
would not make any reactive above-cost price cuts themselves illegal, but
the Baumol rule would mean that making a reactive above-cost price cut
subjects incumbents to a regime of price regulation that itself imposes costs
on them. In particular, it forces incumbents to keep in place a price that
might become less profitable if antitrust courts do not correctly adjust for
changes in market conditions. Baumol's rule thus amounts to a restriction
on reactive above-cost price cuts with a unique penalty. The penalty would
not be standard antitrust damages. The penalty is instead whatever costs are
associated with triggering the equivalent of quasi-permanent monopoly rate
regulation.
Edlin argues that the Baumol rule should be rejected because it does not
fit the standard Grinnell definition of prohibiting conduct that tends to
create or maintain monopoly power by excluding rivals. 359 Instead, Edlin
357. Baumol, supra note 7, at 4-6.
358. Id. at 8.
359. Edlin, supra note 6, at 978.
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argues, the Baumol rule prohibits a price increase that, if anything, would
encourage entry that might end the monopoly power. But the Baumol rule
does not really prohibit price increases simpliciter. It prohibits impermanent
reactive price cuts. Thus, if its effects were desirable, one could easily
square the Baumol rule with the standard legal definition. One need only
say that impermanent reactive price cuts are not deemed "competition on
the merits," but rather are deemed strategic anticompetitive pricing to
exclude rivals, whereas quasi-permanent reactive price cuts are deemed
"competition on the merits" since they only drive out entrants through
means that confer enduring benefits on consumers. As usual, whether or not
we treat the conduct in question (an impermanent reactive above-cost price
cut) as "competition on the merits" must turn not on conclusory legal labels
but on a close analysis of whether banning that conduct on balance has
desirable consequences.360 Once that analysis is completed, the legal label
should follow.
A. Post-Entry Effects
Post-entry, there are two possible scenarios. One possibility is that the
costs of triggering quasi-permanent rate regulation will be sufficiently high
that the incumbent will be deterred from cutting prices as much as it
otherwise would have. In this case, the Baumol rule effectively sets a post-
entry incumbent price floor, and the effects are the same as considered in
Part IV.
The other possibility is that the cost of triggering rate regulation will
not deter the monopolist from cutting prices. 3 6 1 In this case, the long-term
post-entry effects might be favorable, because, after the entrant has exited,
the monopolist will have to keep prices at that lower level for some quasi-
permanent period. Thus, one cannot say of the Baumol proposal, as one can
of the others, that it is necessarily futile in the long run. This apparent
advantage is, however, more than compensated for by the fact that such a
long-term price ceiling creates even worse implementation difficulties and
adverse incentive effects.
B. Implementation and Incentive Problems
To avoid problems in defining entrants, Baumol ultimately triggers his
rule by exit rather than entry. His price ceiling applies "to any firm whose
low prices are suspected of having driven its competitor from the field,
360. See supra Section I.B.
361. See Edlin, supra note 6, at 978-79.
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whether or not that competitor was a recent entrant." 362 But this exit test
raises many new problems. First, the fact of exit can be unclear or invite
strategic manipulation. What happens if a price cut does not drive a rival
out of the market but reduces it to a crippled fringe size? If that does not
count as an exit because the firm is still "in the field," then an incumbent
will have incentives to inefficiently decline to service some set of
customers in order to leave entrants in business. And if small entrants do
not count, courts have to define just what the size threshold is.
Second, the cause of exit will often be unclear and yet so plausibly
connected to rival price as to make the Baumol rule ubiquitous. Firms exit
markets all the time. Their exits have multiple causes that are difficult to
sort out, an uncertainty only worsened by a test based on whether a causal
link to the price cut is "suspected." Indeed, failed firms always could
plausibly connect their exit to their rivals' prices. After all, presumably at
some price they would have stayed in the market. Do we really want every
firm exit to trigger rate regulation of any remaining firms in that market that
have market power? 363 That undermines normal market competition since,
in most cases, firms have market power precisely because they are more
efficient and thus able to charge lower prices than their rivals.
Third, even if we know we have a qualifying exit, we must define the
precise moment of exit that determines when, and at what price, the cap is
triggered. What happens if the incumbent increases prices just before the
entrant exits? Baumol allows the incumbent to rescind a price cut if the
entrant is still "alive and well," but that raises difficult questions about just
how well the entrant has to be.36 In practice, there will be varying prices
during any period of incumbent-entrant competition. It will be unclear what
time to use as the baseline, and choosing any particular time invites
strategic manipulation.
Even if exit issues are resolved, defining the price and product on the
exit date can be hard when both are variegated, and when associated terms
influence the effective price. The incumbent also has incentives to
introduce a related "new" product to evade the ceiling, 365 requiring an
unwelcome choice between allowing evasion and clamping down on new
innovations. Further, after that date, demand shifts will require changing the
price ceiling, with all the problems described above for the Williamson
362. Baumol, supra note 7, at 6 n.17 (emphasis added).
363. Baumol does not limit his proposal to monopoly cases but includes any oligopoly market in
which firms have market power. See id. at 5 n. 15.
364. d.at4n.12.
365. Baumol would prohibit withdrawal of the old product, id. at 9 n.24, but that raises difficult
enforcement problems. How arc courts to decide how many sales of the old product must be made,
whether sales and advertising have become insufficiently enthusiastic, or whether service and delivery
have become too surly?
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approach.366 Likewise, cost shifts will require changes with all the problems
of rate regulation noted for the profit-maximizing price floors.367 But the
problems are even worse. If the price ceiling is mistakenly set too low, it
can make the incumbent lose money and even drive it out of business
entirely. Further, if a mistakenly set price ceiling reduces incumbent output,
by hypothesis there will be no entrant to take up the slack in output.
Finally, trying to maintain the price regulation for a quasi-permanent
period of five years exacerbates the problems created by changing market
conditions. True, one could try (and Baumol is open to) other specifications
of the period of price restraint.368 Professors Joskow and Klevorick, for
example, basically adopt the Baumol rule but change the period of quasi-
permanence to two years. 369 But the quicker the price ceiling expires, the
more ineffectual the rule. Thus, the underlying problem remains that, no
matter what specification one makes, one faces the problem of greater
inefficiencies the longer the period is and greater ineffectualness the shorter
the period is.
To try to get around these line-drawing problems, Baumol allows price
increases as long as they are within an "order of magnitude" of the claimed
increase in demand or costs. 3 70 By now this gambit should be familiar, and
it has the same problem as the efforts to avoid line-drawing by saying a
price or output has to "clearly," "substantially," or "disproportionately"
exceed some benchmark. 371 All these rules move the ambiguity to a new
point but cannot eliminate it. And they do so at the cost of making the
posited rule ineffectual. Baumol presumably does not mean the
mathematical definition of an order of magnitude since that would allow
any price increase as long as it was within a multiple of ten of the posited
increase in demand or costs, and would really make the rule ineffectual. But
whatever meaning is given to the term, some trade-off of harmful effects
remains.
Where the Baumol price ceiling most exacerbates the types of concerns
considered above is in its adverse effects on innovation. Like the price
floors, a price ceiling will induce quality changes to evade the price
restrictions that arc inefficient and would not otherwise have been tried. But
now the incumbent can be expected to try to evade the price ceiling by
366. See supra Section V.C.
367. See supra Section V.C. The Baumol rule does not set a ceiling at the profit-maximizing level
but raises similar problems, because it effectively sets a ceiling at whatever price level creates the same
profitability as the reactive price cut.
368. Leaving the period defined as "quasi-permanent" would be utterly vague and would worsen
uncertainty problems.
369. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 71, at 255 (applying it to reactive price cuts above average
total cost).
370. Baumnol, supra note 7, at 7.
371. See supra Section V.C.
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making its product worse through cheaper production, so that it can still
earn a monopoly profit, which not only creates an inefficient price-quality
trade-off but degrades product quality. Even more problematic is the case
where the price ceiling cannot effectively be evaded. Then, any investment
in innovations to improve the product in a way to make it more valuable to
consumers will be discouraged because the incumbent will not be able to
raise prices to reflect that extra value and recoup the cost of that investment.
Such a lowering of productive innovation is likely to be far more
detrimental than any gain in allocative efficiency. 72
C. ExAnte Effects
The Baumol ban on impermanent reactive above-cost price cuts, if
anything, will offer even less encouragement to entry than the various
restrictions on reactive above-cost price cuts. If entrants foresee that the
rule will not prevent incumbents from cutting prices to a level that will
drive them out, the rule cannot encourage entry at all. If entrants instead
foresee that the rule will effectively impose a price floor on the incumbent,
then it will have the same effect as the proposals of Edlin, Williamson, or
the Departments. The long-term futility of protecting less efficient firms
means that their entry will hardly be encouraged, and the rule provides no
encouragement (and possibly some discouragement) to the more efficient
firms that would otherwise enter.
The Baumol rule is even less likely to create incentives for ex ante limit
pricing than the other rules because it offers less encouragement to entry.
Indeed, since the incumbent retains the option of driving out the entrant
with a reactive price cut that amounts to an ex post limit price, it is hard to
see why the incumbent would ever adopt that limit price ex ante. 373 They
would be better off charging a monopoly price and imposing a limit price
only for a quasi-permanent period after entry, rather than charging a limit
price every day. Not only would the reactive strategy mean that incumbents
would get to charge a monopoly price rather than a limit price on more
days, it also means that incumbents are less likely to impose a limit price
that is unnecessarily low because incumbents imagine entrants might be
more efficient than they turn out to be. Instead, incumbents can impose just
the right post-entry limit price to drive out the entrant.
Finally, when entry occurs, and incumbents respond with price cuts that
trigger a long-term price ceiling, the Baumol rule discourages innovation
and investments by the incumbent in product improvement or, even worse,
372. See supra Subsection IV.C.1.
373. Edlin reaches the same conclusion that the Baumol rule will never induce ex ante limit
pricing, but does so based on different reasoning. Edlin, supra note 6, at 979.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
encourages product degradation. The problem is not just that this will occur
post-entry, but that the prospect of such an ex post restriction on incumbent
prices will reduce each firm's ex ante incentives to make the investments of




Both recent and longstanding analysis supporting a ban on above-cost
predatory pricing requires a better response than current scholarship has so far
given for why predatory pricing should be restricted to below-cost prices. This
Article endeavors to provide that response by showing why efforts to restrict
above-cost reactive price cuts are likely to be futile and harmful.
One reason is that reactive above-cost prices often do not protect
incumbent market power at all, but rather are a normal competitive
response to an entrant who has undermined a competitive schedule of
discriminatory prices that maximized total output given common costs. This
is particularly true in the airline industry, which provoked the recent
proposals to restrict reactive above-cost price cuts. Airlines that operate
hub-and-spoke systems incur common costs that cut across their different
routes, and although on some routes their market share and prices may
appear high, they are in sufficiently vigorous competition with other
airlines that they earn no positive economic profits. Thus, it is likely that
their price discrimination among different routes reflects not market power
and an ability to reap supracompetitive profits, but rather their competitive
adoption of the schedule of discriminatory prices that maximizes the total
output of their hub-and-spoke systems. Reactive price cuts in response to
entry that undermines that output-maximizing schedule of prices is a natural
competitive response, and efforts to prevent such price cuts would likely
have the adverse consequence of increasing prices along the rest of the hub-
and-spoke system, reducing the total output of the hub-and-spoke system,
and harming aggregate consumer welfare.
Even when incumbents do have market power, restrictions on their
ability to adopt reactive above-cost price cuts are unlikely to achieve the
objective of encouraging and protecting entry because less efficient entrants
cannot survive in the long run, and entrants who are (or will predictably
become) more efficient need no encouragement or protection. Further, such
restrictions will have harmful effects by raising prices and lowering
productive efficiency during any period of price restriction, inflicting
wasteful transition and entry costs, as well as distorting innovation and
price flexibility in response to changing market conditions. And the
374. See supra Section IV.D.
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restrictions will discourage the creation of more efficient incumbents and
entrants, which is ultimately far more important.
This analysis reaffirms the wisdom of the position that antitrust law
should not recognize any claim of above-cost predatory pricing. It also
helps specify just what should count as costs. Costs should be defined in
whatever way assures that an incumbent pricing at cost could not deter or
drive out an equally efficient entrant. This test should be met by a cost
measure that includes all costs that are varied by the allegedly predatory
increase in output, since short-term threats or pricing strategies that exceed
short-term costs should not be able to deter long-term investments or entry.
Alternatively, if short-term pricing could deter such long-term decisions,
this test would be met by a cost measure that reflected the magnitude of
predator costs for the sorts of costs that are variable to the rival during the
period of entry or investment decisions influenced by the short-term
existence or threat of such pricing.
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